REPORT

UPON THE

ACCIDENTS WHICH HAVE OCCURRED ON

RAILWAYS

DURING THE YEAR

1856.

Railway Department, Board of Trade,
                                         Whitehall, I0th February 1857.
My Lords,    

I have the honour to lay  before you the following Report upon the Accidents which have occurred on Railways during the year 1856.

From the returns made to this Department by Railway Companies, it would appear that, in 1856, 281 persons were killed and 394 injured on Railways in Great Britain and Ireland.    (See Appendix No. 1. Table No. 1.)

Of this number, 112 persons have been killed and 16 injured who were neither passengers nor servants of the Railway
Companies; 142 killed, and 80 injured, were servants of Railway Companies, or persons employed on the railways under contractors ; 27 killed and 298 injured were passengers.

Accidents to Persons who were neither Passengers nor Servants of Railway Companies.

Of this class one hundred and twelve have been killed and sixteen injured during the year.

A further classification of these shows that two of those who were killed committed suicide. Sixty-seven were killed and seven injured while trespassing on railways. Twenty-eight persons were killed and two injured at level crossings. One person was killed and two were injured whilst standing on a bridge which was struck and thrown down by a load on a train. One person, not in the service of a company, was killed by the breaking of the chain of a crane, with which he was loading stones at a station.

Eleven persons who had come to railway stations on business were killed and five were injured from being run over or struck by trains in motion.

Accidents to Servants of Railway Companies or Persons employed on Railways.

There have been reported to this Department by the Railway Companies the cases of one hundred and forty-two servants killed and eighty injured during the year. Of these, thirty were killed and forty-six were injured from causes beyond their own control, and one hundred and twelve were killed and thirty-four were injured owing to their own misconduct or want of caution.

From these reports it would appear, that of those servants of companies or of contractors who suffered from causes beyond their own control, twenty were killed and thirty-nine injured from accidents to trains or engines, two were killed and two injured whilst shunting trains, and seven were killed and five injured from being run over or struck by trains whilst in the proper performance of their duties, and one man, a guard, was killed in consequence of coming in contact with a bridge.

Of those servants who suffered from want of caution, or misconduct on their own part, five were killed and three injured from accidents to trains, caused principally by their misconduct ; twelve were killed and seven injured by being crushed between buffers or run over whilst coupling or uncoupling carriages or waggons in motion ; forty-five were killed and two injured whilst crossing or standing upon the railway, ten were killed and four injured while shunting trains, twelve were killed and six injured whilst working upon the line, these were principally plate-layers and labourers; twenty-six were killed and twelve injured by falling from or in attempting to get upon or off trains in motion, and two guards were killed by coming in contact with bridges.

A large number of servants of railway companies suffer annually from being crushed between the buffers of carriages and waggons which they are employed in coupling together. The system in use on railways in this country for connecting carriages and waggons in a train has some imperfections which will be further alluded to in a subsequent place.

Accidents to Passengers.

Of the passengers who suffered on railways, 8 were killed and 282 injured from causes beyond their own control, and 19 were killed and 16 injured from want of caution on their own part.

The accidents by which passengers were killed from causes beyond their own control are as follow:—

In England,—

One passenger was killed on the East Lancashire Railway, in consequence of a train leaving the rails at a contractor's temporary crossing on a curve, on the Bacup Branch near Alderbottom, owing principally to a defective check rail.

One was killed at the Albion Station on the Stour Valley section of the London and North Western Railway, in consequence of a collision between a passenger train and a goods train.   

One was killed at the Denton Station on the London and North Western Railway, in consequence of a collision between an engine and a passenger train.

Two were killed on the Newport, Abergavenny, and Hereford Railway, in consequence of an express train leaving the rails when passing round a curve near the Nantyderry Station, when some of the carriages, being thrown on to the adjacent line of rails, were run into by a goods train which approached in the opposite direction.

Two were killed in consequence of a collision between a goods train and a passenger train, which was being shunted at the Church Fenton Station on the North Eastern Railway.

Under this head may also be classed a female passenger who was killed whilst crossing the Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railway at the Cottam Station.

In Scotland and Ireland there were no passengers killed from causes beyond their own control.

Of the 282 passengers injured from causes beyond their own control, 257 were injured in consequence of collisions between the trains in which they were being conveyed, and other trains or waggons, 5 from trains entering stations at too high a speed, 19 from accidents to machinery, and l was injured by stepping out of a train, which had stopped on a bridge before arriving at a station, and falling over the parapet.

It will be seen by the foregoing statement of the accidents to passengers from causes beyond their own control, that, with the exception of one passenger killed and one injured, the whole were killed and injured from accidents which happened to trains.

The proportion of passengers who have been killed and injured to the number of passengers conveyed on railways during the year cannot be shown, inasmuch as the traffic returns for the half-year ending the 31 st of December 1856 have not been received from the Railway Companies. But the table on the following page exhibits the proportion between the number of passengers who have suffered on railways and the number conveyed for each of the thirteen half-years ending the 30th June 1856, as well as the ratio of persons who have suffered to the number conveyed per mile of railway open.

The general average here shown is not, however, divided equally over all the lines of railway. Some Railway Companies have carried the traffic with a greater degree of safety than others, and upon certain lines no accidents have occurred during the last six years. Tables exhibiting the proportion which the number of passengers killed and injured from causes beyond their own control bear to the traffic on the several railways are given in Appendix No. 1. Tables 3. & 4.

Your Lordships have deemed it necessary to cause inquiries to be made by the  Inspecting Officers  of this  Department into   the causes  of seventy-one accidents during the year 1856. The nature of the accidents and the causes to which they are assigned in the Report have been classified and are exhibited generally in the table on page 10. A more detailed classification is contained in Appendix No. 2.

Of the seventy-one accidents which have been reported upon by the Inspecting Officers during 1856, it would appear that in seven cases only were the accidents attributable to circumstances which could not be guarded against; and that in only three of the cases were the accidents solely to be attributed to such circumstances.

In twenty-seven instances, the negligence of the inferior servants entered into the cause of the accident, but only six of these cases were attributable solely to negligence.

The remaining causes of accident may be classed under the following heads:—
The principal causes of accident under the several heads are as follow:

Defects in the Construction of Works or of Rolling Stock.

It is worthy of remark, that none of the accidents which occurred during 1856 were due to the permanent way being in a really defective condition. The immunity from accident on this ground appears to be attributable to the great attention which has been given by Engineers to the subject of permanent way, and to the introduction of the fished joint, and of other improved methods of connecting the rails at the joints. One of the accidents, however, shows that the continuous connection afforded by the fished joint may give rise to accidents if not properly attended to. A train on the North Eastern Railway ran off the line near Sherburn in consequence of the line having been thrown out of gauge by the expansion of the rails, from the heat of the sun, upon a portion of line on which the fish joint was used which was not properly " boxed up" with ballast.

On the London and North Western Railway a train left the rails near Warrington, from being run at too high a speed on a newly laid portion of railway. And an engine ran off the line on the same railway near Watford, in consequence, it was stated, of the super elevation of the outer rail on a curve not having been sufficient for the speed at which the engine was travelling.

Ten accidents occurred at facing points :—

In eight cases the points were on the self-acting principle, and it was the usual custom in these cases to run the trains through the points without their being held: and on the occasions in question the trains ran on to the wrong-line. Of these accidents the worst was at Dunkitt, on the Waterford and Limerick Railway, where the mail train ran through self-acting points into a ballast siding ; the self-acting principle having failed, owing to the switches not having been oiled, and having been left in a neglected state. Another of the accidents due to this cause occurred at Deptford, on the South Eastern Railway, in consequence of the Greenwich train, just after it started from the platform, having passed through self-acting points on to the wrong line ; after the train had proceeded for a short distance, it came into collision with a train approaching in an opposite direction. The remaining accidents were generally similar to these, and the details will be found in the Appendix.

The use of facing points on railways has always been a fertile source of accident, and the additional experience which is daily acquired on the subject shows that the self-acting principle cannot be safely trusted on a main line of railway, but that facing points when passed by trains at any speed should always be held, pinned, or locked in position: and that it is very desirable, especially at junctions, that the signal should invariably be attached to facing points, to indicate clearly to the engine-driver the direction for which they are set.

In two cases, viz., on the London and Blackwall Railway at Shadwell, and on the London and South Western Railway at Basingstoke, the carriages were stopped after dark at a point short of the station, and in each case a passenger, thinking the train had stopped at the station, stepped from the train and fell over a viaduct. It appeared that in the case of long trains carriages were frequently liable to be stopped at these places. The accidents were mainly attributable to the absence of railings along these viaducts.

The fracture of the couplings caused a serious accident on the London and North Western Railway near Wolverton. A very large number of the servants of Railway Companies have suffered from being crushed between the buffers while engaged in coupling carriages together. The present system of coupling carriages together, and the use of side buffers, contains defects and inconveniences, and is the frequent cause of accidents to the servants of the Companies. Either a single central connection, consisting of a buffer and drawbar in one, as is adopted on American railways, and on the Dublin and Kingstown Railway, or an arrangement by which the connection should be made at the buffers and be self-acting, is desirable. But the large amount of railway stock in existence which would require alteration in ease of the introduction of an improved system renders the adoption of any new arrangements a matter of great expense and difficulty.

The use of open carriages caused the death of a passenger on the Ulster Railway. Open carriages on railways are dangerous, unhealthy, and uncomfortable ; and it is very much to be regretted that Railway Companies continue to use them.
The practice of placing passengers who prefer to travel at low fares, in uncomfortable carriages, and of throwing impediments in the way of their travelling, for the purpose of forcing them to travel in carriages of a higher class is unfortunately very common ; it is a short-sighted policy, as it is from the conveyance of numbers that the chief profits of Railway Companies must come. To encourage the habit of travelling, second and third class carriages should be made comfortable, and require a minimum of attendance, whilst carriages of a superior description should be provided for those who are willing to pay a higher rate for privacy and luxury.

Inadequacy of Means for securing Safety.

Amongst the accidents attributable to this cause may be mentioned one which occurred near Hull, on the North Eastern Railway, in which a bridge was pulled down by a crane which was being moved along the line in a truck; one boy who was on the bridge was killed, and two other boys were injured. This accident was attributable to the absence of a standard at the Hull Station for measuring the height of loads placed on trucks.

One accident occurred on the London and North Western Railway on the 4th January in consequence of the engine of a goods train which was standing in a siding having been moved so far forward as to stand partly on the main line. In former years several accidents have occurred from this cause, and consequent!}-the Inspecting Officers invariably require, in the case of new railways, that sidings shall terminate in a blind siding, with points which require to be held open to allow the trains to pass on to the main line, or that chock blocks, to be kept locked, should be fixed to each siding.

The want of accommodation for the requirements of the traffic has entered into the causes of five accidents.

Two collisions occurred at the Bishopsgate Station of the Eastern Counties Railway which are mainly attributable to the want of sufficient room at that Station for the accommodation of the traffic; and a collision occurred at the Dunfermline Station on the Edinburgh, Perth, and Dundee Railway, which was partly attributable to the practice of shunting trains on the single line by which the Station is approached. The Inspecting Officer recommended the Company to double this portion of railway.

In connection with this subject it is to be observed that a large number of the accidents from collision, viz.: twenty-three out of thirty-four, have occurred between passenger and goods, cattle, or mineral trains. The fact of trains being timed to pass each other on lines of railway must, if any one of the trains  is  late, be  always  productive  of a  degree  of unpunctuality,   which increases with the number of trains concerned. Unpunctuality is a great source of danger as well as of inconvenience and expense. But since the causes which prevent the time laid down in a time table from being rigidly adhered to in practice are very numerous, and are in many cases not under the control of the best management, it becomes necessary to consider whether some system does not exist by which the evils which unpunctuality gives rise to with a large traffic can in some degree be mitigated. On some of the main lines of railway the traffic has grown so large as to require from 20 to 25, or possibly more, trains in each direction in 24 hours. With such a traffic the delays of slow trains, which are kept waiting in sidings for the passage of an unpunctual fast train, become productive of great inconvenience and expense, and by complicating very seriously the whole traffic of the railway, become a frequent cause of accident. The difficulties of working have assumed so much importance on the London and North Western Railway as to have induced the Company to entertain the question of adding a third line of rails between Bletchley and London. And if traffic continues to increase in the ratio in which it has recently increased, there can be no doubt that the same course must eventually be pursued in other localities. But it is desirable to postpone for as long as possible so large an extra expenditure of capital, and to utilize to the utmost the instrument which already exists ; and it is probable that a more extended use of the electric telegraph would afford the necessary means, in connection with an adequate amount of siding accommodation, for so assisting the working of railways as to prevent some of the inconveniences of unpunctuality, and obviate the necessity, for a certain time, of constructing additional lines of rails.

The mode of working by means of the electric telegraph to which I refer is that which I have already described in another report to your Lordships as in use on the New York and Erie Railway in the United States. This system is as follows:—The line is divided into as many sections as the requirements of the traffic render necessary ; upon each section, in some convenient situation, is placed an officer, called a "Train Despatcher," to whom the time at which every train arrives at, departs from, or passes each station is telegraphed.

Thus the train despatcher has continually before him the position of every train on the line, which he lays down upon a diagram board prepared for the purpose.

So long as the trains are working in accordance with the time-table, this officer does not interfere ; but when he observes that a train is delayed so much that it will have an influence upon the movements of some other train, he sends a message, distinctly expressed, through the clerks at the nearest available stations, to the engine drivers and conductors of both trains, to alter the place of passing fixed in the time table, thus furnishing them with a revised time-table. The message sent by the train despatcher is followed by the signal, "How do you understand this ?" and the order is not to be obeyed until the train despatcher has signalled back to say that the conductor's version is correct.

The train despatcher is thus enabled to prevent the useless delay of trains, and to compensate for the impediments arising from the variations of weather, and other accidental circumstances, which prevent a time-table from being rigidly adhered to. If from any cause he fails to send a message, the only result is that the trains are delayed to the same extent as would have been the case if there had been no telegraph.

This system is chiefly adopted in America to work single lines of railway, but it is used also on double lines, and might always be applied with advantage to regulate the movements of trains, and prevent delays on double lines of railway, which are required to accommodate a large mixed traffic, where fast passenger trains, or special cattle trains, are timed to pass slow trains; when ignorance of the position of a train often causes great delay and consequent expense, and also increases the chances of accident. This system is one which Mr. M'Callum, the Superintendent of the New York and Erie Railway, states would enable him to work a larger traffic over a single line of railway, than he could work over a double line without it; and it therefore deserves the careful consideration of the managers of those English railways on which the traffic is so large.

The absence of proper signals is stated to have been the cause of fifteen accidents.

In the case of the accident at Longton on the North Staffordshire Railway, it appeared that the station signals were not lighted at night, although trains were timed to stop at the station.

On the Newcastle and Carlisle Railway, an accident occurred at the Four-stones Station. The station was protected by a signal, which was habitually used to give notice to trains to stop to take on waggons at the station; this signal was exhibited on the occasion in question, but a curve in the line prevented the engine-driver from seeing the obstruction on the line, and when he became aware of it, he could not stop so as to avoid a collision.

In the case of an accident on the Midland Railway, at the Holmes Junction, the inspecting officer called attention to the practice of placing only one semaphore at the junction to apply to both lines of railway, distant signals,  worked from the junction, being placed at some distance from the junction along each line; the usual practice on other railways being to provide at the junction, in addition to the distant signals, a semaphore to apply to each line.

There can be no doubt that the arrangement in question will on occasions be productive of doubt in the mind of an engine-driver, and that, if a junction is to be worked safely, it is necessary to provide at least separate main signals and distant signals for each line of railway along which trains approach the junction.

Of the accidents in which the absence or insufficiency of signals has been commented upon, eight had reference to distant signals.

The high speeds at which heavy trains are run on railways make it necessary that every station or siding should be protected by signals capable of being seen for some distance before approaching them. But even with the best arrangements as to signals, collisions will necessarily occur unless the trains are adequately supplied with break power.

The absence of breaks has been noted in the case of seven accidents, and two very serious accidents have been due to this cause, one on the London and North Western Railway to a passenger train at Nash Mills, the other on the South Wales Railway to a coal train near Llansamlet. In both cases heavy trains were run at high rates of speed without a sufficient amount of break power, to stop them within a reasonable distance.

The subject of the adequacy of break power has frequently received your Lordships consideration. In 1844 the Board of Trade issued a circular upon the subject; and on repeated occasions since that time the necessity of a larger number of breaks than are usually placed in s train has been brought to the notice of Railway Companies. The high speeds and heavy trains now in daily use on railways renders this question one of the first importance with a view to the prevention of the most serious class of railway accidents. A careful consideration of the collisions which have occurred shows that, had the engine driver possessed in each case the power of stopping the trains within three or four hundred yards, a very large majority of the accidents would have been avoided. The use of heavy break vans in trains adds to the weight of the train without adding to the accommodation ; and a powerful retarding force applied at one point in a train is far more destructive to the permanent way than the same retarding force distributed over all the vehicles of the train. These considerations render it desirable that heavy break vans should, as far as possible, be dispensed with, and that breaks should be applied to passenger carriages.

The high speeds in use also make it necessary that the time consumed in applying the breaks should be the smallest possible, and that, therefore, the power of applying a large number of breaks should be given as far as practicable to one man ; this is also material with a view to economy, as it enables the number of servants sent with a train to be limited. Many ingenious and practical modes have been patented by which the engine-driver at one end, or the guard at the other end of a train, can apply breaks instantaneously to all the wheels of the train: these inventions merit more consideration than they have hitherto received from Railway Companies. The system proposed by Mr, Newall is, however, in use to a limited extent on several railways.

A system of breaks, connected throughout the train, facilitates the adoption of a means of communication between the engine-driver and guard, which is as yet only partially in use on a very limited number of railways in this country, but which is adopted on every railway in the United States, and is found very advantageous.    It must, however, be remembered that the introduction of any improvement in the construction of rolling stock which bears upon the adjacent carriages in a train, must always be matter of great expense and difficulty ; of expense, because of the enormous number of vehicles employed on railways, and of difficulty, because of the large number of Companies concerned, whose vehicles are continually interchanged, and whose interests are involved in the matter.

The absence of time-pieces has been observed upon in the case of four accidents. The practice of working railways to carefully framed time-tables is one which renders it absolutely necessary that a large number, if not all, of the servants of a railway company should have at all times a correct knowledge of time. This can only be ensured by providing good clocks at all stations, which should be carefully and frequently regulated ; and by supplying with watches all those servants whose duties involve a knowledge of time. It is the practice on many railways for the servants to be required to provide themselves with watches: the watches provided under this system are not necessarily good, and need frequent repair, so that it is often found that they are not available when most wanted. Under this arrangement the men cannot justly be punished when they allege as an excuse for the absence of a watch that it is broken or under repair, whereas, if the watch were supplied by the Company, no excuse would be admitted in the matter. It would be far better to incur the additional expense of supplying watches than to continue a system in which unpunctuality must sometimes be excused.

Insufficiency of Staff.

The practice of sending engine-drivers in charge of trains along lines of railway with which they are unacquainted was adverted to in the case of two accidents. This cause of accident is classed under Insufficiency of Staff, because it cannot be assumed that a Railway Company which possesses an adequate number of engine-drivers acquainted with the road would select men to drive over it who had scarcely ever traversed it previously.

The first case occurred on the Leamington Branch of the London and North Western Railway at the Birdingbury Station; a coal train in charge of an engine-driver who had never been on the railway, accompanied by a fireman who had only been once over the line by daylight and once at night, the last time having been six months previously, was despatched from Rugby eight minutes after a passenger train. The Birdingbury Station stands at the foot of an incline of 1 in 112, and was unprovided with a distant signal. This coal train on arriving at the station came into collision with the passenger train just as it was preparing to leave the station.

Another collision occurred partly from the same cause, at the Dunfermline Station of the Edinburgh, Perth, and Dundee Railway, on the 8th of August. In this case a passenger train was driven by an engine-driver who had never been in Dunfermline before, and a fireman who had only been once or twice on the line about six years previously.

The very serious accident which occurred on the Newport, Abergavenny, and Hereford Railway from the engine of an express passenger train leaving the rails in consequence of a broken spring, on the 12th November, near Nant-y-derry, was attributable to the neglect of the man who drove the engine. This man was unable to read or write, and could not, therefore, make himself acquainted with the book of regulations, with a copy of which he was supplied; he was employed at wages of 1/. per week. The reason of this man having been sent with the train was because the number of efficient drivers employed by the Company was insufficient for the requirements of the traffic.

The absence of any signalman at the junction of some sidings with the main line of the East Lancashire Railway at Bury was the cause of a collision at that station.

The absence of a properly instructed person to attend to the points was the cause of an accident at the Oxford Road Station of the Manchester South Junction and Altrincham Railway. The man appointed to work the points had never been shown his duties; the result was, that in the dark he used the wrong set of points and turned a passenger train on to the wrong line, which caused a collision.                                                                          

A serious accident occurred at the Church Fenton Station on the North Eastern Railway in consequence of the want of sufficient assistance at night to attend to a passenger train which had arrived at the station, and to work the signals for its protection.

The over-working of railway servants has in former years been a fertile cause of accident; the only cases mentioned during the past year were on the London and North Western Railway, at the Denton Station, where a boy of 16 years old was kept on duty daily for 15 hours; and at the Spon Lane Station, where the inspecting officer mentioned that a signalman was on one occasion kept on duty for 26 hours.

Causes of Accidents attributable to the System of Working.

Under this head it is desirable to allude to the negligence of servants, because negligence, although a frequent cause of accident, may often be traced to a want of discipline, and to a careless system of management.

The negligence of servants has contributed to twenty-seven out of seventy-one accidents.  And six accidents were entirely attributable to negligence.

An accident occurred on the North Eastern Railway at Cottingham in consequence of the neglect of the signalman to procure a new glass for his lamp, in lieu of one which was broken.

Another accident which occurred on the Great Western Railway from a train entering the Salisbury Station at too high a speed, appeared to have been due to the carelessness of the engine-driver. And from a similar cause an accident occurred on the Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railway, at the New Holland Station, on the 8th of November, from a train moving on to the pier at too high a speed. An accident at the Woodhouse Junction on the Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway was attributed to the recklessness of an engine-driver of the Great Northern Railway Company.

But the carelessness of engine-drivers has been attributed in some cases to the fact of their having habitually disregarded caution signals, without having been blamed until an accident has occurred. In the case of an accident at Welwyn on the Great Northern Railway, the fireman stated that, they were in the habit of passing the caution signal at a speed of 35 or 40 miles an hour; and Lieutenant-Colonel Wynne, the Inspecting Officer who inquired into this accident, states, that he has found caution signals to be universally-disregarded.

It would appear, also, that the practice of exhibiting a danger signal which was almost invariably changed when a train approached, tended in many instances to lull the engine-drivers into a feeling of certainty that it would have been always so lowered, and that in their anxiety to keep time they did not prepare to stop until they found that the signal was not to be lowered. Much valuable space was in such cases lost by the delay of a few seconds, and the result frequently was that the train could not be stopped in the remaining interval. This hesitation in stopping may to some extent have been attributable to a want of proper discipline ; but the fact of its being the case must be borne in mind in considering the question of the expediency of adopting the system of causing the signals always to be set at danger, and only to be altered to allow of the passing of a train, a system which has many advocates.

In other cases it has appeared that the engine-drivers have disregarded the danger signal. The whole system of working railways is based upon these signals, and this neglect is a fault which should never be overlooked.

Some accidents were attributable to a careless system of working. In the case of the accident at Church Fenton on the North Eastern Railway, it appeared that it was the habitual custom of the night shunter at York to send away the goods trains as soon as they were ready without waiting for the time named in the time-bill. A very little consideration will show that, on a railway worked to time-tables, the practice of running trains before the time is a far greater source of danger than running them late.

An accident occurred on the Birkenhead, Lancashire, and Cheshire Junction Railway at Frodsham, in consequence of a train run without previous notice having come into collision with a waggon which was being shunted.

On the North Union Railway, at Preston, an accident occurred from the negligence of the pointsman in permitting shunting operations to be performed within a very short time of the expected arrival of a goods train. A careless system in performing shunting operations was remarked upon by the Inspecting Officer in the case of two accidents on the Eastern Counties Railway.

It is worthy of notice, that sixteen of the collisions which have been reported upon occurred between trains following each other on the same line of rails, of which, however, five are classed in the table under the head of accidents from shunting operations. This class of accidents has always been numerous, because the velocities at which trains are moved render it impossible for them, with the break power usually provided, to be stopped in time to avoid a collision in the case of a train breaking down, unless the engine-driver of the following train receives notice at some considerable distance from the place of the accident. This fact has led to the practice of not allowing a train to start from or pass a station until an interval of time, generally five minutes, has elapsed since the passage of the preceding train, in order that, in case of an accident, time should be afforded to the guard to carry back a signal to some distance. But where the stations are far apart, and where fast trains are timed to follow slow trains, the interval enforced at the stations becomes frequently so much diminished as to be valueless in cases where trains have broken down or have lost time on the road.

Amongst the accidents which have occurred from this cause, may be mentioned the accident at Birdingbury, on the Leamington branch of the London and North Western Railway; when a passenger train, travelling at about 25 miles per hour, was run into by a coal train which started eight minutes after it, and travelled at 40 miles per hour. A collision occurred on the Great Northern Railway, at Hatfield, between an express train and a coal train, which it was following at a high rate of speed ; the accident occurred just as the coal train was approaching the station, and before the distant-signal could be turned on to danger. In the case of an accident on the Mold Railway, a portion of a train, having become detached on an incline, came to rest in a hollow between two inclines, and was run into by a train which had followed after an interval of six minutes, and could not be stopped. In the case of another accident on the Chester and Holyhead Railway, at Penlan Mills, a goods train was started to run a distance of 14 miles, and to travel at 20 miles per hour; the mail train was started to follow it after an interval of 17 minutes, and was timed to travel at 40 miles per hour, and consequently overtook and run into the goods train when it had proceeded about 11 miles. Another accident occurred at Rhyl, on the Chester and Holyhead Railway, in consequence of a goods train having been run in front of an express train with too short an interval of time between the trains.

On the Trent Valley section of the London and North Western Railway, a cattle train from Liverpool broke down, and was run into by a goods train from Holyhead travelling after it. It appeared that the interval between the trains, which was 20 minutes at Tamworth, had decreased to seven minutes at Nuneaton, and to five minutes at a level-crossing about nine miles from the accident. At the Denton Station, on the London and North Western Railway, a passenger train which had just stopped at the station, was run into by an engine which had started from Staley Bridge (the preceding station) four minutes after the passenger train.

The numerous accidents which have occurred under this system of working have led to the practice of interposing an interval of space instead of an interval of time between trains following each other on the same line of rails ; this is effected by means of the electric telegraph. Stations are established at a greater or less distance apart, according to the requirements of the traffic, and no train is allowed to pass one station until the preceding train has passed the station in advance.

Under this system of working collisions have been much less frequent, but three accidents have occurred on lines on which it was in use during the year. In the case of a collision at the Angerstein Branch, on the South Eastern Railway, it appeared that the telegraphing clerk forgot that a train had passed which was to stop at the branch line, and consequently allowed a following train to pass his station, and the result was a collision. At Nash Mills, on the London and North Western Railway, a coal train broke down just after it had passed the signalman's box; and the signalman, before he perceived the accident, had given a signal to the preceding station, that the line was clear.  A mail train came up to the preceding station at that moment, and was allowed to pass. It was travelling at a high rate of speed, and owing to the inadequacy of break power in the train, it could not be stopped on arriving at the distant signal at Nash Mills in time to avoid a collision with the disabled goods train which stood just beyond the station signal.

The electric telegraph was used on the South Wales Railway to work a portion of line near Llansamlet; a train broke down on the line and several trains were detained at the preceding signal station; in order to prevent the traffic from being obstructed, the station master signalled for one of the detained trains to advance, intending that it should be passed round the disabled train. He exhibited the distant signal, in order to stop the train before it reached the disabled train ; but, as in the last case, the amount of break power with which the train was furnished was too small to check the velocity in the allotted interval, and a collision consequently ensued.

These accidents show that even the electric telegraph will not secure immunity from accident, unless the most careful system of working be maintained, and other necessary accessories to safety be provided.

General Remarks.


The traffic returns for the half-year ended the 31st December 1856, have not yet been received, and it is not possible, therefore, to show what proportion the passengers killed and injured in trains bear to the total number conveyed, but it may be safely assumed to be smaller than that for the previous year.

The number of accidents into the causes of which your Lordships deemed it desirable to institute inquiries is also smaller than that for the preceding three years. It may, therefore, be safely assumed that the railways have been worked with a greater degree of care than in former years.

Inquiries have been made into railway accidents by this Department since 1840, and it is only from a careful analysis of the causes to which the several accidents have been attributable that safe conclusions can be drawn as to the best means for reducing the number of railway accidents. The records of this department, however, only contain such an analysis for the year 1840; and for the four years ended the 31st December 1856.

It appears that in 1840, out of thirty-five accidents, twenty-one were attributable, amongst other causes, to defective arrangements, eighteen were attributable to misconduct of servants, and six to mechanical causes.

In 1853, seventy-six accidents to trains were reported upon; and it appeared that in only five of the seventy-six cases did
purely accidental circumstances alone cause the accidents; and in only eleven other cases were purely accidental circumstances combined with other causes to create the accidents. In only twenty-eight cases was the direct negligence of inferior servants a contributing cause of the accidents ; and in some of these cases the negligence was traced either to the men having been overworked or to defects in the state of discipline.

In 1854, out of eighty-five accidents which were reported upon, in only twenty-one instances did purely accidental circumstances enter into the causes of the accidents, and in only sixteen out of the twenty-one cases were the accidents attributable to accidental circumstances alone. The negligence of inferior servants entered into the causes of thirty-six of the accidents, but in only three cases were the accidents due to that cause alone. Three accidents were from causes entirely beyond the control of the company. Hence only twenty-two out of the eighty-five accidents could not have been guarded against.

In 1855 it has been shown that out of ninety-four cases the accidents in twenty-two instances were attributable to purely accidental circumstances, but that in only ten of these cases were accidental circumstances the sole cause of the accidents. The negligence of servants entered into the causes of thirty-six accidents ; but of these, negligence was the main cause of accident in only sixteen cases; the remaining sixty-eight accidents being attributable to defective arrangements.

In 1856 it has been shown that in seven cases only out of seventy-one were the accidents attributable to causes which could not be guarded against, and that in three of these six cases were the accidents solely attributable to such causes; and that of the twenty-seven cases of accident into the causes of which the negligence of servants entered, in only six cases were the accidents solely due to negligence; the causes of the remaining accidents being defective arrangements.

When it is considered how large a number of separate parts are required to form the railways and the vehicles which run upon them, the failure in material or workmanship of any one of which may produce a casualty, and when it is considered that nearly 100,000 individuals are employed in conducting the traffic, the negligence or errors of any one of whom may cause an accident, it cannot be expected that a perfect immunity from accident on railways will ever be secured. But it appears from the foregoing analysis of the causes of  the accidents which have been reported upon, that by far the larger number of these accidents are attributable to causes over which the managers of the railways have control, but which through negligence or false economy they do not remedy; and what is termed the negligence of the servants in the case of an accident is often either an habitual infringement of the regulations, which has been for a long time permitted with the cognizance of the managers; or a practice which has grown up in the absence of defined regulations, and which, until an accident occurs, is not objected to by the officers of the Company. This is an important fact, because the public have a right to require that the traffic on railways shall be conducted with the greatest attainable degree of safety.

A further consideration of the causes of these accidents shows that a railway is so complicated an instrument that it is not probable that accidents would be prevented were railway companies compelled by legislative enactment to adopt particular modes of working, or to provide specified accessories to safety ; because any system upon which railways can be worked will be found to contain some elements of danger, and to require modifications under special circumstances.

Besides, the art of railway management has not yet attained a fixed position; fresh improvements are being daily introduced. And hence, if Railway Companies should be required to work their lines according to a specified standard laid down to-day by the Legislature, the progress of improvement would be to some extent stopped for the future.

It must also be recollected that when under a specified system of working new elements of danger are found to arise, it would either be necessary to provide for this by fresh Legislative enactments, or else a power of modifying the system must be placed in the hands of some public department.

But the interference with the management which would thus be necessary, would to some extent relieve the managers of the lines from responsibility without practically placing it on any one else.

These considerations lead to the conclusion that freedom from railway accidents is not to be obtained by external interference, but that it is to be promoted only by an efficient and responsible internal management, which enforces the greatest care and punctuality in the working of the traffic, and by the maintenance of the strictest discipline amongst the servants employed; and that any legislative enactments on the subject should be framed with the view of promoting these objects.

No doubt, the separate nature of the duties of railway servants interposes difficulties in the way of efficient supervision, but any derangement of the traffic is prima facie evidence of defects of management, of delinquencies, or of negligence; so that in order to obtain a knowledge of these defects and to maintain discipline it is only necessary to note carefully every case of derangement of traffic, and to institute a complete inquiry into its cause.

Inquiries of this nature into the every-day derangements of the traffic can only be conducted by the officers of the companies; but from what has been stated of the causes of important accidents, it is clear that the occurrence of a serious railway accident may be considered prima facie evidence of mismanagement. And as it is not likely that inquiries by the managers themselves would expose errors of management, it is essential to their detection, that on the occasion of an accident, a searching and impartial inquiry should be made into its cause.

In legislating upon the subject of railways, Parliament has laid down the principle that a railway shall not be opened until, in the opinion of a public officer, it is in a condition for the traffic to be carried safely over it, but that when once open for traffic the Company may work it as they think fit. At the same time the Company are liable to a pecuniary penalty in case of accident in the shape of compensation to parties injured.

Independently of the fact that increased safety promotes travelling, this penalty, and the expense of an accident, makes the interest of the shareholders in this matter identical with that of the public, that the railway shall be worked as safely as possible.

From what has been stated above it appears that it is only by the occurrence of an accident that shareholders and the public become aware that something is wrong, and that it is only by careful inquiries into the causes of the accident that negligence or errors in the managers of the railways can be detected.

The only public inquiries that take place into the causes of railway accidents in this country are the coroner's inquests in the case of fatal accidents. This Department, it is true, makes inquiries into railway accidents by means of its officers, but the only power it possesses is that of ordering an inspection of the scene of an accident, and any further inquiries made by its officers arc on sufferance ; and their reports can only be made public by being presented to Parliament.

The coroner's inquest is a tribunal ill calculated for inquiries of this nature : to be effectual they should be conducted by persons acquainted with the details of railway management. Besides this, accidents which have not been attended with fatal results, and do not therefore come under the notice of the coroner, are as often caused by mismanagement as those in which death has ensued.

From these several considerations it appears that the most effectual method of causing those in whom the management of railways is vested to do their duty, and to establish an efficient system of working the lines under their control, would be to cause all important railway accidents to be inquired into, in a public manner, by a competent and impartial officer, or tribunal, whose report should be made public with as little delay as possible after the inquiry.

It might possibly be urged that publicity of the causes of railway accidents might operate injuriously against Railway Companies in cases where persons injured sued for compensation, but practically they could scarcely be worse off in that respect than they are at the present time; indeed it is probable that in cases where it was clearly shown that the accident could not have been guarded against, juries might take a view favourable to the Railway Companies. And a complete public inquiry would, by placing the directors and the shareholders in possession of the causes of the accidents, from an impartial point of view, enable them to judge what steps were necessary, by a modification of their management or otherwise, to prevent a recurrence of the accident. Besides which, such an inquiry would, whilst it prevented the servants from being punished in cases where the management was to blame, render punishment more certain in cases where it was proved to be deserved.

I have the honour to be, my Lords,
Your most obedient Servant,
Douglas Galton
 Captain Royal Engineers.

To the Lords of the Committee of
Privy Council for Trade and Foreign Plantations.



Accidents 1856

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