ACCIDENTS APPERTAINING TO THE MANAGEMENT.

COLLISIONS BETWEEN TRAINS FOLLOWING EACH OTHER ON THE SAME LINE OF RAILS

CHESTER AND HOLYHEAD RAILWAY.

Railway Department, Board of Trade  
   Whitehall, Mar 24,1856.
SIR,
In compliance with the instructions contained in your letter of the 14th instant, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended the accident, that occurred on the 10th instant, near the Bangor Station of the Chester and Holyhead Railway.

A special train, composed of two engines and tenders, thirteen loaded waggons,twenty empty cattle trucks, and a van, left Conway for Bangor at 11. 33 p. m. on the day in question; and the mail train, which was five minutes behind time, followed  from Conway at 11.50. The former is stated to have travelled at the usual speed for such trains, twenty miles an hour, until it was within three miles of Bangor, when the nut got loose in the valve of the tender of its leading engine, and the steam beginning to fail on an ascending gradient of 1 in 220, the speed was reduced to fifteen or sixteen miles an hour.

As this train was passing the Penlan Mills, one and a half miles from Bangor, it was run into by the mail, the driver of which could not have seen it from a greater distance than 300 yards, on account of the curves on the line. He did his best. however, to pull up in that space, and the speed of his train was reduced to such an extent when the collision ocurred that no damage was done to the stock, and the passengers escaped, as far as I have learnt, without injury.

Some of the waggons of the goods train were, however, uncoupled, and left on the line, while the drivers went on with the remainder to Bangor, in entire ignorance of what had occurred.

Two persons were riding in the van at the rear of the goods train, the breaksman, and an assistant breaksman belonging to another train, who had previously remained at Conway, and had taken this opportunity of travelling to Bangor. These men saw the mail pursuing them shortly before the collision occurred, and the breaksman waved his red hand lamp to it, as an intimation of danger in addition to that afforded by the tail lamp on his van; but, seeing that it would not be possible for the mail train to pull up, he got into his van again and lay down to await the shock, leaving his comrade standing on the step. The latter must then either have jumped off and lost his footing in the dark, or been thrown under the wheels by the collision, for his body was afterwards discovered between the rails, with the head dreadfully crushed. The breaksman himself escaped with some slight bruises, and a small cut on his forehead.

The night signalman at Conway had carefully entered in his book the times of departure of these two trains; and he states that he remarked to the driver of the second engine of the goods train, that it would either be necessary for him to make haste, or to shunt at that station out of the way of the mail.  The driver denies this; but the night porter at Conway corroborates the statement of the signalman, and states also that he heard the reply of the driver, to the effect that they could go on to Bangor very well. The signal man also warned the driver of the mail train, before he left Conway, that the goods train was seventeen minutes in front of him; but finding, upon inquiry, that it was a comparatively light train, provided with two engines, the did not think it necessary to travel more slowly on that account.

This driver might perhaps have used more caution in rounding the curves near Penlan, after the warning he had received; it is undoubtedly a wrong principle, first to send a goods train forward in the way of a mail train, and then to warn driver of the latter, a man who is expected to travel at express speed, and to be particularly punctual, of the positive and the probable danger which he must be prepared to encounter.

The true cause of the collision is sufficiently evident.  Two trains were started from Conway for Bangor, a distance of fourteen and a quarter miles; the one to travel at the rate of twenty miles an hour, and the other, following it seventeen minutes afterwards, to travel at a speed of forty miles an hour.

Under these circumstances, simple calculation will show that the latter ought to have overtaken the former, in its course, in eleven and one third miles, at three miles from Bangor, or about the place where the leading engine began to fail; and although it did go a little farther, in spite of the partial failure of one of its engines, before it run into, yet that was simply because the drivers did not keep precisely to what they call their " usual speed."

Now, there are two remedies, by which such a catastrophe may be prevented from again occuring, namely, either to work the line by telegraph, taking care that no two trains shall be between any two telegraph stations at the same time, or so to increase the interval between trains timed to travel at different rates as to provide for their not overtaking each other.

The former of these is no doubt the more expensive in first cost, but it is the more certain, whilst the latter arrangement, involving a different problem for each particular case, must necessarily be left to a certain extent to the judgment of men as drivers and signal men, and must be liable to be misapplied: besides which it leaves open the floor to numerous dangers, such as collisions consequent upon the failure of engines, or accidents to trains of many descriptions. all events, the present regulations, which only enforce an interval of five minutes between the trains, and direct that Caution signal is to be displayed for an additional five minutes, are inadequate to secure the public safety in such cases as the one in question.

I have, &c. As Secretary of the                                                                                                                                 H. W. Tyler,
Railway Department, Board of Trade.                                                                                       Capt. Royal Engineers.


CHESTER AND   HOLYHEAD.

Railway Department, Board of Trade,
Whitehall, May 24, 1856.
 In compliance with the instructions contained in your letter of the 14th instant, I have the honour to report, for information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended the accident, that occurred on the 12th instant, near the Broughton Station of the Mold Branch of the Chester and  Holyhead Railway.

The two stations on this branch, at Hope and Broughton, are, respectively, 9 and 4 3/4 miles to the south west of Chester; and a heavy incline, commencing at 3/8ths of a mile from the former, descends on a gradient of 1 in 43 for 105 chains, and 1 in55 for 57 chains further, towards the latter.  This portion of the line is also curved, and the view is to a certain extent impeded by over-bridges and by trees.

It will be observed by the accompanying section, with which the engineer has been so good as to supply me, that a rise of 1 in 300 (BC) for 25 chains follows the incline above referred to ( AB); and I may mention that the next summit (C) is visible from the centre of that incline (D), while the lower parts of the road (B) are obscured by the trees.

On the 12th instant, a cattle train composed of an engine and tender, S6 loaded cattle trucks, a second and a third class carriage  and a van, left Mold at 2.30 p.m., half an hour late, passed Hope slowly at 7 min. to 3, and stopped at the top of incline, in accordance with the usual custom, that some of the breaks of the trucks might be pinned down, for the purpose of checking it during the descent.  The train was then started down the incline, but before it had proceeded more than half a mile the breaksman observed that about 18 of his waggons had became uncoupled from the remainder of the train. platelayers, who were at work on the line, saw what had happened, and drew the attention of the driver to. it as he and the latter hastened on in order that the loose waggons might not overtake him.

The breaksman, finding that the driver was getting out of his way, then took off his break, and, aware that another train would be following, hoped that the impetus he acquired in descending the incline would carry him over the succeeding bank;  but in this he was mistaken, for, after mounting for a certain distance, his waggons came to a stand, and then back by the force of gravity into the hollow.

An inspector of police in the company's service was riding in the van with the breaksman; and these men had signalled to the platelayers, in passing, to proceed to the rear, and warn the next train; and the breaksman himself, when his speed slackned, got out of his van and ran back some 40 yards for a similar purpose with his red flag.

The train which I have referred to as following the cattle train, was composed of an engine and tender, 15 loaded coal waggons, and a van.  It left Padeswood, a station a mile to the west of Hope, at 2.45 p.m. (having waited there for the cattle train  to pass), and reached Hope just as the cattle train went through that station.  It was then brought to a stand, and kept for six minutes, to give time for the other train to get out of the way, and it was allowed to start at the end of that period with a warning to the driver.

The coal train was brought to a stand also at the top of the incline, and six of the breaks having been pinned down by the breaksman it was again started, the driver shutting off his steam and putting on his tender break when a speed of three or four miles an hour had been attained.  This speed, however, gradually increased, and by the time the driver saw the signal of the platelayers, at a mile from the summit, he was travelling at the rate of 15 miles an hour.  The fireman upon this crept over to the waggon nearest to the engine, and let down the break, but, the blocks having been worn out, the lever dropped to the bottom of the guard, and he narrowly escaped being thrown off.  He then returned to the engine, and the driver, having reversed his engine, went back over the waggons and pinned down the breaks of two more trucks.  On passing through a bridge situated at 1 3/8 miles from the summit, and 11 miles from the bottom of the incline, he now saw the cattle train proceeding to Broughton, and, unaware that some of its trucks had become detached, and were left on the lower part of the line, he thought that all was right. He did not, however, take off any of his breaks, though he threw the reversing lever of his engine into back gear again  [The engine was travelling tender first],  until, on rounding the curve, he perceived the trucks upwards of 1000 yards ahead, when he again reversed his engine and turned on his steam, his only remaining  resource

The breaksman had also managed to pin down another break, and there were thus 10 [one of which was not, however, in working order] waggon breaks applied, besides those of the tender and van, in addition to the retarding force of the steam acting upon the coupled wheels of the engine ; but they were all unable to stop the train, which came into collision with the stationary trucks at the rate of 8 or 10 miles an hour.

Six or seven of the cattle dealers, who were riding in the two carriages at the rear of the train, were hurt, and the cattle suffered considerably. The driver and fireman of the coal train jumped off their engine just before the crash, and escaped without injury.
Such are the circumstances of the collision, which has evidently been occasioned by the unsafe manner in which this dangerous part of the line is worked.

The coal train was a special train, and one of those referred to in the following " Notice " inserted in the Company's working time tables:—

    "Notice."
" As there is no exact time fixed for the running of coal trains on the Mold Branch, it will be needful for every one concerned to keep a good look out, and be prepared for their arrival at any time."

And, coming from a mineral branch, it was expected to make its way between the other trains as it best could. The cattle train was half an hour late, in consequence of a fair at Mold, and the delay in loading the trucks:  and the coal train therefore followed it more closely than it would otherwise have done. The interval preserved between the two was all that the regulations required ; and, indeed, there seems no reason for attaching blame to any of the parties concerned.

But it is evidently unsafe to permit trains, and particularly heavy trains of this description, to follow one another, with an interval of only a few minutes between them, over such gradients as occur between Hope and Broughton ; and I would therefore suggest to the company, the necessity of establishing a telegraph wire between these two stations, and of not allowing any train to leave the former until the line has been reported from the latter to be clear after the passage of a preceding train.

There are other precautions, too, which, as appears from the evidence I have received, are urgently required.

The driver of the coal train states, "I never can stop that train when half-way down the bank; sometimes it pushes us to the Mold Junction (nearly 2 3/4 miles beyond the bottom of the incline) before we can pull up. We went down there on Friday night last. We then passed Broughton Station at twenty miles an hour, although we had the breaks pinned down so that we could not start from the top.    The same thing has happened scores of times, when the rails are any way wet."

It is evident, therefore, that, in many cases, an additional amount of break power in proportion to the load, is required to enable the driver to retain the command of his train in descending this incline : and as it appears that many trains are not now due to stop at Broughton, unless the signal at that station be "at danger," it would seem to be highly desirable, in order to ensure greater caution in descending the incline, that all the trains should, in future, be directed to come to a stand at that station.

I may also observe, in reference to a note inserted in a former part of this report, to the effect, that the engine of the coal train was travelling tender first at the time of the accident, that this mode of working the engines increases the liability to accidents of another nature, and particularly on gradients such as those above described.

I have, &c.
The Secretary of the                                                                                                                                 H. W. Tyler,
Railway Department, Board of Trade.                                                                                         Capt. Royal Engineers.


CHESTER AND  HOLYHEAD  RAILWAY.
Railway Department, Board of Trade,
                                                                                                                                         Whitehall, August 14,1856.
Sir,  
In compliance with the instructions contained in your letter of the 5th instant, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended the accident, that occurred on the 2nd instant, near the Rhyl Station of the Chester and Holyhead Railway.

The 1.40 p.m. goods train from Bangor, consisting of an engine and tender, 25 waggons, and a van, left that station at 1.50, ten minutes late, on the 2nd instant, and after stopping at Conway, Abergele, and Colwyn, reached Rhyl at 3.45, five minutes after its proper time. There were two waggons to be left at Rhyl, and two others to be taken on; and the body of the train was left on the main line at the entrance to the siding, with the van 285 yards outside the station signal, while the engine was employed in the shunting. This finished, the engine went forward to the up coke stage, for the purpose of taking in coke, without the train, because there was a down passenger train at the platform, and because, if the goods trains had been attached to the engine, the passengers would then have been cut off from their only means of communication with the town and the the booking office.

As the engine was returning to the goods train, the latter was run into by the up express passenger train, at three or four minutes to four, about the time at which it was due to arrive, inasmuch as its time for leaving Rhyl was four o'clock. The collision was slight, two ladies only having been injured, and neither of them severely.

No blame can be attached to the driver or the express: the only warnings that he had of his danger were, first, the sight of the waggons, at 100 or 300 yards distance, as he approached the station round a curve; and, secondly, the waving of his hat by a platelayer, who was near the spot, and, seeing the danger, ran forward to avert it. The driver appears to have done his best to pull up after he received these warnings, and very nearly to have succeeded when the collision occurred.

The questions that naturally arise under these circumstances are, "Why was the goods train left on the main line when the express was due?" and "Why was it not protected by signals?".  These questions I shall now endeavour to answer.

The goods train, though only five minutes late, had not sufficient time to finish its shunting and get away before the arrival of the express; and it is therefore evident that it runs too closely before the express. It has done so for many months, and it seems that not unfrequently it has been seen going out of one end of the station while the express is arriving at the other end. The station at which the goods train shunts out of the way of the express is Prestatyn, 3f miles beyond Rhyl; and, considering that the express is only detained about five minutes at Rhyl, and travels twice as fast as the goods train, not only is there too little time allowed in these cases for the latter train to be safely shunted at Prestatyn out of the way of the former, but there is a great probability of its being overtaken on the road.

It will be remembered that three months since I had occasion to report upon an accident in which this contingency actually occurred, in which a fast passenger train following a goods train between Conway and Bangor overtook it and came into collision with it, as the natural consequence of the speeds at which they were respectively expected to travel, and the interval in time which was allowed between them; and here again the same liability is incurred.

I can only repeat the remarks that I then made, as to the remedies which may be applied to such a state of things, viz., either that the intervals in time should be increased, so as to keep the slow trains at a greater distance from the fast ones; or, which would be far preferable, that an interval of space should be applied instead of an interval of time, by the establishment of telegraph stations at suitable intervals, and by prohibiting any train from passing any one of these stations until the preceding train has been reported clear of the next one.

Such a system would appear to be peculiarly applicable to a line like the Chester and Holyhead Railway, on which irregularity and unpunctuality can never be avoided, the through traffic being brought upon it at one extremity from the sea and at the other, from many lines and long journeys. Had it been in force upon the present occasion, the express would not have been allowed to leave Abergele until the goods train was either shunted out of its way at Rhyl, or forwarded from that station towards Prestatyn, and this collision could not, therefore, have taken place.

When the goods train arrived at Rhyl at 1.45 on the day in question, the station master and all his porters were fully employed at the other side of the station with a down passenger train, which was half an hour late from Chester, which was very full, and of which in that hot weather the axle boxes required extra attention ; and the station master was thus prevented from observing, in sufficient time to be of any use, the position of the goods train, extending so far outside the station when the express was due, and unprotected by signals. Just as the down passenger train started, however, he noticed the approaching express, at a mile and a quarter from the station, and subsequently, as the former train drew forward, he saw the goods train. He then ran towards the goods engine, which was at the coke stage, and told the driver to shunt his train out of the way of the express, not so much because he was apprehensive of any accident taking place, as because he was anxious that the express should not be detained.

There were two breaksmen with the goods train, one who was in charge of the train, and who was attending to the shunting, and the other whose principal duty was to proceed to the rear with his hand signals whenever the train stopped. The first breaksman, who has only been employed as assistant guard and assistant breaksman for three months, appears to have expected that the express would have been a little after its time, as, according to his statement, it usually is; and he was going to the telegraph office to make an inquiry upon the subject when the collision occurred. The second breaksman was a lad of 18 years of age, who had served two years in that capacity. He says that, though he considered it his duty to go back for the safety of the train on other parts of the line, he had not thought it necessary previous to this accident to do so at the stations, because he then trusted to the fixed signals for protection. He says further that, on arriving at Rhyl, he found the axle-boxes much in want of grease, and that the porters were all so much engaged with the down passenger train that he could get no one to attend to them. Under the belief that his train would most likely have to proceed to Restatyn before the express, and that there was no time to be lost, and not thinking that the express was so nearly due, he therefore ran for the grease box, and was hard at work with it when he saw the express approaching. He then ran hack to warn the driver, but had not got more than 10 or 12 yards to the rear of his van when the collision occurred.

There is no doubt that if the first breaksman had placed his train in the siding at Rhyl, where there happened on that day to be room for it, and if the second breaksman had run back with his flag for its protection, instead of greasing his axles, the collision might have been avoided; and these men may fairly be blamed for not having adopted these courses; but it is equally certain that this part of the traffic is worked in a dangerous manner, as well as that the goods train ought not to be run so closely in front of the express, and that there ought to be, what, strange to say, has never yet been supplied for the protection of this important station, a distant signal 800 yards or so to the east of it, for the protection of the up line.

The station master applied in writing on the 1st June last for such a signal, and gave at that time a strong instance of  trains following each the necessity for it, as will be seen by the following communication which he addressed to the Superintendent of the line

Chester and Holyhead Railway.  
 Copy of Memorandum.    Rhyl to Chester,—11  down train, Friday, 1st of June 1856.
"'Please cause an auxiliary signal to be erected between Voryd and the station, to prevent up trains from running into goods trains, &c, that may be shunting here. When there are two breaksmen to the train the duty of one ought to be to go back 600 yards and stop coming trains, but this is not always done ; and when there is only one (as was the case last night, with the special cattle) it cannot be done ; and if my night porter, a cokeman, and myself, had not been very sharp last night a pitch in might have  happened     
                                                        
(Signed)       J. Winston."
J. O. Binger, Esq.

These remarks of the station master are most apposite, and it is to be hoped that his request to have a distant signal will now be complied with.

There is a semaphore signal on the platform at Rhyl, which was "at danger" at the time of the accident, but this signal could not of course be supposed to protect a train 285 yards on the wrong side of it. It is seen pretty clearly from the Voryd Bridge, which is a mile from the station, but not so clearly, by day, from a less distance, because it then appears against the station building, which, being of red brick, tends to obscure the arm of the semaphore. If this signal were raised a few feet higher, or if the side of the station building which is next to it were whitewashed, it would be a great improvement.

I think it right to make this remark, in consequence of my attention having been drawn to the state of the signal in the course of my inquiry; but it cannot be properly considered as having had anything to do with the accident now referred to, although it was supposed by the station master to have contributed to the security of the goods train,, inasmuch as a driver is only bound to stop his train before passing a danger signal, and not 285 yards before he reaches it.

In summing up the causes which have been instrumental in producing this collision, they may be stated to be, mainly, the want of a distant signal to the east of Rhyl, and the dangerous practice of running a fast train upon the heels of a slow one ; though, more immediately, the neglect of the two breaksmen in not providing for the safety of the goods train under the circumstances in which it was placed.
I have, &c.
The Secretary of the                                                                                                                                  H. W. Tyler,
Railway Department, Board of Trade.                                                                                   Captain Royal Engineers.


GREAT  NORTHERN  RAILWAY.

Railway Department, Board of Trade, 
Whitehall, March 3, 1856.
Sir,
I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, that I have inquired into the circumstances connected with a collision that occurred on the 12th January at the Hatfield Station of the Great Northern Railway.

It appears that in shunting some trucks loaded with timber at the Welwyn Station, which is situated close to the south end of a tunnel, one of them was thrown off the rails, the effect of which was to block the up line of railway. An accumulation of up trains was the consequence at the north end of the tunnel. When the line was cleared, the first train that was released was a coal train of twenty-eight loaded waggons. The driver and guard arranged to shunt it into a siding at the Welwyn Station, and the driver of a passenger express train, which stood next after the coal train at the north end of the tunnel, heard the driver of the coal train say so. When the coal train reached the Welwyn Station the driver of it received a signal from the station master to go on (without his stopping), there being no room for it in the Welwyn Station sidings. He accordingly proceeded with the intention of shunting at the next station, Hatfield, four miles further on. The station master states, that when the coal train was out of sight he telegraphed to the north end of the tunnel for the express train to come on, That train passed him eight and a half minutes after the coal train, travelling at the speed of between thirty-five and forty miles an hour. The caution signal was exhibited at the station, and a caution flag was stuck on the line some 400 yards further on, in consequence of repairs having been in progress for some time on that part of the line. The driver of the express states he saw the caution signal at the station, but not the other one, but he maintains he was travelling at a justifiable speed, as the line being remarkably straight and the day clear he could have pulled up his train in time if any obstruction had appeared on the line; but the green flag, if it meant anything, meant that the part of the road immediately in advance was out of repair and required a low speed. There is no doubt that the flag was there, as it had been a fixture for some time during the repair of the line, and its existence was known to all the drivers. When the driver sighted the Hatfield signal, which is a very conspicuous one, and visible a great distance off, it showed all right, and the driver instantly put on steam and increased his speed to sixty miles an hour. Just then he sighted the coal train, which, it appears, though within the distant signal, had not reached the station, and was still on the main line. The driver did all he could to stop, but in vain, and a collision was the consequence. From the evidence of the station master and several others at Hatfield there can be no doubt that the cause of the signal showing all right arose from its not obeying the lever which worked it. Before Christmas it had been out of order for four days, in consequence of the wire being frozen up in the tube through which it passed. Some alterations were then made, and the signal till then had continued to work well; but on this occasion the signal refused to work from the same cause. It had been stationary for fifty minutes, and the wire was again frozen up in the same iron tubing. The driver of the passenger train states, that in passing the Welwyn  he saw the sidings all full, and he never for a moment doubted but that the coal train which was in front of him had shunted there; and the supposition was a very natural one. Notwithstanding that he says thirty-five or forty miles an hour was. under the circumstances of this line, a caution speed, I do not believe he would have ventured to drive at that speed had he known the coal train was in front of him, because the line to Hatfield, for a great part of the way, descends with a gradient of 1 in 200, on which it would be very difficult to stop a train within a moderate distance that was travelling at so high a speed. The fireman of the train stated that they were in the habit of passing the caution flag signal on the viaduct at a speed of thirty-five or forty miles an hour, and one of the porters at the Welwyn Station stated that the drivers were in the habit of utterly disregarding the caution signal. I can from my own experience say, that the drivers on the Great Northern Railway are not peculiar in disregarding a caution signal, for, except at junctions, I have found the caution signal to be universally disregarded; and inasmuch as there is a certain amount of confidence placed in it by those who direct it to be exhibited, I believe it to be a source rather of danger than otherwise.

The immediate cause of the accident was no doubt the defective machinery of the distant signal, and whoever had the charge of the maintenance of it is much to blame in not having, after the first failure, repaired it in an efficient manner.

I am of opinion that great blame attaches to the station master at Welwyn for allowing an express train to follow a coal train in the short interval of eight or nine minutes, more especially when it might be anticipated that the driver would try to make up his lost time. I am the more anxious to draw attention to the point, inasmuch as there are no instructions on this subject to station masters in the book of printed rules, and the regulation of the time of precedence of slow trains in advance of quick ones is a matter in which the public safety is seriously concerned.

Between London and Hatfield the Company work their trains in conjunction with the electric telegraph, and I have much pleasure in remarking that it is done in the most efficient manner, viz., by not allowing any train to pass one telegraph station until it has been ascertained that the preceding train has passed the succeeding station. I am informed that the Company intend to extend the system throughout their line, having found the results so satisfactory between London and Hatfield.
I have, &c.
The Secretary of the                                                                                                                             Geo. Wynne,
Railway Department, Board of Trade.                                                                         Lieut.- Colonel Royal Engineers.


LONDON AND NORTH WESTERN RAILWAY.
Railway Department, Board of Trade, Sir,                                                                                                                                           Whitehall, January 18, 1856.
I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, that I have inquired into the circumstances connected with a collision that occurred on the 1st inst. at the Birdingbury Station of the Rugby and Leamington Branch of the London and North-western Railway.

The Rugby and Leamington Branch is a single line, the principle which is adopted to avoid the danger arising from two trains being on the line at the same time, and proceeding in different directions, is, to have a single staff or stick, which is considered as the key of the line; when the station master at either end has this staff in his possession he may send off any number of trains in succession over the line ; when he has despatched the last train that it is necessary for him to send, he gives the staff to the guard of that train, who has instructions to deliver it up to the station master at the other en the line, and the line then becomes locked at the end from which the staff has been sent.

The 1.30 p.m. passenger train from Rugby to Leamington was despatched 15 minutes after time; it was more than ordinarily heavy, consisting of four carriages, four carriage trucks, and two vans; the usual train is not more than half  this size; the time allowed in going to Birdingbury, the first station on the line, is nine minutes, the distance being something more than six miles, but the guard stated that it never was done with an ordinary train  in less than twelve  or fourteen minutes.  Leaving Rugby there is an ascending gradient for two miles of 1 in 127, and when that is surmounted the line falls rapidly ; the Birdingbury Station being at the foot of an incline nearly 2 miles in length, which falls 1 in 112, and as the line curves rapidly a short distance from the station, the latter does not become visible until it is approached within 600 yards ; it is protected only by a station signal.

 The passenger train reached Birdingbury at 2 o'clock, having lost six minutes on the way; it was delayed three minutes  at the station, and was slowly moving away, having proceeded only forty or fifty yards, when it was run into by a coal train from Rugby. This train was despatched at 1.55; it consisted of thirteen loaded waggons and a break van, and its weight might be 135 tons ; it was drawn by a passenger engine; the coals were to be delivered at the Manton Station, the succeeding one to Birdingbury; the driver who was selected to take this train had never before been on the line, and his fireman stated that he (the fireman) had only been on the line twice before, once at night, and that six months had elapsed since he had been over the line. The driver stated that in going round the curve, which hides the view of the station, he was not going more than seventeen or eighteen miles an hour ; that having then asked the fireman what distance they were from the station, he replied it is just through the bridge, and that he then immediately reversed and screwed on the break himself. The fireman says that they were going forty miles an hour, and that when the driver asked him how far they were from the station, he replied that he did not know, but he thought not far off; immediately after, they came in sight of it, the station, as I mentioned before, not being visible more than 600 yards off. The speed must undoubtedly have been much greater than what the driver states, as the collision was a severe one, the coal engine being thrown down the bank on one side, and a great number of waggons thrown off the line on the other side, and the van and some of the trucks of the passenger train smashed to pieces.

From the circumstances I have just detailed there will be little difficulty in assigning the collision to the proper causes, and in indicating the departments to which blame attaches.

The collision it is evident was caused by sending a driver on a line with which he was totally unacquainted, accompanied by a fireman hardly better informed in the matter, that line presenting features of difficulty in its gradients, curves, and in the position at least of one of its stations, that station being situated immediately at the bottom of a long incline of 1 in 112, and not visible more than 600 yards off, and unprotected by a distant signal which would point to the necessity that the driver selected to conduct a train over it should be well acquainted with its peculiarities, and the circumstances of a station, the position of which had nothing to indicate its nearness to a stranger. The driver said, and no doubt said truly, "If there had been a distant signal to indicate to me my nearness to the station I should not have run into the train."

The departments to blame are, the locomotive, which sent a driver over a difficult line, with the peculiarities of which he was perfectly ignorant; and the department in which rests the responsibility of erecting proper signals at the stations.

I was informed by the Superintendent of the southern division of the line that the Directors had inquired into the circumstances connected with this collision, and had punished the man who had despatched the coal train, not because he had disobeyed any order in sending it off within an interval of not more than eight minutes between the trains,—for, by recent instructions which have been issued, it appears that three or more trains are now allowed to travel at the same time between stations not three miles apart, which would involve intervals of time infinitely shorter, and which one is almost afraid to contemplate,—but because they considered he should have exercised a discretionary power, and allowed an interval of twenty minutes or more, the despatch of the coal train not being a matter of urgency. Now, as it is a rule on every line in the kingdom that trains may follow at intervals of five minutes, it appears a very unjust measure to visit with punishment a man guilty only of an error of judgment, if error it was, and to allow the really culpable parties to escape. Had the Directors been aware of all the circumstances of the case they could hardly have come to the decision they have done, and I am therefore glad to have this opportunity of making all the facts of the case known to them.

When single lines are worked, as ordinarily is the case, with one engine, the necessity for auxiliary signals is not so apparent, but with the system adopted by the London and North-western Railway Company on their single lines it is obvious that trains require to be protected by signals in the same manner as on double lines, and I know of no instance in which an auxiliary signal is more required than at the Birdingbury Station, and that the Directors in their investigation should have overlooked a question of such urgency would argue a very superficial investigation into the subject.

I have, &c. The Secretary of the                                                                                                                              Geo. Wynne,
Raihvay Department, Board of Trade.                                                                             Lieut.- Col Royal Engineers,


LONDON  AND  NORTH  WESTERN  RAILWAY.

Railway Department, Board of Trade, 
Whitehall, October 25, 1856.
Sir,   
In compliance with the instructions contained in your letter of the 16th instant, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended the accident, that occurred on the 9th instant, near the Rugby Station of the London and North-Western Railway.

The Trent Valley Junction, about half a mile to the north of Rugby, where the Trent Valley and Birmingham railways meet, is provided with an excellent stage for the signalman, on which are his semaphore signals, and levers for working his distant signals in each direction. The auxiliary signal towards Stafford is on the further side of a bridge carrying a road over the railway, 700 yards from the stage, and is visible for about a mile.

At two o'clock on the morning of the 8th instant, two special cattle trains were approaching this junction along the Trent Valley line, with an interval of perhaps 1000 yards between them, the one from Liverpool and the other from Holyhead.

The spindle gland got loose on the engine of the Liverpool train when it was within about half a mile of the auxiliary signal, and the driver endeavoured to bring his train as well as he could within the protection of that signal, under the belief that the mail train from the north, due at Rugby at 2.9, was not far behind him. After passing the bridge, and when travelling at the rate of five or six miles an hour, the driver directed his fireman to jump off the engine, and to run back for the purpose of warning any following train. The fireman did so, and in passing the break van he called to the guard, and informed him of what had occurred. The guard, who was not a man of much experience, and who could not otherwise have known the reason for their slackened speed, then got his hand lamp, jumped out of his van, and ran back also.

These men, unable to go more than 50 or 60 yards from the van, were not, however, in time to stop the Holyhead train. The driver of that train could not have seen the Liverpool train after it passed the bridge, until he was within 250 yards of it, and he does not appear to have seen the hand lamps of the men who were running towards him any sooner. He came into collision with the van at a speed of eight or ten miles an hour; while the Liverpool train was still proceeding at the rate of four or five miles an hour. Two drovers who were riding with ten others in a second-class carriage next to the van, received contusions and internal injuries, and great havoc was made amongst the cattle.

Thirty cattle trucks, a carriage, and a break van, were attached to the engine of the Liverpool train; and 28 trucks and a van to that of the Holyhead train. The driver of the latter could not possibly have been expected to pull up in less time, if, as he states, the distant signal near the bridge was not turned to "danger" before he passed it. But there seems to be a little discrepancy on this point. The signalman at the Trent Valley Junction saw the lights of the two trains, as they were approaching his distant signal, with a mile, as he thought, between them; and he states that he turned his distant signal to " danger" as soon as the first train had passed under the bridge. Now, the Liverpool train may be stated to have travelled at an average rate of seven or eight miles an hour, if not more, from the bridge to the site of the collision, because it was still going at four or five miles an hour when it was struck, and had slackened rather suddenly to that speed ; so that there would have been about a minute and a half for the distant signal to stand at "danger" before the collision, during which time the driver of the Holyhead train would have travelled about 600 yards, 300 yards outside the signal, and 300 yards after passing it.

Under these circumstances, it might be supposed that this driver ought to have seen the auxiliary signal turned to "danger" when he was 300 yards from it. The driver, fireman, and guard of the Holyhead train all agree, however, that this signal showed a white light up to the time of their passing it; and the guard, who paid particular attention to it, noticed after the collision, when he went back to protect the train and debris from the mail train, that it still showed a white light, and that it was not until between five and ten minutes after the collision that it was turned to "danger."

This latter portion of his statement is perfectly accounted for by some of the wreck having fallen on the wire, and prevented the signal from showing "danger" until the wire was liberated; but if the signalman's evidence he correct, it is certainly extraordinary that none of the servants of the company, who were with the Holyhead train, should have seen the auxiliary signal turned to " danger" before they passed it ; and the circumstance can only be accounted for in one of two ways. viz., either that the trains must have been nearer to each other in passing the bridge than otherwise appears or that the signalman must have worked his lever some 40 or 50 seconds later than he says he did; and the latter is the more probable solution, as there is a bank at the side of the line which would partially, if not altogether, shut off the lights of a train, after it passed the bridge, from the view of the signalman.

I have thought it desirable to consider this question thus in detail, because it seems, at first sight, as if the driver must be to blame for not having obeyed the distant signal; whereas, when more carefully regarded, the evidence does not lead by any means to the conclusion that he was at all in fault in this matter.

After passing the auxiliary signal, and even before he arrived at it, the driver saw the main junction signal at "caution," because it had been lowered to allow the Liverpool train to pass ; and he states that he believed that it was so lowered for his own train, and was preparing to pass through the junction accordingly, when he suddenly saw the Liverpool train in front of him.

He had waited at Tamworth for 20 minutes after its departure, to give plenty of time for the Liverpool train to get out of his way, as it was ordered to stop at Nuneaton; and, according to their own statement, neither he himself, nor his fireman, nor the guard, had seen anything more of it until just before the collision. The guard of the Liverpool train, however, says that he caught two glimpses of the Holyhead train following him upon the road, and that the second glimpse was a very distinct one, lasting for some little time along the straight line leading to the auxiliary signal. He certainly did not show the same anxiety to protect his train, when it slackened speed, as the fireman did, though he knew that the cattle train was behind him, and the fireman was unaware of it, but he says that he jumped from his van as soon as the speed of the train was sufficiently reduced to allow of his doing so safely. If the guard thus saw the Holyhead train, the driver of that train ought to have seen the Liverpool train, without doubt, though, even if he had seen it, he could not have conjectured that its engine was about to break down, and that it would slacken to so slow a speed just as it got out of his sight round the curve. It must be remembered, also, that the mail was very close at the heels of this driver, and that even if he had known what was going on in the train in front of him he was bound still to get on as far as he could out of the way of the mail. As it happened, the breaksman of the Holyhead train had only just time to run back and stop the mail after the collision took place.

The Holyhead train had been gradually catching up the other after it left Tamworth. There was seven minutes between them at Nuneaton, and five minutes at Bulkington Crossing, 10 miles from Rugby, the last place where there was any one on the watch at that time in the morning. It was dark, but not foggy ; and the atmosphere was therefore in a favourable state for seeing the signal lamps. The printed regulations of the Company direct that engine drivers, when travelling on the line, are not to approach nearer to each other than 800 yards, and there seems not the slightest reason to suppose that this rule was disobeyed until after the first engine broke down.

Having regard to all the circumstances of the case, there does not appear to be any proof of blame attaching to the driver of the Holyhead train, or to any of the servants of the company; but, the engine of the Liverpool train having accidentally failed, and the train having been reduced in speed upon an awkward curve, the accident, if such it can be called, would then seem to have followed as the natural result of the system in force for working the trains ; and it was a most fortunate circumstance that the mail train was just stopped in time to prevent a further collision, and consequences of a far more serious nature.

It so happened that this collision occurred between an auxiliary signal and a junction, and in a position, therefore, where a semblance of protection was afforded to the disabled train. But it might equally well have taken place away from all signals, at any other curve, or on any other part of the line, where the view is obstructed, and this consideration leads to the reflection that the present system of working on the greater number of railways in the kingdom is insufficient to provide against such contingencies.

Under that system, trains follow one another at a greater or less interval of time according to circumstances ; the interval allowed is insufficient even, in some cases, to admit of a slow train reaching its destination before a faster one runs into it, as I have had occasion to report in reference to some recent accidents on the Chester and Holyhead Railway, and is often not enough to give the guard of any train which becomes suddenly disabled time to run back to protect it from that, which follows, as in the present instance; and the consequence is, that when from any unforeseen cause a train is stopped in one of the dangerous positions in regard to view with which railways abound, the chances are very much in favour of a collision taking place, more or less serious in its consequences according to the weight, speed, and nature of the trains implicated.

The answers that may be made to this proposition are, —firstly, that it is the duty of the station masters and signalmen not to start the trains excepting at such intervals as shall allow a reasonable time between them ; and, secondly, that the different signalmen and gatemen along the line have instructions to exhibit a danger signal for five minutes, and a caution signal for ten minutes, after the passage of every train. But, unfortunately, these measures are by no means sufficient to secure the safety of the public ; for the station masters and signalmen are prevented, sometimes by the want of more perfect judgment, and oftener by the exigencies of the traffic, from carrying out their part of them with safety to the trains ; and the signalmen and gatemen can only at best preserve the required interval at the particular point of the line where they happen to be stationed. In the case of the present accident, the five minutes was preserved at nine miles from the site of the collision, without, as might be supposed, much good effect; and the only rule then in force was, that the drivers should keep a constant distance of 800 yards between their engines, which was equally useless.

Such being the system now generally adopted, and its risks being as constant as its nature is unsatisfactory, both to those who manage railways and to those who travel by them, it behoves the Directors of a great company like the London and North-Western to consider seriously in what way the system can be improved, and how comparative security can be obtained, in place of continual danger, or a mere chance of safety.

The plan of preserving an interval of space between the trains instead of an interval of time, by means of the electric telegraph, which has already been recommended by their Lordships, if properly carried out, offers immunity from this class of accident, and indeed from almost all collisions ; and it is incumbent upon the Directors either to adopt   it, or to substitute some other improvement of an equally efficient nature in the place of existing deficient arrangements.
The Secretary of the                                                                                                                                                            I have, &c.
Railway Department, Board of Trade.                                                                                                                                   H. W. Tyler,
Captain, Royal Engineers.

Railway Department, Board of Trade,   
                                                                                                                                   Whitehall, November  4, 1856.
Sir,     
I am directed by the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, to transmit to you the enclosed copy of the Report which their Lordships have received from Captain Tyler of his inquiry into the circumstances attending the collision which occurred on the 9th ultimo at Rugby on the London and North-Western Railway.

My Lords have already had occasion to point out to the Directors the necessity, on lines of large traffic, of adopting a system of working by which an interval of space shall be preserved between succeeding trains.

Had such a system of working been in force, My Lords are of opinion that the present accident would not have occurred, and they trust that the subject will again receive the careful consideration of the Directors.

My Lords are desirous of learning to what extent the electric telegraph is used for signalling trains on the London and North-Western Railway.                                                                                                                I have, &c.
The Secretary to the                                                                                                                              Douclas GaltoN,
London and North-Western Railway Company.                                                                     Captain, Royal Engineers.


LONDON  AND  NORTH   WESTERN   RAILWAY.
Railway Department, Board of Trade,         
Whitehall, November 22, 1856.
SIR,        
I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, that I have inquired into the circumstances connected with the accident that occurred on the London and North Western Railway on the 3d November, at  a place called  Nash Mills, half way between the stations of Boxmoor and Kings Langley.

The London and North Western line is divided into telegraph stations placed at average distances of two miles apart, and though the system of telegraphing, which I have described at length in a former report, is in my opinion defective, yet every train as it passes a telegraph station is signalled back to the station previously passed; and though two trains going in the same direction may find themselves between two adjoining telegraph stations at one and the same time, which I consider to be wrong in principle, yet the driver of the last train always knows there that is a train but a short way ahead of him.

On the 3d November a special coal train was despatched from Tring at 3.13 p.m., three minutes after the express, due London at 4 p.m. was due there; the policeman at the Boxmoor Telegraph  Station was unable to say what time it passed him, he having no clock in his box and his watch not going well, but from observation of the times of other trains he was of opinion that it passed about 3.40; the policeman at Nash Mills Telegraph Station, two miles up the line from Boxmoor, having no clock in his box and his watch being out of repair, was unable to state the time of the coal train passing his box, but thinks it was about 3.45; when the coal train passed, he immediately according to his instructions, turned on his danger signal, until he should hear from the next up telegraph station (King's Langley) that the coal train
had passed and then signalled back to Boxmoor "line clear;" the danger signal would therefore only intimate to an up fiver   between Boxmoor and Nash Mills that on the next length the message "all clear" had not been received, and it should then be his duty to stop or slow his train sufficiently to allow the policeman to tell him what distance of time the previously passed train was ahead of him.  I beg attention to the nature and object of this signal, as I shall have to refer to it further on.  When the policeman came out of his box he observed that the coal train had come to a stand-still 230 yards off, the engine having broken down ; instead of instantly sending the message to Boxmoor that the line was blocked, he ran up the line (this was an error in judgment) before he got half way he was met by the guard, who informed him of the cause, and as soon as he could get back to his box, he telegraphed to Boxmoor "line blocked."  From the statement of the policeman at Boxmoor this message must have arrived just as the express train was passing his box at 45 or 50 miles an hour.  The driver of the express train states that he left Tring 28 minutes late, that was at 3.39, that he was travelling at the rate of from 45 to 50 miles an hour ; that he saw the danger signal at Nash Mills nearly three-quarters of a mile off; that he whistled to the guards to put on their breaks; that he caused the fireman to put on the tender break, and that the signal still continuing against him he reversed his engine, and that he did all this as quickly as he could, and in this statement he is borne out by the two guards, so far at least as hearing him whistle as soon as the signal became visible, and instantly applying their breaks. The train consisted of 19 carriages in all, besides engine and tender, and probably represented a weight of 130 tons, proceeding at a speed of from 45 to 50 miles an hour. To control the momentum of this great load down an inclined plane of 1 in 330, the Company had provided but two breaks additional to that of the tender : the day was clear and the rails dry, and the distance to pull up in was 1,550 yards, or, making allowance for the time lost in applying the breaks, it may be called 1,300 yards; yet with this distance the break power was inadequate to prevent the express train from running into the coal train, which it struck with a force which probably would have carried it 100 yards farther, and to a still greater distance had the circumstance of weather not been so favourable.

Though there can be no doubt that the accident was due to a want of sufficient break power, it may be asked whether the coal train should have been found where it was. I think I can show that it certainly should not, and that it was very improperly sent in advance of an over-due express train. The coal train was composed besides the engine and tender of 37 loaded waggons and a break van, the aggregate weight of which was probably 400 tons. The interval which elapsed between the despatch of the two trains from Tring, it is true, was 26 minutes, and had the train been an ordinary goods train instead of an unwieldy coal train of 400 tons weight, its despatch under the circumstances would have been justifiable; but putting aside all the contingencies that a train of this magnitude is liable to, from breaking couplings, etc., it will be seen that whereas the express travelled at the rate of 50 miles an hour, the coals did not go more than 15 1/2 miles, so that in the ordinary course of things it would have been overtaken even if all went well, three or four minutes before it could have reached its destination at Watford, but the ticket collector who dispatched it thought otherwise, and felt so confident, that he did not even communicate to the express driver what was in front of him ; it suggests itself to me that in a case of this kind the responsibility should rest with the station master, and not with the collector; I have no doubt however in my mind, from experience in similar cases, that the station master would not have hesitated to dispatch the coal train, though he would probably, feeling himself in a more responsible situation, have communicated what he had done to the driver.

Railway Companies must, where the traffic is large, and from circumstances, frequently irregular, leave a large discretionary power in the hands of some of their servants, but my experience goes to show that the ordinary class of station masters and their subordinates are not the persons to be entrusted with this power. At the larger stations', no doubt, on the London and North Western Railway, such as Watford, Rugby, etc., there are station masters employed to whose intelligence any amount of discretionary power might be left, but these are exceptional cases ; it is therefore a question deserving of consideration whether this discretionary power may not be better placed.

In consequence of some accidents on the London and North Western Railway in 1849, Captain Laffan having the valuable assistance of Professor Barlow, made a series of very interesting experiments on the break power required to stop trains at different velocities, and deduced a set of formulae to meet the varied circumstances under which trains might be travelling, and in the report in which these formula? were introduced, he amongst other suggestions, recommended that the London and North Western Railway should "augment considerably the breaking power attached to all trains."

The general manager of the London and North Western Railway, in replying to Captain Laffan's report said "that he was instructed to say that measures were being adopted to increase the weight of the break vans on the Liverpool and Manchester line, and thereby render their breaking power more effective."

If we consider the forces to be controlled, we shall be at once struck with the utter inadequacy of the means the Directors proposed, to meet the recommendations, viz.:—adding perhaps a ton to the weight of each break ; we will take one of the trains involved in the present collision, the express, its weight is 130 tons, and it is moving with a velocity of 73 feet per second, its momentum will, therefore, be 9,490 tons, and to control this moving mass it is proposed to add two or three tons to the breaking power. This is the measure adopted on the Liverpool and Manchester line, but probably no alteration has been made on the main line; it must be evident that Captain Laffan's recommendation never pointed to so inadequate a measure, but to the introduction of a larger proportion of break vans in each train, or to some of the many valuable practical inventions for the simultaneous application of break power to all the carriages of a train.

Adopting the formula given by Captain Laffan, the express train should have been brought up in 1,092 yards, but it must be remembered, what I have already stated with regard to this signal, that its absolute meaning was to indicate not immediate, but doubtful prospective danger, the driver knew that all was right on the length in which he was travelling and that probably in a few seconds the signal would be lowered announcing that the next length was clear, he therefore did not adopt his strongest and what may be termed an extreme measure for bringing up his train, viz., that of reversing the gear of his engine, until he found the signal continued against him and under the circumstances he can hardly be considered in fault.

The traffic on the London and North Western Railway is so great that the Company cannot afford to have their telegraph stations at greater distances than they have, which is much less than on other lines where the system has been successfully introduced ; and as it would be a serious impediment to a fast train to draw up or slow at every mile and three quarters, or two miles, it is the more incumbent on the Company to adopt the most effectual methods for applying break power to their trains.

Since writing the above, I have read the general manager's letter of the 19th instant, containing remarks upon Captain Tyler's reports of the accidents of the 15th and 25th October, the tendency of which appears to throw discredit on the telegraph system of working trains. He says, "This agency, while removing one class of casualties, may introduce another class quite as serious in its results." And he goes on to remark, that " the frequency with which the driver sees the danger signal removed after he has come in sight of it, is not unlikely to cause greater danger by encouraging him to hesitate for a valuable moment in the expectation that the signal will, as possibly it has on every former occasion, vanish before he reaches it." These observations are intended to apply to the accident I am now considering, and I admit that the effect on the driver will be what he describes; but the solution of the objection will be found in a more discriminating exercise of discretionary power in dispatching slow trains in advance of quick ones, and above all in the adoption of an improved system of applying the breaking power, which on a line of such crowded traffic and with such extreme speeds as those on the London and North Western, is of the gravest importance.

I am quite aware of the great cost at which the directors have established a system of train signalling, and though not approving of the system in all its details, I must bear testimony to the laudable desire they have shown in this respect to advance the public safety.
As the other objections to the telegraph urged by the general manager have not been found to exist on other lines, where it is as extensively used as on the London and North Western Railway, with the best results, I am inclined to believe that they are due rather to defective instrumental arrangements and local circumstances than to the system.

Believing, however, the subject to be one of great importance, I shall be glad of an opportunity of discussing the subject more fully with the general manager.

As the policemen at the telegraph stations have to keep diaries in which the times of some of the trains have to be reported, and that they have also to inform the drivers in many instances of the times of the trains ahead, it appears strange that they should neither be supplied with clocks to their boxes, or be obliged to have proper watches.
I have, &c. The Secretary of the                                                                                                                        Geo. Wynne,
Railway Department, Board of Trade.                                                                        Lieut. - Colonel, Royal Engineers.

LONDON AND NORTH WESTERN RAILWAY.
Railway Department, Board of Trade,
Whitehall, 15th December 1856.
Sir,  
In compliance with the instructions contained in your letter of the 11th instant, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended the accident, that occurred on the 3rd instant, near the Denton Station of the Stockport and Staleybridge section of the London and North Western Railway.

Denton is four miles from Staleybridge, 2 1/4 miles from Guide Bridge, which lies between them, and 3 1/2 miles from Stockport. Between Guide Bridge and Denton the gradient first rises 1 in 125, and then, after a short level, falls 1 in 132, for upwards of a mile, into the latter station. Denton is protected, in the direction of Guide Bridge and Staleybridge, by a semaphore signal on the station platform, and a distant signal 386 yards from it ; the latter being worked by a lever close to the semaphore, and a wire, in the usual manner.

On the 3rd instant, the 8.10 p.m. passenger train from Staleybridge reached Denton at 8.28, between three and four minutes after its proper time ; and when it arrived, the semaphore signal was turned to danger; but the distant signal was left at all right. Almost immediately afterwards, two following engines came into collision with it, and injured nine of the passengers, all, probably, who remained in the train; and one of them, a girl 12 years of age, died, unfortunatelv, shortly afterwards from the injuries she received. The remaining passengers jumped out of the train in consequence of a warning from the guard, and were thus saved.

The passenger train, though a light one, consisting of an engine and tender, three carriages, and a van, had lost three minutes in slipping upon the incline leading from Guide Bridge towards Denton, which has already been referred to, partly in consequence of the very slippery state in which the rails are described to have been, and partly on account of a sharp curve which occurs on the incline.

On arriving at Denton, the guard, aware that the two engines had been waiting to follow him from Staleybridge, asked the station master whether the distant signal was on, and received a reply to the effect that it was not; he then directed it to be turned to danger at once, but before this could be done the following engines were heard to whistle, they appeared in sight, and the collision occurred.

There was a dense fog at the time, and the lights of the engines could not be seen, any more than those at the station far enough to be of any use under the circumstances of the case.


The two engined left Staleybridge three or four minutes after the passenger train—a pilot engine drawing a disabled engine, which had burst a tube, to Longsight for repair.  The regulations required that an interval of five minutes should be observed after the departure of the passenger train, but the station master at Staleybridge, an officer in the Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Company's service, states that he sent the engines away four minutes after the passenger train, knowing that they would be stopped for the remaining minute at a junction close at hand, in order to make room for another passenger train which was due to arrive at the station.  It appears that they were just brought to a  stand at this junction, and were then allowed to proceed.    They were also detained for three minutes at Ashton, a mile and a half Staleybridge ; and they were preparing to pull up at the distant signal at Denton when they found that signal at all right - concluding that the station was clear they then ran on down the incline, and came into collision with the passenger train as before described.

Looking to the time of their starting, and that of the collision, these men must have travelled at a speed of 18 or 20 miles an hour between Staleybridge and Denton. As they found the distant signal at the latter station at all right, they cannot be blamed for the collision; and certainly no fault would have been found with such a speed if no accident had occurred. 

The station master at Denton has one porter, a lad 17 years of age, to assist him at the station, who usually works the signals. On the evening in question the passenger train overshot the station by about 25 yards, and this porter, instead of at once turning on his distant signal, as he admits he ought to have done, proceeded to carry a package to the guard's van (to save the train from backing), and to attend to two passengers who were waiting for the train. The station master appears to have trusted to the boy to work the signal, and not to have thought about it until too late, but to have devoted all his energies to getting away his package and two passengers, and the train, with all speed.

The porter seems to be an intelligent, active, and well disposed lad ; and he was of course unaware of the near approach of the two engines; but he cannot for a moment be excused for not having put on his distant signal as soon as the passenger train arrived at, or came in sight of, the station ; and he must bear his share of the blame for not having done so. It may be considered that the station master ought to have seen that the lad did his duty in this respect, but, as he is obliged to leave the station in his charge for portions of every day, and thus to make him solely responsible in this respect, he can hardly perhaps be blamed for trusting to him on this particular occasion ; and as the train only stops at the station, ordinarily, for less than a minute, it is evident that, the signal not having been turned on, there was not much time for consideration about it. On this account I do not attach much importance to a discrepancy that exists in the statements of the guard and the station master, as to the question and answer that passed between them, according to the evidence of the former, in regard to this signal.

The work at this station is light, but the hours of work of this porter are in my opinion too long, inasmuch as he is kept on duty for periods extending over 14 and 15 hours on alternate days, with intervals of three half hours only for his meals.   
                                                                                                                                         .
Having stated the principal circumstances connected with this collision, I shall now proceed to consider the causes to which it is to be attributed.

Although the porter is not to be excused for omitting to employ the means that were placed at his disposal, it must yet be observed that it appears by no means clear that he would have prevented the collision, even if he had made use of his distant signal, for it is a question which cannot be positively decided one way or the other, whether the two engines were not following too closely after the passenger train to have rendered this signal of any use.

It is exceedingly probable that they were so, for supposing them, after pulling up with a view to stopping, if necessary, in obedience to the distant signal, to have run down to Denton, and against the passenger train, at an average rate of 13 miles an hour, they would then have taken about one minute in passing between the distant signal and the point of collision. Now, if this collision had not occurred, the passenger train would most likely have stopped, taken in its package and its two passengers, and started again, all in less than a minute ; and therefore it had not been at the station, probably, for a full minute when the collision occurred. If not, and if the two engines travelled down from the distant signal at the speed or at less than the speed above mentioned, then, even if the porter had turned on the distant signal, the collision would not have been prevented.

It is of no consequence to consider whether or no these suppositions represent what actually occurred. They may or may not do so. But there can be no doubt that it is quite possible that they may do so, that the two engines may have been, and perhaps were following the passenger train so closely that there was not even time to protect it when it stopped for a minute, or less, to take up a package and two passengers at this station ; that there may not have been and perhaps was not 400 yards between them; that these two engines were dashing after the passenger train through a dense fog, over slippery rails, round sharp curves, along heavy gradients, slipping up and slipping down, in labouring to proceed or in struggling to stop; and that if any accident had happened to check the progress of the passenger train on the road still more serious consequences might have ensued.

It is not right that the public safety should be endangered by such faulty arrangements. The five minutes interval allotted for their security is, notwithstanding its almost universal application over the lines in this country, a most inefficient protection, even when trains of the same description are following one another, and still more so when, as is more frequently the case, they differ in every important particular of power, speed, load, and stoppages. It is in an extended application of the telegraph only that this evil can find a remedy, and it is by ensuring an interval of space instead of an interval of time between the trains only that they can be prevented from interfering with each other, and gaining to a dangerous extent upon each other, even on short journeys.

I have lately had occasion to point out to the Directors of the London and North Western Company, in three remarkable instances, how desirable it is that they should thus provide for the safety of their passengers; and the present is the fourth case within four months which demonstrates the necessity that exists for employing this method over their many lines, not in the imperfect manner in which, as far as I understand, it has been adopted between London and Rugby, but by really enforcing the intervention of an interval of space between every two trains, of whatever nature, and by thus rendering collision impossible without evident mistake or neglect on the part of their servants.

I have, &c.
Secretary of the                                                                                                                                       H. W. Tyler,
Railway Department, Board of Trade.                                                                                   Captain, Royal Engineers.

MANCHESTER,   SHEFFIELD,   AND  LINCOLNSHIRE   RAILWAY,
Railway Department, Board of Trade,
                                                                                                                  Whitehall, March 25, 1856.
Sir,      
In compliance with the instructions contained in your letter of the 3d instant, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended the accident that occurred, on the 1st instant, near the Woodhouse Junction on the Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railway.

The Woodhouse Junction, between the Midland and Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railways, is six miles to the east of Sheffield, and is protected in the direction of the latter station by a wire signal, 700 yards from the junction, which can be seen for 1,380 yards. The whole of this latter distance, as well as a great portion of the former, is on a gradient falling towards the junction at the rate of 1 in 137.

As a Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire goods train was standing 150 yards within this distant signal, about half-past two o'clock on the morning of the 1st instant, an empty Great Northern passenger train, consisting of two engines and tenders, 14 empty carriages, and a break van, came into collision with it, at a speed variously stated to have been between 6 and 15 miles an hour.

The leading Great Northern engine had its buffer plank broken, and its chimney breast stove in. The body of the van at the rear of the Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire train was thrown upon the waggon in front of it, which, as well as that next to it, was broken to pieces; and two other waggons were damaged, the one losing its buffers, and the other its hornplates.

The driver and fireman of the leading Great Northern engine were cut and bruised about the head in jumping off, and, unfortunately, a poor man who was assisting in clearing the line after the accident had his arm taken off by the same engine, as it was being run backwards and forwards in a small space, which had been cleared between the two trains, for the purpose of pumping water into the boiler.

The Great Northern Company have running powers over this portion of the Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire line; and owing to this, and other circumstances, the two companies are not on the best of terms. It might, therefore, naturally be expected, that, on an occasion of this sort, the servants of either Company would be anxious to clear themselves, and lay the blame as far as they justly could upon their rivals ; or, at least, that such would be the tendency of any partial feelings which might be called forth. But, in the present instance, they have done far more, as I shall now proceed to explain; for the servants of each Company have been tolerably consistent in throwing the whole blame of the occurrence the servants of the other Company, in a manner that shows a most discreditable disregard of truth on the part  one of them; and it will be seen that there is no small difficulty in arriving at the truth in the presence of the conflicting statements which have been thus afforded.

The goods train, which consisted of an engine and tender, 41 waggons, and a break van, left Sheffield at 2.5, and arrived  Woodhouse soon after 2.20.  It is stated that the green light was shown to it from the Woodhouse distant signal as usual, approach, but that that light was turned to red before the goods train passed it, and so remained until after the collision ; and this statement is supported by the driver, tire-man, and guard of the goods train, as well as by a clearing house number-taker, who was riding in the guard's van. and by the pointsman who was on duty at the junction.

The several statements of these men, and the consistent manner  in which they were made,  would, if they were uncontradicted, leave no doubt of their truth.  The distant signal shows a red light behind as well as before, when it is set to "danger," and the Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire servants were thus enabled, as well as the number-taker, see from the rear that which was indicated from the front. The goods guard saw in this way that the distant signal was at danger immediately after the collision, and the number-taker observed the same thing two or three moments previously. The guard noticed the red light also after his train had come to a stand, and before the collision occurred ; but the fireman did not see anything of the distant signal after he had passed it. The number-taker, driver, and goods guard agree that the pointsman could not have altered his signal, because he was assisting in the shunting operations, and did not go to his box after their arrival until the collision occurred, and they all three, as well as the fireman, saw the green light of the signal turned to red as they approached it. This last circumstance is further corroborated by the fact that they had no waggons to leave at Woodhouse, and the consideration that they would not have stopped at that station if the red light had not been shown to them.

The Great Northern train left Sheffield at 2.26, according to the fireman porter, who was in charge of the station, and who looked at his watch when it started ; and at 2.18 according to the evidence of the guards. The time of its arrival at Woodhouse, or that of the collision, was probably not long after 2.30, because the goods train arrived soon after 2.20, and all agree that it had been there about ten minutes before the collision took place, as would also seem to be true from the work that was done.

There were two drivers, two firemen, and two guards with the Great Northern train. Neither of the guards observed the distant signal as they approached it; but both the drivers, and one of the firemen, state that they saw a green light exhibited, which was only altered to red when they were from 200 to 350 yards from it, whilst the other fireman saw the green light only, and did not observe it altered to red at all.

It is not possible that these men could have been mistaken, or could have been misled by what is called colourblindness, because they describe the alteration, at a particular time, of the green light to the red, or danger signal; and they agree so far as to say, two of them, that they were from 250 to 300, and the third, that they were from 200 to 300 yards from it when the alteration took place. It is not likely that they separately computed this distance with such accuracy, and so much in accordance with each other. On the contrary, it is highly improbable that three men, judging a distance under these circumstances, should, in stating from memory the independent impressions made upon their respective minds, all agree in its being between 200 and 300 hundred yards, and that two of them should agree to a yard in their statements.

It is not possible, in the presence of such conflicting evidence, to form an absolute opinion, as to whether the accident is attributable to an omission of the servants of the Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Company, in not setting the distant signal "at danger,'' or to the reckless driving of the men in charge of the Great Northern engines; but I may state, that the impression formed on my own mind, both from the substance of the evidence and the manner in which it was given, is that this signal was "at danger," when the Great Northern train approached it, and that the drivers of that train, from whatever cause, disregarded it until too late, and then, with the intention of throwing the blame upon the pointsman, instead of themselves, agreed to the statements above quoted.

There is no doubt that before the Great Northern train started from Sheffield, the leading driver was duly warned by his own guard to look out for the goods train at Woodhouse, and it would appear that both drivers saw the goods train leave the former station before them.

The next question to be discussed in regard to this accident is, whether or no the Great Northern drivers and firemen were sober.

They are all reported by their superintendent to be excellent men. Two of them have been three or four years in the service of the Company, and the other two 12 months, and no complaint has been during those periods preferred against any of them. The drivers had been working on that portion of the line since the commencement, on the 1st February last, of the competition cheap trains, run by the Great Northern Company, in opposition to the three Companies which were leagued against it.

According to their own evidence, as well as that of the guards who were with them, they were all perfectly sober, and had only drank, one of them two glasses, and two of them one glass each, of beer during the previous day; but the statements of some of the Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire servants are to a contrary effect, as will now be seen.

The foreman porter, in charge of the Sheffield Station, "saw the drivers and firemen before they started, and spoke to them, and they seemed to be perfectly sober."

The pointsman at Sheffield "could not say they were sober," nor "could not say they were drunk." He could smell them all of beer, as he stood on the steps of the engines. He "could see by their features that the beer had had some effect upon them." " They appeared to be all about the same," and he "did not see any difference." He " thought they were fit to drive on the line."   He " should say they had not had too much beer for that."

The clearing-house number-taker says, in regard to" the fireman and driver of the second engine, that he saw them after the collision, that "they were the worse for drink;" that "they staggered," and that he "could smell them of ale."

The driver of the Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire goods engine spoke to a Great Northern fireman after the collision, who called him by name. It did not "strike" him "that he was otherwise than sober," but his "fireman remarked to him that he was rather drowsy".

The fireman himself thought that this man "looked as if he had had a little beer."

The guard of the goods train considered that " the driver of the second engine and his fireman were the worse for drink. He " took particular notice of it, and called the attention of two men besides. The driver was not so bad as the fireman.  The driver and fireman of the first engine also both smelt of ale or porter."

The pointsman at Woodhouse "smelt the Great Northern men very strong of liquor, but did not know whether they were drunk or sober."
Of the people who saw them before they left Sheffield, it appears, then, that the foreman porter considered them perfectly sober, and that the pointsman smelt them all of beer, and thought them to be all equally under the effect of beer, which is not very probable, but still believed them to be fit to drive on the line.

Of those who saw them after the collision, the clearing-house number-taker, the goods guard, and the pointsman at Woodhouse, smelt them more or less of ale or porter; the number-taker, and the goods guard, thought that two of them were the worse for drink; the goods fireman thought that the second passenger fireman walked as if he had had a little beer, and the driver and the pointsman could not say that they were otherwise than sober.

It seems, therefore, that the evidence of their state before they left Sheffield, is not such as would justify an opinion that they were incapable of performing their duties at that time ; and that the evidence as to their condition at Woodhouse, some ten or twelve minutes after, would lead to the supposition that they had drank more beer than they admitted, but that they were not so bad as some of the witnesses on the other side would make them.

A beer can was found on the line near the Great Northern engines after the collision, and it was charged against the Great Northern Drivers, that they had therewith refreshed themselves too freely on the journey. The can was produced during my inquiry, and the drivers and firemen all protested that they had never seen it before. I therefore handed it to the superintendent of the Great Northern Railway, who undertook to have the circumstances connected with it brought to light; but 1 have since received the report of the Great Northern inspector of police, by which it appears that he is unable to discover  where the can came from, or by whom it was brought to the spot. ' Under these circumstances, I have requested that it should be forwarded to the Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Company, in order that similar inquiries might be instituted on their behalf.

It forms a further ground of complaint against the Great Northern Company, that no proper notice was given by them to the Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Company of the running of this train, which was an extra train, not provided for in the time tables.

The following are the circumstances of this part of the case : —

During the recent competition between the Great Northern Company on one side, and the London and North-Western, Midland, and Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Companies on the other, cheap trains were run by both parties to Sheffield, amongst other places ; and the 29th February having been the last day of low fares, the train which was due at 9 p.m. at Retford from London, was very late, on account of the great number of passengers it conveyed. The Great Northern station master therefore took upon himself the responsibility of sending away the local train to Sheffield at 10 o'clock, and of affixing an extra tail lamp thereto, as an indication that the other would follow, special, when it arrived. He also sent three written notices, one to Sheffield, another to Woodhouse, and a third to Worksop, of his intention of sending a special train down the Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire line, as soon as the regular train arrived from London; and he further informed the Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire signalman at Retford, of the circumstance, in order that the other trains might be cautioned.

The Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Company's Act provides for the framing of certain conditions, under which the Great Northern trains shall be run on this part of the line, which are to be agreed upon by the engineers of the two Companies, and, in the event of their not being able to come to an understanding, are to be settled by an engineer appointed by their Lordships. As no such conditions have, however, been laid down, it is clear that none can have been broken; and the Great Northern station master appears to have acted judiciously and carefully under the circumstances in which he was placed.

It may be stated, in conclusion, that this accident was probably attributable to the recklessness of the drivers of the Great Northern passenger train, but that the conflicting nature of the evidence afforded by the servants of the two companies, does not admit of the truth being more certainly ascertained without the intervention of some tribunal before which the several witnesses on both sides can be examined and cross-examined upon oath.

I have, &c.
The Secretary of the                                                                                                                                             H. W. Tyler,
Railway Department, Board of Trade.                                                                                   C                           aptain, Royal Engineers.

Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railway.
                                                                                                                   Secretary's Office, Manchester, March 28, 1856.
Sir, 
I have bid your favour of the 27th inst., enclosing copy of a report from Captain Tyler, in reference to the accident at Woodhouse, before the Directors.

The Directors observe that Captain Tyler states, that "the conflicting nature of the evidence afforded by the servants of the two Companies does not admit of the truth being more certainly ascertained, without the intervention of some tribunal, before which the several witnesses on both sides could be examined and cross-examined upon oath."

After this expression of opinion from the inspecting officer of the Board of Trade, the Directors consider it their duty at once to take the case before the tribunal indicated by Captain Tyler, and will have the parties, whom they consider at fault, summoned before the magistrates.
Perhaps their Lordships will instruct Captain Tyler to attend the investigation.

I have, &c.
Captain Gallon, Royal Engineers,                                                                                                                    E. Ross,
&c.  &c.  &c.         
                                                                                                                                      Secretary.
Railway Department, Board of Trade, 
Whitehall, April 30, 1856.
Sir,        
In my report of the 25th ultimo, on the subject of the collision which occurred on the 3rd of the same month, between a Great Northern empty passenger train and a Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire goods train, near the Woodhouse Junction, I stated that the accident was probably attributable to the recklessness of the drivers of the Great Northern train, but that the conflicting nature of the evidence afforded by the servants of the two Companies, prevented the truth from being more certainly ascertained without the intervention of some tribunal before which the several witnesses on both sides could be examined and cross-examined upon oath.

I also alluded to the case of a platelayer on the Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railway, whose arm was taken off by one of the Great Northern engines, as it was being run backwards and forwards, in a small space which had been cleared between the two trains, for the purpose of pumping water into the boiler.

This poor man has since died, and I have received the enclosed communications from the coroner who inquired into the circumstances of his death, by which it will be perceived, that the fireman of one of the Great Northern engines made statements, when examined before him upon oath, which leave no doubt that the accident in question was caused by the recklessness of the Great Northern drivers.

This fireman, whose name is Astwood, confessed that the two drivers and the other fireman, who were attached to the Great Northern train, had persuaded him to agree with them in making a false statement as to the colour of the signal displayed from the Woodhouse Junction, in order to screen themselves from blame, and to impute the accident to the alleged misconduct of the servants of the Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Company.

The names of the four men who combined in this discreditable manner to cast unmerited blame upon others for the sake of saving themselves, are, Hewitson, Moore, Edmonson, and Astwood.
I have, &c.
The Secretary of the                                                                                                                             H. W. Tyler,
Railway Department, Board of Trade.                                                                                     Captain Royal Engineers.
Thomas Wilkinson''s Death. Sir,                                                                                                                                                    Rotherham, April 22, 1856.
I am very much obliged by the copy evidence taken by you and of your report received this morning. I send you a Sheffield paper of Saturday last, wherein you will see some mention made of the adjourned inquest on Thomas Wilkinson, and as to what the witnesses had agreed amongst themselves to state to you.

The evidence of Astwood was (as is usual) taken by me on oath, and he admitted that he, with the other witnesses, had made a false statement to you.
I have, &c.
To Captain Tyler,                                                                                                                                              Thos. Badgor.
Board of Trade, London.
Thomas Wilkinson's Death.                                                                                                                                                 Rotherham, April 28, 1856.
Sir,    
According to your request, I beg herewith to send you an extract from the evidence given by William Astwood on the adjourned inquest.
I have.&c.

To Captain Tyler.            
                                                                                                                               Thos. Badgor.
Thomas   Wilkinson's Death. Inquest held at the Sheffield General Infirmary, Sheffield, on the 11th, and by adjournment on the 18th  of April 1856at the Town Hall in Sheffield.

Extract from the evidence of William Astwood of Retford, in the county of Nottingham, one of the firemen in the employ of the Great Northern Railway Company (fireman of the engine No. 20). "I had had only one glass of ale in the refreshment room. It is awkward for one man to manage an engine. It was one  of Hawthorne's engines. When they have a deal of steam in them, the regulator is awkward to open and shut. I was not  aware I was so near to the men; the engine blowing off made a great noise. I did the best in my power to manage her.  I admit the signal was on at red. Hewitson, the driver of the first engine, Moore, the driver of the second engine, and  Edmonson, the fireman of the first engine, came to me and persuaded me to say that the signal was green ; that they had all made up their minds to say it was green, and it would be worse forme if I did not also say so".

" I was examined by Captain Tyler, the government inspector, and so were John Hewitson, John Moore, and James Edmonson.  We had only 80 yards to run between the train we ran into and the Great Northern train."
W. Astwood. Taken upon oath, this 18th day of April 1856,
Before me,
Thos. Badgor, Coroner.

SOUTH-EASTERN  RAILWAY.

Railway Department, Board of Trade,
                                                                                                                                         Whitehall,  October 25, 1856.
Sir,    
I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, that I have inquired into the circumstances connected with a collision that occurred at the junction of the Angerstein Branch of the South-eastern Railway on the 30th September.

The junction of the Angerstein Branch is situated between the Blackheath and Charlton Stations of the North Kent Railway ; the branch itself is a short line for goods only, leading to a wharf on the Thames. The junction with the main line is not a direct one, but is made by a pair of back points through a siding on the down line ; ail trains have therefore to be shunted into the branch, which consequently involves the operation of getting a train into the branch a tedious one, especially if the train is a heavy one, as in this case the train has to be divided, the siding being on a steep ascending gradient; the advantage gained, therefore, by dispensing with meeting points is more than balanced by the blocking of the main line, and in my opinion a direct junction would be better than the present indirect one.

The junction has been left without signals, which is a serious omission ; had they existed the collision which I am about to describe would probably have been avoided. The South-eastern lines are worked by a carefully arranged system of electric telegraphing, which does not permit one train to follow another on a telegraph length until that length has been signalled clear. Every message as soon as it is sent and received is entered in a book, and the regulation is, that the man in charge of the station signal is to ask at the telegraph office if the line is clear before he turns off his danger signal. On the present occasion the signal man at Blackheath Station acted up to his instructions ; asked at the telegraph office if the down line was clear, and, receiving an affirmative answer, turned off the signal. The signal showed that the telegraph clerk gave a wrong reply, and the result was a collision at the Angerstein Junction. The way it happened appears to be this.

There are two boys employed in the telegraph office, the eldest a lad of about eighteen years, the youngest a boy of thirteen or fourteen years ; the latter, besides working the telegraph, goes of messages : they both appear to be competent to the work. Two books for entries are kept, one for the Angerstein Branch and the other for the main line ; the entries of the former are afterwards posted into the main line book. The senior boy was engaged writing when the 11 a.m. passenger train passed, but it was duly telegraphed by the younger boy, and properly entered in the book. At 11.37 the coal train arrived, en route to the Angerstein Branch, and the answer from Angerstein being received that ail was clear, the train was allowed to proceed; the younger boy entered its arrival and departure in the Angerstein book, and posted it in the main line book, and then went on a message.  When the 11.30 passenger train came in sight the signal man went to the office to ask it the line was clear, and received from the elder boy the answer yes ; of course the train was allowed to proceed, and the coal train not having got into the branch, it was run into by the passenger train.  The shunting appears to have taken a long time, in consequence of the train being too heavy to be shunted as a whole in: branch,  and had therefore to be divided; and it is for this reason I am of opinion that the direct junction, where no shunting  or dividing of trains is required, is a safer arrangement than the indirect one into a siding on a steep  gradient, which necessarily causes much delay. The telegraph clerk admitted having given the affirmative answer of the down line being clear, but said that he did not know that the coal train had passed, as he admits, however, that before answering he referred to the book, and as the entry was made of the coal train having passed, though not of the line being clear, his statement is simply untrue, or he did not make proper use of his eyes. This I believe is the first instance that has come under the notice of this department of an accident occurring when the traffic is worked under a good system of telegraphing; it tells nothing against the system, but only shows that the best arrangement will break down under gross carelessness ; it also teaches the lesson, that, however perfect the system may appear to be of working the traffic by means of the electric telegraph, it ought only to be used as an auxiliary to the ordinary station and distant signals; had the latter been in existence I believe the accident could hardly have happened. To explain how a junction came to be left without signals, it is necessary for me to state, that the Angerstein Branch being solely a goods' line it was not inspected by an officer of this department; and there is, moreover, some difficulty about the signal for the down line, from the circumstance of the junction being within a few yards of the east entrance of the Blackheath tunnel, and the tunnel being both on a curve and without a ventilating shaft it is usually full of smoke and steam; there would, therefore, be a difficulty frequently in seeing the signal until in the act of passing it; this, however, might be met by placing the distant signal at such a distance up the tunnel that, even if it could not be seen until in the act of passing it, there might still be sufficient space for the train to pull up before reaching the junction in case of the danger signal being on. There appears to be no reason for keeping separate books of entries for the branch and main lines ; and I would, therefore, suggest that all messages and replies should be entered at once into the main line book.
I have, &c.
The Secretary of the                                                                                                                         Geo. Wynne,
Railway Department, Board of Trade.                                                                        Lieut.- Colonel, Royal Engineers.

SOUTH  WALES  RAILWAY.
Railway Department, Board of Trade,
                                                                                                                                           Whitehall, December 8, 1856.
Sir,
I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, that I have inquired into the circumstances connected with a collision between two coal trains that took place on the South Wales Railway on the 7th October, between the Llansamlet and Landore Stations, in which the driver and fireman of one of the trains met with such serious injuries that they subsequently died.

Before entering into the particulars of the accident, I will describe the character of the line between Llansamlet and Landore. The distance between the two stations is 3 1/4 miles ; at about 40 yards from Llansamlet Station the line falls for 2 miles with gradients of 1 in 198,1 in 91, and 1 in 106; at the bottom of the last gradient the Swansea Vale Railway crosses the line on. the level; for about 1/4 of a mile from this point the line is on a level, and then ascends to Landore with gradients of 1 in 109, and 1 in 264. For the purpose of protecting the level crossing, a telegraph has been established at the point of crossing communicating with the two stations, and no train is allowed to be despatched .from either without the question being asked "Is the line clear?" and an affirmative answer received from the crossing on the Llansamlet side. A distant signal extends 539 yards up the line, which can be seen by an approaching down train a farther distance of 1,012 yards.

It is not unusual for coal trains to weigh from 400 to 500 tons ; in order therefore to ascend the gradients on the Landore side of the crossing, such weighty trains require to be brought down the incline on the Llansamlet side at very high velocities, and speeds of 40 miles an hour are not unusual. To each coal train a break carriage of no great power is attached, but the break power on which the main dependance is placed for stopping the trains or checking their speed is derived from the lever breaks attached to each waggon, which the guard applies by means of his foot, jumping for the purpose from waggon to waggon, or else clambering along their sides while the train is in motion. This most hazardous proceeding it is evident must be altogether impossible when the speed is high, and the danger imminent; and where such weights and velocities exist involving momentums of perhaps 30,000 tons, the signal I have described is not only useless, but is calculated to mislead by holding out a means of safety which does not exist.

I will now proceed to give the particulars of the collision.

The engine of a down cattle train broke down about three-quarters of a mile from Landore ; it was followed by a coal train of 21 waggons; the driver of this train states that, knowing there was a cattle train ahead of him with a disabled engine, he came down cautiously, with a number of breaks on; at the level crossing he received a caution signal from the policeman, and seeing a number of red lights in front of him, he reversed his engine and brought up his train without striking the cattle train, but the act of reversing broke the slide valve of his engine and consequently disabled it; the guard immediately went back to the crossing to desire the policeman to stop all trains from Llansamlet, which he said he would do, but desired the guard to show a white light in the event of his being able to get away. At the inquest this policeman gave the following account of his proceedings:--"About 25 minutes past 10 the passenger train was telegraphed at Llansamlet. I  looked towards Landore and I could not see at that time any light. I did not telegraph for  the train to come on until I was satisfied that the train which was stopped had gone on; I afterwards saw the red light on the tail of the train which had stopped," (that is, the coal train, for, in the mean time the engine of the cattle train had got up its steam and gone on,) " and after waiting again for some time, I telegraphed for the passenger train to come on. still kept on my danger signal." He here states no grounds, and he evidently had none, which would justify him in being satisfied that the train had gone on; and if he was satisfied, why did he still keep on his danger signal ? When I examined him he stated to me, "I telegraphed ' all clear,' because I thought that part of the coal train had gone on, from its having been there so long." In my opinion it is evident he must have been aware that the coal train was still on the line, and that he trusted to the signal to stop the passenger train coming down; and if it were otherwise, his reason for believing that it had gone on was very slight. I have noticed particularly this evidence of the policeman, because it will be seen further on that the station master of Swansea acted in the same manner, for which a verdict of manslaughter was brought in against him. I would say, the very fact of a distant signal being established, is an authority, in the absence of contrary orders, for the person in charge of the station to trust to its efficiency. In the instance of the passenger train it proved perfectly effective, as it stopped the train ; and the driver of it, after receiving a caution from the policeman, proceeded cautiously onward, and brought up in rear of the coal train; but it must be remembered that what would answer for a passenger train would be useless in the case of a coal train ; their momentums would be as 1 to 4 or 5. I would observe here, that it could only be a surmise on the part of the policeman that it was passenger train that was coming down, as the telegraph can only communicate "line clear," or "line blocked." While matters stood thus, the station master of Swansea came on to the ground; he made immediate arrangements for sending on the passenger train to Landore by crossing it on to the up line; and then having (according to the evidence of the policeman) taken every precaution not only to see that the danger signal was turned on, but that it was burning brightly, he ordered the policeman to telegraph to Llansamlet that the line was clear. There had been two or three messages previously to ask if line was clear, and a negative had each time been returned.

The station master's object was to relieve the Llansamlet Station from an accumulation of trains by passing them on, like the passenger train, down the up line past the obstruction; he trusted to the signal being sufficient to arrest the train in time for him to give the driver his instructions. It unfortunately proved otherwise ; the train, which consisted of 28 loaded coal trucks, representing a weight of about 480 tons, came rushing down at the rate of between 40 and 50 miles an hour.
                                                                                                                     
The fireman, who survived for a few days after the accident, states that they came down without steam and the tender break on, that they saw the danger signal at the farthest point from which it can be seen, and that he and the driver did all they could to stop the train, but without effect; the guard says that he was not aware of danger until passing the distant signal, when he saw it on, that he instantly put on his van-break, but that the danger was too imminent for him to venture on to the waggons to put down the breaks : the consequence was, that they ran into the other coal train with tremendous force. The policeman employed at the crossing, in his evidence at the inquest, said, "If left to my own responsibility I should have telegraphed  'all wrong.' I lay all the blame of the catastrophe entirely to Mr. Hancome (the station master)." He further says, "I did not know whether a goods, coal, or passenger train would come down." The policeman's evidence is not borne out by his acts with regard to the passenger train, which he signalled down when he must have been ignorant of its description. And he is, in my opinion, more in fault than the station master, for he never remonstrated with him about what he was going to do, nor ever pointed out to him that the coal trains came down at such high speeds as would render it impossible for them to be brought, up by the signal, a fact of which the station master might not be aware, but of which the policeman could not be ignorant. There was an order issued last March, in consequence of an accident on the Llansamlet incline, ordering the enginemen not to run between Llansamlet and Landore at a greater speed than that allowed in the time tables; 20 minutes by the time tables is the time allowed for doing the distance, which is at the rate of 10 miles an hour. To issue such an order for a line of the construction of that between Llansamlet and Landore, over which loads of 500 tons are drawn by single engines, must have been done with a perfect knowledge that it could not be acted upon and the traffic of the line maintained. And the General Manager admitted issuing an order previously, reducing the speed over other steep parts of the line, a special exception was made with regard to the portion between Llansamlet and Landore; and that the trains continued to run at much higher speeds must have been quite notorious; and therefore there could be but one object in issuing the order I refer to, viz.. to screen the Directors and the officers of the Company in the event of a fatal accident occurring from over-driving. Speeds of  40 and 50 miles an hour, with enormous loads, on such inclines as exist between Llansamlet and Landore, must be dangerous, on account of the uncontrollable momentum that would be generated; but that a far higher speed than that contemplated in the order referred to would, I believe, be not only safe, but also necessary to carry on the traffic. If the order of the 17th March had been enforced, the station master was, in my opinion, not only justified, but acted quite properly, in bringing down the train as he did, with a view of passing it along on the up line. And in this he was only following the ordinary practice on all railways when obstructions occur; if it was not to be enforced the distant signal would serve only to deceive, as it did, those entrusted with the conduct of the traffic, and the blame must rest with the management; to which also must be referred the great want of punctuality in the time of all the trains involved in the accident. I cannot express in language too strong the cruelty of exposing the guards of the coal trains to the danger they must run in applying the waggon breaks while the train is in motion: and if a fatal accident should occur to any of them while in the performance of this duty, a serious responsibility must rest with the Directors of the Company.

A deviation of the Swansea Vale Railway, which has been for some time in progress, is now completed, and the level crossing is therefore avoided by that line being passed under the South Wales Railway; but as I feel satisfied that economical arrangements will require the portion of line between Llansamlet and Landore to be worked at speeds higher than ordinary, I would recommend that the traffic between the two stations should be worked by means of the telegraph, and that but one train should be allowed on either line at the same time; and I consider it would be desirable that the telegraph should have the power of communicating something more than "line clear," or "line blocked," as, for instance, " train to proceed with great caution."

At the request of the locomotive superintendent of the Great Western Railway, I append a letter addressed to the public press by the chairman of the South Wales Railway, and a copy of the 23rd Article of the existing agreement between the Great Western and the South Wales Railway Companies; and I give the statement he made to me, viz. : —

" The joint committee have several times acted on the 23rd Article, and directed drivers to be fined and removed, and in all instances their recommendations have been attended to."
I have, &c.
The Secretary of the                                                                                              .                                  Geo. Wynne,
Railway Department, Board of Trade.                                                                                            Lieut.-Colonel, R.E.

"Article 23. The joint traffic committee may require any engineman or fireman to be removed for inefficiency or other reasonable cause; and if any requisition which may be made for that purpose shall not be complied with by the Great Western Company, the question shall be referred to the determination of the umpire."




Accidents 1856

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