ACCIDENTS APPERTAINING TO THE ROLLING STOCK AND ROAD.

 ACCIDENTS DUE TO FACING POINTS


CHESTER AND HOLYHEAD RAILWAY. 

Railway Department, Board of Trade,
                                                                                                                                             Whitehall, October 25, 1856.
Sir,
I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, that I have inquired into the circumstances connected with a collision that occurred at the Bangor Station of the Chester and Holyhead Railway on the 17th September.

The Bangor Station is a four-line station, that is, the up and down platforms are on sidings off the up and down lines. The points leading to these siding are weighted to keep open for the main lines. They have, therefore, to be held open for all trains arriving at the station. The points of the down siding are close to the western entrance of the Bangor tunnel. All down trains approaching whistle on entering the tunnel, and it is then the duty of the switchman, if the down siding is clear, to turn off the signal, and hold open the points for the train to go into the siding.

It appears that all trains, both passenger and goods, pass through the siding, and that the portion of the main lines between the points of the up and down sidings is used as a siding for any waggons that have to be left for the Bangor Station, or that are to be taken on from it; so that, in fact, the order of things has been reversed, and the sidings are virtually the main lines and the parts of the line which are kept clear of obstructions. It seems, therefore, a contradiction to the usual order of things to weight the switches to keep open that part of the line which is always encumbered with waggons, &c.

On the occasion of the collision I am reporting on, the driver of the night mail train from London gave the usual whistle on entering the Bangor tunnel for the signal to be turned off, which was done, and the driver proceeded, expecting to be turned into the down siding; but for some unaccountable reason the policeman stood by the points without opening them, and the train consequently ran into the waggons standing as usual on the main line. I was informed that immediately after the accident the policeman absconded, and has not since been heard of. The night porter stated that he saw the policeman turn off the signal for the train to come on, but cannot account for his not opening the points.

If the switches had been weighted to stand open for the siding the collision would have been avoided. For the reasons I have already stated I am of opinion that the normal condition of the points should be, to stand open for the siding, and  if the Company have no objection to urge against the points being so weighted, I recommend that they be altered to stand open for the sidings both on the up and down lines. In making this recommendation I desire to add my opinion, that nothing would justify the Company to trust alone to the action of these points for the safe working of trains through them. The danger of facing points is universally admitted, and I believe on every well-regulated line it is an established rule that such points are invariably to be held while a train is passing through them; and any Company that should neglect to enforce such a rule would incur a serious responsibility in the event of an accident occurring from the points not acting. When facing points are weighted to keep a train from running into an obstruction an additional element of safety is thereby introduced.
I have, &c.
The Secretary of the                                                                                                                      Geo. Wynne,
Railway Department, Board of Trade.                                                                         Lieut.-Colonel, Royal Engineers.


LANCASHIRE AND YORKSHIRE AND LONDON AND NORTH WESTERN RAILWAYS.
Hallway Department, Board of Trade,
                                                                                                                                        Whitehall, December 17, 1856.
Sir,
In compliance with the instructions contained in your letter of the 15th instant, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended the accident, that occurred on the 9th instant at Manchester, near the Victoria Station of the Lancashire and Yorkshire, and London and North Western Railways.

The east end of the Victoria Station is under the control of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company, and is used by that Company for their traffic to the north and east; but the west end is under the management of the London and North Western Company, and accommodates the traffic in that direction of both these and the Cheshire Junction Railway Companies.

Altogether, 103 trains pass in and out of the west end of this station every day. To accommodate this vast traffic, there are but two main lines, leading into three platform lines, which are used, according to necessity, for arrival or departure ; and into another—a standing line for carriages. As will presently appear, all the traffic both ways passes over a portion of, or across, what ought to be the departure line.

There are three sets of points only, to which it will be necessary to refer in the present report, namely, the "top points," leading from the arrival or up, to the departure or down line ; the "buffer points," leading to the southernmost platform line, on which there is a stationary buffer; and the "middle points"  leading to the middle line, which is, in fact, the third line from the south, but which is so called to distinguish it from the "back line"  to the north of it, which is used as a standing line for carriages.    A line between the middle line and the buffer line is called the "departure line.''

The top points are about 140 yards to the west of the nearest platform on the departure line; and the buffer points and middle points are, respectively, 70 yards and 110 yards to the east of the top points.

The following is the mode in which the traffic is ordinarily worked into the station:—

The trains approach at such speed as the judgment of the drivers may point out, according to circumstances; and, while they are in motion, the engine is uncoupled from the train about 100 yards to the west of the top points (or more or less according to the state of the atmosphere), and is brought to a stand on the up line at the same time that the detached train is turned across to the down line, or from thence into the buffer line or middle line, according to the state of the station. In order to save time in bringing out carriages, so as to make room for an incoming train, or for other purposes, the engine is sometimes turned across, in front of its own train, from the up line towards the buffer line, instead of being at once brought to a stand on the up line.

The engine is uncoupled from the train on the level, but the train afterwards runs down a gradient of 1 in 100, which commences about 50 yards to the west of the top points, into the station.

The London and North Western trains have always a guard in front of them as they approach the station, and, in some cases, with heavy trains, a guard in the rear also; the Lancashire and Yorkshire trains come in with a guard behind only, unless they are heavy enough to require two, in which case they have also one in front; and the Cheshire Junction trains, which, as before stated, also run into this station, adopt a similar arrangement.

On the 9th instant, a Lancashire and Yorkshire train arrived from Blackburn punctually at 9.57 a.m.; and, as it approached the station, the engine was uncoupled, while in motion, at the usual place. It first ran along the up line, and was then, in accordance with a previous arrangement entered into between the pointsman and the driver, and sanctioned by the station master, turned through the buffer points, so as to cross in front of its own train to the buffer or south line; while the train, consisting of seven carriages, including two break carriages, one at each end, followed it, to be turned through the middle points, and so on to the middle line. It was the duty of the same pointsman to work both these pairs of points, which, as has been previously explained, are 40 yards apart; and he would no doubt have done so, as usual, but for the circumstance that the carriages followed very closely after the engine, and that thus he had not time, after turning the engine through the buffer points, to run to the middle points, and turn the carriages in the opposite direction.

The carriages, therefore, ran down the departure line instead of the middle line, which had been prepared for them, and came into collision with an engine and carriages which were standing there, at a speed of five or six miles an hour, bruising one gentleman in the face, knocking out the tooth of another, and crushing the hats of several other passengers.

It would appear from the evidence that the carriages descended the incline with greater speed than usual after having been detached from the engine, but that they might even then have been stopped if they had been turned into their proper line. It is not clear whether this speed is attributable to the driver's having run in too fast, considering the weight of his train and the state of the rails, or to the neglect of the guard in not applying his break at the proper time. It seems that the engine had barely time to get out of the way of the carriages while crossing in front of them, though the guard says that he screwed his break tightly on as soon as the engine was uncoupled, and the driver and fireman state that they did not exceed the usual speed in running in. The foreman porter at the station, seeing what was about to occur, jumped up on the train and applied the front break, but not in time to be of much service.

The acting guard was a porter from Blackburn, who had done duty in that capacity thirty or forty times before, and had conducted trains seven times previously into the Victoria Station. The regular guard of the Blackburn train was absent on account of sickness. It is undoubtedly desirable that there should be a guard at the rear of every train running on the line, but it is also necessary to have a guard in front when entering this station in the manner above described, and particularly in so thick an atmosphere as that of Manchester; for, independently of the difficulty of determining from the last of seven carriages the amount of break power necessary to pull up the train at a given point, the guard is often unable to see anything at such a distance on account of the fog.

The collision was the result of a little extra speed given by the driver to, or permitted by the guard on, an arriving train, and was a very likely accident to occur under the system adopted for working the trains into the station. The officers and servants of the Company are in a great measure compelled to the adoption of that system, in consequence of the insufficiency of accommodation, and the necessities that exist with this heavy traffic for crossing the engines and trains in different directions, for making the most of time in getting the trains in and out again, and for keeping the platform lines clear as much as possible for arrival and departure.

There is sufficient difficulty in doing this safely when the trains are punctual ; but when they are not so (a not unfrequent occurrence) then the arrangements require to be continually altered according to the exigencies of each particular occasion. An improvement, though comparatively a slight one, might be made, by bringing the levers of the points together, and working them from stages, instead of employing the pointsmen to dart about, between, and across the engines and carriages, in some cases at no little risk to their lives. But what is principally required is the permanent enlargement of the station, and the establishment of separate arrival and departure platforms; and it behoves the Companies interested to take immediate measures for the prosecution of this object. The expense would, no doubt, be considerable ; but the step must be taken, sooner or later, to enable the increasing traffic to be carried on; and the shorter the delay, the less will be the risk arising from the present unsatisfactory state of the station.
I am, &c.
The Secretary of the                                                                                                                                  H. W. Tyler,
Railway Department, Board of Trade.                                                                                   Captain, Royal Engineers.


LONDON  AND  NORTH-WESTERN   RAILWAY.
Railway Department, Board of Trade,
                                                                                                                                               Whitehall, March 6, 1856.
Sir, 
In compliance with the instructions contained in your letter of the 27th ultimo, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended the accident, that occurred on the 18th ultimo, at the Huddersfield Station of the London and Northwestern Railway.

There is a passenger platform on the "up" side only of this station, the other side being devoted to the goods' traffic; and all the down trains have to cross the up line on their arrival, in order to get to the siding which is alongside of the platform

To the west of the station there is a tunnel, and in the centre of it a junction, called the Springwood Junction, and communication is kept up by telegraph wires between the signalmen at either end of the tunnel and at this junction. Two men are posted at the station end of the tunnel to attend to the instruments and signals, and to work the points; and there are other pointsmen at different parts of the station. A signal worked by the signalman at the tunnel mouth serves to warn any trains approaching on the up line from the other end of the station.

On the 18th ultimo the 11.50 a. m. passenger train from Manchester, consisting of an engine and tender, five carriages, and a van, reached Huddersfield punctually at 1.17. The signalman at Springwood Junction announced its approach by the usual telegraphic notice to the signalman at the station end of the tunnel, and the latter repeated the message as an indication that all was right.

A minute or two afterwards, the pointsman at the middle of the station held up his arm to announce to the signalman at the end of the tunnel that an up coke train was coming from the direction of Leeds. The signalman perfectly understood him, and at once turned his signal to "all right," to allow the coke train to come on ; and the consequence was, that the engines of the two trains met at the crossing, whilst the up coke train was proceeding on its own line through the station, and the down passenger train was about to cross the up line in order to get to the platform.

There were about fourteen waggons in the coke train, and it was travelling at a rate of five or six miles an hour when the collision occurred, the speed of the passenger train having been still more reduced. It was exceedingly fortunate, however, that the engine of the coke train struck the engine of the passenger train instead of the carriages. As it happened no injury was sustained by the passengers, and none of the waggons or the carriages were damaged. The engines did not leave the line, but the outside framing was torn off the goods engine, and the buffer plank, axle box, and one of the cylinders of the passenger engine, were broken. The breaksman of the coke train unfortunately had his foot crushed, and four of his toes have since been amputated.

The facing points which conduct the down trains from the down to the up line, are fifty-three yards from the signalman's box ; they are self-acting, and are kept set for the up line. The signalman perceived the mistake he had made, in allowing both trains to come on at the same time, directly he heard the passenger train in the tunnel; and if his presence of mind had not to a certain extent failed him at the moment, he might have run forward and altered the points, so as to allow the passenger train to proceed on the down line of rails instead of crossing to the up line and getting in the way of the coke train. He was engaged, however, in signalling to the drivers to stop their trains, and it did not occur to him until too late that the collision might thus have been prevented.

This accident was entirely caused by the momentary forgetfulness of the signalman, and he has been under suspension since it happened. He has been eight years in the service of the Company, and no previous complaint has been made against him; and he has served three years at that particular post with great credit. He fully admits his fault on this occasion, and is naturally exceedingly sorry for what has happened.

Looking to the nature of his former services, the Company are inclined to take a merciful view of his case, and to allow him now to return to his post, in the belief that they could not intrust the duties, which are complicated and difficult, to a better man ; and, under all the circumstances of the case, I cannot but concur with them.

The only recommendation that this accident appears to call forth is, that, for the future, the facing points for the incoming trains should be invariably attended by a pointsman whilst a train is passing over them. I think this desirable, as well for the safety of the train itself, as it passes over the facing points, as for the purpose of securing it from collision, either in a manner similar to that now referred to, or against a train standing on the down line, in case the points should not return, after the passage of a former train, to their usual position.
I have, &c.
H. W. Tyler,
The Secretary of the                                                                                                                        Captain Royal Engineers.
Railway Department, Board of Trade.


LONDON  AND  NORTH-WESTERN  RAILWAY.
Railway Department, Board of Trade,      
                                                                                                                                     Whitehall, June 7, 1856.
Sir,     
In compliance with the instructions contained in your letter, of the 22nd ult., I have the honour to report for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances connected with the fatal accident, which occurred at Edge Hill, on the London and North Western Railway, on the 17th May.

It appears that about 8 1/2 p.m., as a Stour Valley goods train was passing towards the sidings at Wapping, after having deposited various waggons in the Waterloo goods sidings, both of which sidings are immediately contiguous to Edge Hill, whilst in the act of passing over a pair of self-acting facing points, used for turning the traffic from the straight road to Wapping, towards the passenger station at Edge Hill, the leading waggon, laden with boiler plates, was thrown off the rails, and after striking a check rail at a crossing and running rather more than forty yards, was diverted across the rails to the left, and finally upset on its right side: and the breaksman, who was improperly riding in this waggon (in accordance with the usual custom when shunting) instead of in his own van, fell under and was crushed by the waggon, and was taken out in a dying state, from under the second waggon, and shortly afterwards expired.

The train is stated to have been proceeding at about seven or eight miles an hour, the engine (Bulldog) having shifted its position from the front to the rear of the train, behind the guard's break van, when placing the waggons in the Waterloo sidings.    At the time of the accident the train only consisted of an engine and tender, break van, and three waggons.

The points at which the waggon was thrown off were, as already stated, self-acting and weighted to stand open for the straight line to the Wapping sidings. The weight attached to the lever was lcwt. lqr. 19lbs.; the point rails were twelve feet long, and fish-jointed at the heels, and they are stated to have been in perfect order immediately before the accident occurred.

About ten minutes before the accident, whilst an excursion train was standing on the up line of rails, the pointsman held these points, from the opposite or north side of the railway, whilst the 8 a.m. parliamentary train from London passed on the down line towards Edge Hill passenger station; and a few minutes after it had passed, the pointsman on hearing the sound of a whistle in the direction of Edge Hill, got on the buffers of a carriage of the excursion train and looked down the line. On seeing that all was clear, he signalled for an engine (the Gorgon), which was on its way to the shed, to come on, and it accordingly passed over the same pair of points; but in an opposite direction to the parliamentary train.

In doing so, it opened these self-acting points, and the pointsman states that he not only heard the noise of their falling back, but also observed, as he stood on the buffers, that they were properly closed after the "Gorgon" passed over them. In a few minutes more the Stour Valley goods train passed towards Wapping, and the accident occurred. The two other waggons and the break van, which now stood next to the engine, and the engine and tender all passed on, and remained on the line to Wapping, and the waggon which was overturned was not uncoupled.

The state of the point rails was looked to immediately after the accident occurred, and the point of the right one was found slightly indented where the waggon wheel had apparently mounted. Two of the chairs at the heels of the points were found broken, and the marks of the wheels, where the waggon had got on the ballast, were plainly seen. Thus far no visible cause for the accident had been traced; but on further examination it was found that the rod which supported the weight attached to the lever was broken, so that the points were no longer weighted to stand open for the straight line to Wapping.                                                                                                                                                

Some experiments were made, for my information, of the effect of passing a train from Edge Hill, and from Wapping, over the same pair of points, with the weight detached from the lever, and it was clearly proved, that on passing on the straight line from Wapping the wheels effectually closed the points against a train going to Edge Hill; but that on passing out from the curved line from Edge Hill, the right point rail was left open to the extent of about 1 1/2 inches, a sufficient quantity to cause a waggon propelled from behind to mount the right point rail, whilst the dropping down of the opposite wheels between the left point rail and the rail would have the effect of closing, or making the points right for the following waggons going to Wapping.

As the result of my investigation I should state, that I believe the accident resulted from the breaking of the rod carrying the weight for the lever, and that such breakage was probably occasioned by the jar of the falling back of the points, which took place when the Gorgon engine had passed over them towards the engine shed.

I do not doubt the pointsman having heard the noise of the falling back of the points after the Gorgon passed over them ; but I cannot credit his statement that he saw them properly closed, and thus far fair for the Wapping line.

One of the company's regulations directs, that facing points should be tried prior to the passage of trains over them, to ascertain that they are in proper order; but it was explained to me that in consequence of the amount of traffic, at this point, this was not insisted on.

I know of no other means of avoiding this class of accident than by the disuse of facing points, or causing them to be held for all trains meeting them; the first alteration is probably quite out of the question, but I do not see any sufficient cause why the latter should not be invariably adopted. I enclose a tracing showing the spot where the accident occurred.
I have, &c.
The Secretary of the                                                                                                                                 W. Yolland,
Railway Department, Board of Trade.                                                                             Lieut.-Colonel, Royal Engineers.


LONDON AND  SOUTH-WESTERN  RAILWAY .
Railway Department, Board of Trade,
Sir,                                                                                                                                                         19th December 1856.
I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, that I have inquired into the circumstances attending a collision that occurred at Northam on the London and South Western Railway on the 20th October.

Northam is about a mile from Southampton, and is the goods yard of that station. On the day of the accident the driver of the yard-engine was standing with his engine on along siding that runs alongside of the down line ; in the centre of this siding there is a pair of points leading to the down line; these points are weighted to keep open for the crossing leading on to the main line; one pointsman had charge of these points and all the others in the yard; close to the points there stands a signal, which, when turned on, indicates that nothing is to leave the yard; the points faced the engine where it was standing. The driver states that, believing the points led into the continuation of the siding, he put his engine into motion. The moment that he discovered his mistake, knowing that the 1 p.m. train from London was due, he put on steam, with the intention of getting ahead of it, but there was not time; the waggons that he was drawing were struck by the passenger engine, which was thrown off the line ; the concussion threw the driver off the yard-engine, which having full steam on, ran on, and was not brought up until it came in contact with the end of the station at Southampton, part of which it threw down.

The conduct of the driver, if sober, is unaccountable, for he was an old hand, and had been frequently let through these points, and therefore must have known how they were weighted, and the signal moreover was turned against him.

I consider it to have been a great mistake weighting the points so as to lead to danger, that is, into the main line. Since the accident the weight has been reversed, and the points stand open for the siding continuation; it would be a useful additional precaution if there was an arrangement for locking or pinning back the points so as to close them against the main line. I should prefer the latter expedient, as being equally efficacious and less troublesome, the danger to be guarded against being carelessness, not wantonness.
I have, &c.
The Secretary of the                                                                                                                             Geo. Wynne,
Railway Department, Board of Trade.                                                                    Lieut-Colonel, Royal Engineers.


MANCHESTER  SOUTH  JUNCTION  AND  ALTRINCHAM  RAILWAY.
Railway Department, Board of Trade,   
                                                                                                                            Whitehall, February 12, 1856.
Sir,            
In compliance with the instructions contained in your letter of the 2d instant, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my enquiry into the circumstances which attended the accident that occurred on the 26th ultimo, near the Oxford Road Station of the Manchester South Junction and Altrincham Railway.

At this station there is a platform on one side of the line only, which is approached by a siding leading from the down line.                                                                                                                                                            .

Passenger trains starting from the Oxford Road Station for Altrincham come out therefore on the down line in the first instance, and are then turned over a cross-over road to the up, their proper line of rails. The siding points, and those leading to the up line, are within a few yards of each other, and are about ninety yards from the station platform.

Between eight o'clock in the morning and  a quarter to ten at night there is a regular pointsman to attend to these and other points, and to work the signals; but a passenger train leaves the station at eleven p.m. which is turned across two nights in the week by the pointsman, and two nights by each of two porters belonging to the station. In fact, these men take it by turns to remain the extra hour, and they are allowed to come on duty an hour later on the following morning. The signalman and porters are also allowed to go off duty at a quarter to six p.m. on two nights in each week.

Five or six through goods trains pass the station in the course of the night, but there is not ordinarily, I am informed, any occasion for the working of the points and signals after the departure of the eleven p.m. passenger train, and the points being set right for the goods trains, the signal lamps are put out, and the station is left  in charge of a night watchman between eleven p.m. and eight a.m.

On the night of the 26th ultimo, the porter appointed to work the points for the eleven p.m. passenger train, left the platform with his hand lamp immediately before the departure of the train for that purpose, but, on arriving at the end of the siding, he caught up the lever of the points leading to the down line instead of the lever of those leading to the cross-over road. The passenger train ran forward therefore along the down line, instead of crossing to the up line, and came into collision with a goods train which happened to be standing there in obedience to the signal exhibited, and to be waiting for the passenger train to pass out. Six of the passengers were unfortunately injured, though the speed of the train was not great.

The porter who made the mistake had been nearly five weeks in the service of the company, and had performed this duty on three previous occasions. He was employed before in some neighbouring bleaching works. He had worked principally during the period that he had been in the company's service as a carriage washer, but he appears to have also had a good deal of experience in the working of the points at the other end of the station; and, according to the statement of the regular pointsman, he was instructed some twenty times by him in the working of the points in question, and had assisted at them some ten times in shunting operations. The porter himself, however, could not remember having received such instruction on more than one occasion, though he thought that he had sufficient knowledge in regard to the points, and would not have made such a mistake in daylight.

The system of sending any porter at night from the platform to these points, to work them for a train which is following him, is not a safe one ; and, in the case of a man comparatively inexperienced, the risk is increased. This accident may therefore be attributed partly to the faultiness of the system in force, and partly to the want of experience of the man employed.

I am informed, however, that in order to avoid the necessity for a porter leaving the platform in future for such a purpose, the night watchman is now being trained to the duty of working these points, with a view to his being stationed at the spot in readiness for the departure of the train question.
I have, &c.
The Secretary of the                                                                                                                                   H.W.Tyler,
Railway Department, Board of Trade.                                                                                    Captain, Royal Engineers.


MANCHESTER,   SHEFFIELD,   AND  LINCOLNSHIRE  RAILWAY.
Railway Department, Board of Trade, 
                                                                                                                                    Whitehall, December 23, 1856.
SIR   
In compliance with the instructions of the 22d ultimo, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended a collision that took place on the 18th November, at the Barnsley Junction, Penistone, of the Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railway.

At about 9.40 a.m., on the 18th ultimo, a train of eleven coal waggons left Silkstone for the Weigh Siding at the Barnsley Junction, Penistone, and on emerging from the tunnel the driver gave the usual signal to the signalman that he had waggons for the siding, and the signalman came down to the facing points, which are self acting, and weighted to stand open for the main line, and held them open whilst the waggons and engine passed through into the siding; the engine entering last. The signalman then proceeded to scotch the wheels of the coal waggons, in which he was assisted by the guard, the siding being situated on an incline, and the fireman detached the engine, which then left the junction for Barnsley, passing out of the siding over these points in order to bring up the 10.25 a.m. passenger train from Barnsley, stopping on the way down for water.

The 10.25 a.m. passenger train, with four timber waggons on in front, left Barnsley a few minutes late, stopped at Dodworth and Silkstone, and on emerging from the tunnel the driver sounded the whistle for the main line, and both the distant and semaphore signals were lowered to allow the train to proceed. The driver states that he shut off his steam at the Penistone end of the viaduct, or about 18 chains from the main line, and he thinks he was travelling at that time about 14 miles an hour; but his son (the fireman) estimates the speed at from 20 to 30 miles an hour. As the engine approached the self-acting points before referred to, the fireman called out to the driver to "hold on," and he put on the tender break; and the driver says he was in the act of reversing his engine as it struck the coal waggons, after passing into the siding, instead of continuing on the main line, as it should have done had the points been in their proper position.                                                               

Four passengers and the guard and fireman were injured by the collision.

These facing points were put in on the Barnsley main line somewhere about three months ago, when new sidings were put in at this junction ; and I am informed that it was originally intended to have connected these points with the signal stage distant 73 yards from it, and to have worked them from it by lever. It is to be regretted that this intention was not carried out.

When the state of the points was looked to immediately after the accident, they were found standing half open, and there was a mark on the rail about a yard from the point of the switch, as if a stone had been recently crushed, and some of the broken parts of the stone had fallen down on the chair, and it is said that the points would not close, unless the handle of the lever was let go with a jerk.

It is also stated, that some of the passengers tried the points immediately after the accident, and before they were seen by any of the Company's servants, so that I have not been enabled to obtain conclusive testimony as to their actual state at that time.                                                                                                                                                                                        

A block of wood was found close to the points of the proper length for propping them open, and a platelayer on the line stated that they were propped open to let the coal waggons into the siding at 9.40 a.m., and he said that he told his ganger immediately afterwards, but this is denied by the ganger. It is, however, certain that he repeated the statement to him on the following morning. But the asserted fact is strenuously denied by the pointsman, engine driver, fireman, and guard. In the absence of disinterested evidence, I am unable to decide between these conflicting statements; but my impression is against any block of wood having been used, and in favour of their having stuck from other causes when the engine passed over them in coming out of the siding.

But the frequency of the accidents at facing points on the main lines obliges me to recommend, that in all such cases they should be either locked or connected with the signal boxes and worked by lever, the pointsman being directed to try them prior to the passage of every train over them.
I have, &c.
Captain Galton Royal Engineers,                                                                                                       W. Yolland,
&c.                                                                                             Lieut.-Colonel, Royal Engineers.


MONMOUTHSHIRE   RAILWAY.
Railway Department, Board of Trade,  
                                                                                                                                     Whitehall, November 29, 1856.
Sir,    
In compliance with the instructions contained in your letter of the 25th instant, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances connected with the accident on the Ebbw Vale branch of the Monmouthshire Railway, on the 19th instant.

When the 12.0 up passenger train from Newport to Blaina and Ebbw Vale, on the 19th November, had reached the Aberbeeg Junction, 15 miles from Newport, the portion intended for Ebbw Vale, consisting of a tank engine, four loaded trucks of ore, and three passenger carriages, were sent forward, as usual, at 1.30 p.m.

This train had not, however, got more than 800 yards from the junction, when, in passing over a pair of facing points, leading to the Penyvan Colliery siding, situate on a rising incline of 1 in 69, the engine mounted the rails, ran for a distance of 25 or 30 yards between the two roads, then crossed obliquely to the left over the rails of the siding, and fell over a steep bank, of about 20 feet in height, into a field, crashing through, and overthrowing a small tree in its progress.

The engine is supposed to have turned completely over, and then fell on its left side, as the leading wheels were found pointing down the valley and line.

The driver escaped with some severe bruises ; but I regret to state that the fireman was found lying between the bank and the engine, opposite to, and about six feet from, the safety valves, which were on a level with his breast, apparently scalded to death, but not otherwise injured. None of the passengers were hurt.

When the engine ran down the bank, the draw-bar broke short off in the buffer plank, and the trucks of ore remained on the top of the bank; but all were off the rails, between the siding and the main line; whilst the passenger carriages were all on the siding with the exception of the front wheels of the leading carriage, which were off the rails towards the main line.

The line between Aberbeeg Junction and Ebbw Vale is single throughout, and the facing points leading to Penyvan siding, are always kept locked; and a stop block is placed about 50 yards higher up than the points, to prevent trucks from accidentally running on to the main line.

The facing points are placed on a part of the line where it curves sharply to the right, the radius being 10 chains ; the siding going off nearly in the direction of the tangent to the curve, but, if anything, slightly inclining to the left. The cant of the rails is said to have been 5 1/2 inches.

The driver states that he was travelling about nine or ten miles an hour, and that when the engine mounted the rails, he at once shut off the steam, and called to his fireman to put on the break, and that he believed the points were open to the main line as he came up to them.

After the accident he went and particularly examined them, and he found that the left point-rail was bent at one or two places, and the iron rail was quite bright at the heel; the heel chair of the right point-rail was split, and several intermediate chairs, in the siding and on the main line, were also broken; and the end of the rail abutting against the right pointrail bore marks of having been heavily struck.

The stop block on the siding was in its proper position across the rails and locked, and the end of the handle of the lever was found to be raised from 4 to 6 inches above its proper position. The point rail opposite to the lever handle was open about half an inch, and the end of the left point-rail was open about two or three inches, and the rail bent for a distance of 12 or 15 inches. The lever was found secured by means of a chain and a padlock (which was locked), to an iron staple driven into the wood, but the staple was found drawn from the wood and hanging loose. The rails were displaced where the engine crossed the siding, but not torn up.

The engine has outside cylinders with 6 wheels, coupled ; weight on the leading wheels, 9 tons 12 cwt., and 10 tons on the trailing wheels : total weight, 29 tons 9 cwt. It was made by Stothert and Slaughter, and delivered in September 1854. The distance between the leading and trailing wheels is 11 feet. It is said to have been in very good order at the time of the accident.  The leading springs which are of india-rubber, and the trailing springs of steel were uninjured after the accident, but the centre springs belonging to the driving wheel were broken; they were volute steel springs, and they were found on the top of the bank about 10 yards beyond the spot at which the engine is supposed to have first mounted the rail.

The wheels of the engine were found correct in gauge after the accident.

The driver thinks the engine mounted at the heel of the points, which are 12 feet in length, and of the ordinary construction, with two tie bars and one connecting rod. The gauge of the rails is said to have been 4 feet 8 3/4 inches at this curve.

The switchman at Penyvan siding unlocked the points and the stop block about half-past 11 a.m. for a train to enter the siding, and he did not lock them again until the engine came out with 12 coal trucks. Two trains passed down the main line, one with 25 trucks about half an hour, and the other with 4 trucks about three quarters of an hour after the coal train came out of the siding; but no train afterwards went up the line, before the one to which the accident occurred.

The Inspector of permanent way pa|sed down the line at half-past 12 o'clock, at which time the points were all right, and one of the platelayers informed me, that he saw the spot half an hour before the accident occurred, and at that time there was nothing wrong with them.

I have attentively considered the whole of the circumstances connected with this accident, and am unable to offer a decided opinion as to its cause.

I see no grounds whatever for suspecting that it arose from any neglect on the part of the Company's servants. I have no doubt that the engine quitted the rails at the points, and my impression is, that it mounted before it reached the end of the point rail, dropped between the left point rail and the other rail, bending the former at the spot at which it dropped, and also at its end. by the power acting against the locked lever of the points until the staple was forced upwards and allowed the points to open, and I can only surmise that it left the rails from the tightness of the gauge of the rails, and the sharpness of the curve, the versed sine of the arc subtended by the leading and trailing wrheels being somewhere about 28 inches.
I have, &c.
The Secretary of the                                                                                                                                  W.  Yolland,
Railway Department, Board of Trade.                                                                         Lieut.-Colonel, Royal Engineers.


SOUTH-EASTERN RAILWAY.
Railway Department, Board of Trade    
                                                                                                                                 Whitehall, November 17, 1856.
sir,   
In compliance with the instructions contained in your letter of the 4th instant, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances connected with the collision which occurred on the 30th ultimo, near the Deptford Station of the Greenwich Branch of the South Eastern Railway.

The Mine along this line of railway, which is about 3 3/4 miles in length, is at the present time carried by trains which leave  London Bridge and Greenwich  Stations every quarter of an hour, starting five minutes after the quarter hours.

Every alternate down train, instead of proceeding to the arrival platform at Greenwich, is turned off to the up line, by a pair of facing points and a cross-over road, commencing at about 153 yards from the Greenwich Station, and the train stops at the departure platform. In a similar way, every alternate train leaves the arrival platform at Greenwich, situated at the side of the down line, and is diverted to the up line by a pair of self-acting facing points, weighted to stand open for the cross-over road leading to the up line. These facing points (which led to the accident) are 160 yards distant from the Greenwich Station, and 110 yards from the signalman's box, where a pointsman is placed, whose duty it is to signal all trains in and out of the station, and to hold the facing points for turning a down train towards the departure platform on the up line.

The trains start from, and arrive at, Greenwich at about the same time; sometimes the down train arrives before the up train is timed to start, and, in that case, the up train, if it is leaving the arrival platform, is kept until the down train has crossed over to the up road;  whereas, if such down train has not arrived at the appointed hour, then the departure of the up train from the departure platform is protected by a distant signal, worked from the signal-box, from which it is 245 yards distant. This signal stops a down train from approaching the facing points and cross-over road.

The traffic is usually worked by means of tank engines.

On the night of the 30th October, the 8.35 p.m. down train from London Bridge passed along the down line, and stopped at the arrival platform at Greenwich at about 8.50 p.m.

At 9.5 p.m., the same train left the same platform (the arrival platform) on its way to London, and, had all been right at the facing points, it should have passed over the cross-over road before referred to, and got on to the up line ; but, instead of doing so, it continued its course on the straight road along the down line, which it should have quitted at 160 yards from the station.

The driver of this train informed me, that prior to its starting he was in the signalman's box, getting some tea and making out his time bill for the day's work, so that he did not bring his train out of the station ; the fireman brought it out, which was not an unusual occurrence ; that he got on the engine at the signalman's box, and he thinks he had his time bill in his hand as he jumped on the engine, and then he put it into his pocket; that he brought his tea-can with him out of the signal-box, and, when he got on the engine, he stood it down by the fire-box ; that he then took charge of the engine, and went on some distance, keeping a good look-out, when he heard a slight noise which seemed to be at the side of the engine ; that he thought it was occasioned by the key in the large end of the connecting-rod working slack ; that he took the gauge-lamp out of the holder, and held it down by the side of the engine, and made sure that the noise was not due to that cause; that on bringing the lamp back he shut off the feed-cock, and was then about to return the lamp into the holder, when his fireman asked if he had done with it, and he gave it to him ; he then put his hand on the spring-balance and held it down for a moment, then looked at the fire, the door being partly open, and, whilst doing so, his time bill dropped out of his pocket on to the foot-plate; that he picked it up, looked to see what it was, and then put it again into his pocket; that he had no occasion to read it, as it was all complete at that time ; that if it had not been complete it could not have been afterwards done, as his right hand was hurt; that when he stood up, after looking at the fire, his eyes were dazzled, but he soon became aware that he was on the wrong line; that he does not know exactly what it was that first made him aware of the fact, but thinks he was conscious of it before he saw the red lights of the down train, which was advancing towards him; that he immediately shut off the steam, then reversed the engine, and put on the steam the reverse way; that he called to his fireman to put on the break, and the latter placed his hand on the break and made a curious noise, as if he was confused or frightened, but the break was not applied; the fireman had the lamp in his hand at the time, and he endeavoured to put it in the holder. At this time he saw the driver of the 8.50 p.m. down train looking towards him, and he says he had then a great mind to jump off, but refrained from doing so, as he thought the engine would run back without control into the Greenwich Station; that he touched the steam-whistle, but it was only a touch, and he does not think the guard could have heard it. He considers that he was running at the rate of 15 miles an hour when the collision occurred, and that he had run about 100 yards after he had shut off the steam.

I have been particular in giving the driver's full explanation of the circumstances, because it cannot fail to strike every person as very extraordinary, that he should, according to his own showing, run more than a quarter of a mile on the wrong line of rails without discovering it. The distance between Greenwich Station and Deptford Station is about 870 yards, and the spot at which the collision occurred is 670 yards from the former station.

It is no part of the driver's duty to see that the points are in order, and those he had to pass over to cross to the up line were self-acting points, weighted to stand open, as I have already stated, for the cross-over road ; but it is his duty, most undoubtedly, to keep a sharp look-out, and that does not appear to have been done on this occasion. It is true that the whole distance to the next station is short, and there is no doubt that the fact of running for a great number of years (he had been employed as a driver on this line for 12 years), without any serious accident occurring, begets confidence, and confidence leads to heedlessness, so that I am not so much surprised that the driver did not sooner discover that he was on the wrong line; but it is unquestionable that the driver seriously neglected his duty in not keeping a better look-out.

The duty of the signalman is to look to these points ; to hold others close to them that are required to turn a down train towards the departure platform ; to attend to others close to his signal box, and also to the signals ; but as the signalman's box and signals are 110 yards from the first-named points, it is manifest that he cannot be at the two spots at the same time. It formed no part of his duty to hold these self-acting points, and it is not done. The signalman states that these points were all right half an hour before, as an up train from the same platform passed over them at that time; and it appears to me that it must have been the down passage of this particular train leaving London at 8.35 p.m., and arriving at Greenwich at 8.50, that left them open for the down line, instead of for the cross-over road, and thus allowed the same train to proceed towards Deptford on the down or wrong line.

The shock of the collision with the 8.50 p.m. down train must have been very severe, although neither engines nor carriages were thrown off the rails. The drivers, guards, and firemen of both trains were severely injured, and no less than 35 passengers were more or less injured. (See list enclosed.)

After the accident occurred, the signalman examined the points, and he states that he found the screw-nut which fastened the connecting rod with the tongue of the points lying on the soil underneath, and between the tongue and the rail. He also states that he came on duty in the afternoon at 4 p.m. ; that the points were then in good order ; that he tried them again at half-past seven or eight o'clock, and, as already stated, he let a train out at 8.35 p.m. ; and that he never knew this nut to work off before.

The pointsman who was relieved at 4 o'clock p.m. says the points were in good order, but that the nut was rather slack, though not more so than was necessary for the points to work properly.

With reference to this observation, I beg to remark that no slackness nor freedom was required to make them work properly.

The station master saw the points at three o'clock, but did not particularly notice the state of the out

I examined the nut, and tried to ascertain to what extent it must have been unscrewed to cause it to drop or be forced off; the nut appeared to be a very good nut, and, as far as I could judge, not at all likely rapidly to become unscrewed, and the points worked exceedingly well, nothing having been done to them since the accident. It was suggested that the nut might have been taken off after the accident, in order to account for it, and to shift the suspicion from its being due to their not having been properly cleaned ; but I saw no grounds for entertaining any such idea.

On the other hand, I cannot think such a nut would have dropped or been forced off without having been continuously neglected for a considerable period of time.  Such is my impression.

The immediate cause of the accident was, evidently, the points having been so placed that the train, instead of taking to the cross-over road, and on to the up line, continued to run on the down line; the neglect of the driver was the secondary cause.

But an accident of this nature could not have happened at all, had the arrangements for conducting the traffic been such as the amount of that traffic actually required. During the year ending on the 31st January last, 2,424,326 passengers travelled on the Greenwich branch, or an average of above 6,600 daily.

For every half hour throughout the day two trains are in motion towards each other on the same line; and if these trains keep their time properly, they should be within a very short distance of each other on every occasion, since, as 1 have already stated, sometimes the down train arrives before the up train starts, sometimes it does not; so that any failure in the machinery, or any neglect of duty, or even a mistake on the part of either of the drivers of the two engines, or the pointsman, would be likely to produce an accident of this kind.

That no accident of this kind had happened before, is, to my mind, a very clear and extraordinary proof of the goodness of the machinery, and of the careful and faithful manner in which the Company have been served by its servants ; and its occurrence now only adds one more instance to the many already on record, that a vicious arrangement for conducting a heavy traffic is sure to be exposed, no matter how long it may be delayed, to a casualty of the kind that took place on the 30th ultimo.

The present arrangements for conducting the traffic may be decidedly improved, by bringing the signals and points to the same spot, and working all from the same box; but I am bound to state that a traffic to the amount of that earned on to and from the Greenwich station should be conducted to an arrival platform, and should quit a departure platform, and by this means avoid the perpetual crossing of trains filled with passengers.
I have, &c
Captain Galton, Royal Engineers,                                                                                                    W.   Yolland,
&c.           8&c.                                                                                                       Lt-Colonel, Royal Engineers,



List of Persons
----
-----
.Mrs. Edward Roberts -William Lloyd
Elizabeth Price   -
James Wood, driver of down train
John Barker, fireman
George Duykinck, solicitor, of New York
Robert Somers, lighterman -
Henry Snell
Frank Castle, stoker
Thomas   Buttons,   dock  labourer
William Watson, driver
Richard Roffey     -
James   Jessico Biddell, writer
Miss McBean
Mr. Hills      -
Mr. Crouchley, sen-Mr. Crouchley,jun.
Stephen Frampton   -Timothy Brown cork manufacturer
Philip Turner, guard of up-train Alfred Brooker
Mr. Godby
—   Gibbon, guard
Mrs. Samuel John Jennings
W. L. Beaufort
W. Simpson       -         -
Thomas Davies Frederick Creaton A. Creaton       -
William Towns     -Charles Allen Parke Mrs. Grist Mrs. Elwood Mr. James Samuel Miss E. A. Ay ling    -William Dunn      -Henry Jennings
James Stevens, jun.    -Rev. Alexander Geo. Burnett Mrs. Elizabeth   Sabine   and
daughter J. H. Cole

WATERFORD   AND   KILKENNY   RAILWAY.
Railway Department,
                                                                                                                                    Board of Trade, December 9, 1856.
Sir,    
I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, that I have inquired into the circumstances connected with an accident that occurred at Dunkitt, on the Waterford and Kilkenny Railway, on the 19th November, on which occasion live men were killed.

The circumstances of the accident, though so disastrous, can be very briefly told, as well as the mismanagement described that led to it.

The Company are relaying their line, and have contracted with Mr, Errington to superintend the work to its completion, and during that time to undertake the general engineering of the line. At a place called Dunkitt, a depot for creosoting the sleepers has been established. Dunkitt was formerly a temporary terminus of the line, and an abandoned siding, which formed part of the station there, baa been handed over to the engineering department for their accommodation. The points leading into this siding, though regularly weighted to keep open for the main traffic, have, as a further precaution, been spiked down, keeping the siding closed. The order, a verbal one, which regulated the management of these points, directed that they should only be unspiked to admit the ballast train, and be spiked down again until the train was ready to leave ; in fact, that they were always to he spiked down, keeping the siding closed, except when a train might be in the act of going in or coming out.

When I inspected the points at the date of my inquiry, I witnessed the process of unspiking the points, which was a tedious and somewhat difficult one : the switches I found were kept with so little care, and left .so dirty, that they would not work on the self-acting principle, though the levers were heavily weighted.; but this point may perhaps be considered as one of no importance, as, by the order, the self-acting principle was superseded by the direction for spiking down the points; but, in my opinion, it would have been an additional element of safety if the points had been kept cleaned and oiled, as all points ought to be, and would have been so kept by a carefully instructed pointsman.

Mr. Bradburn, Mr. Errington's deputy, on whom devolved the responsibility of placing the points under the charge of careful and trustworthy persons, appointed a man of the name of Brian, who was ganger of the men who accompanied the ballast train, to look after the points while the train was in the siding, and another man named Connolly to look after them when the train was away; this man was the ganger of the men employed on the Dunkitt length of railway. The evidence that I collected went to show that the points were opened and closed indifferently by any of the men accompanying the train, by the fireman, by the signalman or by any of the labourers, and less frequently by Brian than by others of the parly ; he probably considered he had other duties more important to attend to.

On the morning of the accident the ballast train brought a load of sleepers from Waterford, and after placing the waggons in the siding at Dunkitt the driver tookhtSe engine back to Waterford for coke and water, and returned to the siding about half an hour before the down clay mail train was due to pass. Who it was that opened the points to let in the engine on its return from Waterford, no one chooses to say; whoever it was, it is certain that he did not spike down the points ; the mail train came up and the driver when too late to stop perceived that the points stood open for the siding, and the collision took place, attended with the fatal results i have stated.

Dunkitt stands at the summit of a steep incline descending towards Waterford, and there being a general order for drivers to keep their engines well in hand, the train fortunately approached at a moderate speed, or the result would in all probability have been even more serious. It will be seen from" what I have stated that it was any man's duty that could be best spared at the moment, to open and shut the points. I have no doubt that it was the common practice only to spike down the points when the train left the siding, and that while it stood in the siding the self-acting principle of the points was relied on. and this principle failed from the dirty state in which they were kept.

It is hardly necessary for me to remark here that on all carefully regulated lines, where facing points unavoidably exist, they are looked upon as sources of the greatest anxiety, and a man is told off for the exclusive duty of watching them. On the Waterford and Limerick line, which is single, and where facing points are therefore unavoidable, this system has been ignored. An ignorant labourer with many other duties to perform, all of which he probably considered of more importance than attendance on the points, was placed in charge, and he delegated (unchecked) the duty to men more careless and ignorant than himself. Brian's conduct was no doubt highly culpable, but Mr. Bradburn's, who placed him in  charge, and took no pains for months together to see that the duty was properly performed, was in my opinion far more 80 ; and it was nothing short of trifling with the public safety, to leave elements of such danger in the hands of careless people unable to appreciate the magnitude of the danger that might arise from neglect. Mr. Bradburn, I learn, was for many years a foreman of platelayers on the Caledonian Railway, and I have no doubt he is a very competent person to superintend the relaying of the line, but I have no hesitation in saying that, from his education and nature of his avocations, he is not a person to be trusted with the direction of anything connected with the safety of the traffic. Platelayers are proverbially addicted to shifts and careless of running risks. In the event of any sudden engineering difficulty occurring on the line, Mr. Bradburn is the only person the Company have to fall back upon, and how much the local directors feel the difficult]       having such a person the following extract iron; their minutes will show :

"Minute of Directors, dated 13th May, sent to the Secretary in London: —
" The Committee cannot but deeply regret the removal of Mr. Galbraith, an assistant engineer, as they do not consider " Mr. Bradburn a class of person to be entrusted with so extensive and responsible an undertaking."

The local directors where  informed in reply that a better person could not be selected. It is much to be regretted that they did not act upon their conviction and place as little responsibility as possible in Mr. Bradburn's hands. And though I am of opinion that the engineer employed by the Company acted most improperly in placing Mr. Bradburn in the local direction of the engineering departments, yet I think the general manager of a line cannot divest himself of the responsibility that attaches to him to see personally or by his overseers that proper precautions are taken to guard efficiently every part of the line,  where from the construction or other cause, danger to the traffic is to be apprehended.
I have, &c.
The Secretary of the                                                                                                                              Geo. Wynne,
Railway Department,                                                                           Lieut.-Colonel, Royal Engineers.

February 16, 1857.
SIR.
I Beg to forward to you a letter from Mr  Errington, bearing on my report on the late accident at Dunkitt on the Waterford and Kilkenny Railway.

It may be in your recollection that while in my report I threw the onus of the accident on the traffic manager, for not taking proper precautions "to guard efficiently every part of the line where, from the construction or other causes, danger to the traffic was to be apprehended," yet I give it as my opinion, "that the engineer employed by the Company acted most  improperly in placing Mr.  Bradburn in the local direction of the engineering department." I stated further that  "though Mr. Bradburn was no doubt unfit, from education, to be entrusted with the a very competent person to superintend the relaying of the line, he was direction of anything connected with the superintending of the traffic."
 
Mr. Errington distinctly states in his letter that he never undertook the general engineering of the line, and that his duties had reference solely to the relaying of the line, and putting the rolling stock in order ; and that moreover the extract of the minute that was shown to me, and which I quoted, had, when read in extenso, no reference to Mr. Bradburn as a resident engineer. Mr. Errington's statement appears to me to be fully borne out by the extract he furnishes of the "resolution" of the Directors appointing him their engineer for one specific purpose, viz., to superintend the works about to be executed for putting the line and rolling stock in complete order—those works, as far as the line was concerned, being the relaying of it.

Mr. Bradburn, as I stated in my report, was probably as competent a person as could be found for such a purpose: I have, therefore, much pleasure in withdrawing any reflection that my report may contain on Mr. Errington, as to his having appointed an improper person to superintend the duties he undertook. I felt myself called upon more especially to remark on an incompetent person being left in charge of the engineering of the line, because you are aware that there exists on the line a bridge of large span, which was seriously remarked upon by the inspector before the line opened, and to which the attention of the department has since been drawn, and which in my opinion should never be left for any length of time without competent engineering inspection.
I have, &c.
The Secretary of the                                                                                                                              Geo. Wynne,
Railway Department, Board of Trade.                                                                                            Lieut.-Colonel JR.E.

(Enclosure.)
                                                                                          13, Duke Street, Westminster, February 6, 1857.
Dear Sir,
In reference to my interview with you on Monday last, as to your report of the 9th December 1856, on the accident on the Waterford and Kilkenny Railway, I now forward, as you requested, copies of the documents I then produced, which show that the information given to you at the time you held the inquiry, and on which you founded your report, was not consistent with the facts.

As I was not afforded an opportunity of giving this explanation previous to your report being sent in, I feel that I am entitled to claim the correction now, and I understand you are willing to make it.

The exact conditions upon which I became connected with the Waterford and Kilkenny Company are as follows :
A deputation of directors waited upon me at the close of the year 1855 to request that I would undertake to advise the company in the relaying and repairing the road. I mentioned Mr. Bradburn, who is an excellent practical roadlayer, and described his qualifications, and was assured that he was exactly the sort of person required.

In the first instance, however, I sent over to Ireland an experienced assistant engineer to take the levels of the line, set out the work, and report upon the state of the road, and it was at the close of this gentleman's labours that Mr. Bradburn was sent over.

On referring to the resolution of my appointment as engineer, which I annex, you will find it is "for the purpose of superintending the works to be executed for putting the line and rolling stock in complete order'." There is no mention of any other duty, nor was any other ever contemplated; there is, therefore, no justification for saying that during the construction of those works "I was to undertake the general engineering of the line." What you mean by this expression I do not understand; but it certainly was never understood by me that the terms of my appointment contemplated any general or special superintendence, other than that relating to the reconstruction of the road.

Next as to Mr. Bradburn. He has been a plate-layer for more than 20 years. He superintended and directed the relaying of the rails and change of gauge of the Wishaw and Coltness Railway, in Scotland, where there were not less than 100 mineral trains every day, without a single accident. This work was done under my own eye; I knew its difficulties, and appreciated the conduct of those who completed the task without accident. I depend less, therefore, on the excellent testimonials which I received of Mr. Bradburn's general character than on my own personal knowledge of him. These testimonials, however, I send to you for your satisfaction, but I repeat my conviction that Mr. Bradburn was in every way qualified for the work he was appointed to perform.

In quoting the Minute of the Committee of the 13th May, in confirmation of your opinion as to Mr. Bradburn's unfitness, you appear only to have seen a part of it, and I therefore annex it in full.

The whole complaint of the Committee, as stated in that Minute, related to the employment of Scotchmen as platelayers at higher wages than Mr. Bradburn paid to the Irishmen, and it was for this preference of experienced men that Mr. Bradburn became the object of attack by the authorities in Ireland. I have not noticed before the complaints made to me of the impediments thrown in Mr. Bradburn's way, but I do so now with a view to show that the prejudice existing against him had its origin, not in his incompetence, but on his assumed preference for Scotch over Irish labour.
Permit me to repeat, which I do most emphatically, that I have only considered myself as the engineer of the Waterford and Kilkenny Company, for the special object of re-laying their then defective road, and for no other purpose whatever.
I am. &c.
Col.  Wynne. R.E._______________________________________________J. E. Errington.


Accidents 1856

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