ACCIDENTS APPERTAINING TO THE MANAGEMENT.
COLLISIONS AT JUNCTIONS,
NORTH BRITISH RAILWAY.
Railway Department, Board of Trade,
Whitehall, February 12, 1856.
SIR,
I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lords of the
Committee of Privy Council for Trade, that, in compliance with the instructions
contained in your letter of 16th ultimo, I have inquired into the circumstances
which attended the accident, that occurred on the 8th ultimo, at the Niddrie
Junction of the North British Railway.
The Niddrie Station is about four miles to the east of Edinburgh, and
its platforms are thirty yards from the point where the line from Musselburgh
joins the line from Dalkeith to Edinburgh.
The junction pointsman is stationed at 80 yards from the platforms, and
is provided with wire signals towards Edinburgh and Musselburgh, at the
respective distances of 205 and 312 yards from his box. These signals are
approached on rising gradients of 1 in 50 from the direction of Musselburgh,
and 1 in 80 from that of Edinburgh.
There are no main signals, these not forming part of the system adopted
by the North British Company for the working of their junctions, and the
distant signal towards Dalkeith is worked from the platform of the station.
On the 8th ultimo, the 6.30 a.m. passenger train from Musselburgh, consisting
of an engine and tender, and four vehicles, arrived at the Niddrie Station
at 6.35, having been permitted by the pointsman to pass his distant signal
for that purpose. Soon afterwards, the 6.20, p.m. passenger train from
Edinburgh to Dalkeith approached the junction from the opposite direction
; and the pointsman, having, as he states, exhibited his caution light
up and down four times to the driver of the Musselburgh train, turned
his distant signal towards Edinburgh to "all right," and showed the white
light to the driver of the Dalkeith train, to intimate to him that he might
run past the junction to his side of the Niddrie Station.
In the meantime, the driver of the Musselburgh train started for Edinburgh,
and, when he had gone some thirty yards, the two trains came into collision
on the junction crossing. The side rods of the engines were broken, and
a third-class carriage, which happened to be empty, was turned over on its
side; but the damage to the stock was comparatively trifling, and one passenger
only was slightly hurt.
It appears that these two trains are in the habit of crossing the junction
at about the same time, sometimes the one and sometimes the other gaining
the precedence, and the Dalkeith train being due a minute later than the
other. It is rather an object with the driver of the Dalkeith train not
to be stopped on the incline, and the pointsman allows him therefore to
run through the junction when he can-do so without risk. The pointsman does
not appear to have imagined on the present occasion that the Musselburgh
train would start so soon after the signal which he had made to it, and,
engaged in signalling the Dalkeith train with his hand lamp, he did not perceive
until too late what was about to happen.
The driver of the Dalkeith train obeyed the signals which were shown to
him, and cannot be blamed for the collision ; but the driver of the Musselburgh
train started from the Niddrie Station without orders, and acted wrongly
in this respect; though it is true that he might have received orders to
start, and come into collision with the other train in precisely the same
manner, and that it was not from any apprehension of an obstruction at the
junction that the orders to start were withheld from him.
The usual practice at this station is for the bell to be rung when the
station master sees that all is ready, and for the guard then to give the
driver a signal to start. It seems that on the occasion in question the
bell was not rung at all, though the driver believed that he heard it, and
looked round for the guards' signal as he moved off, keeping his eyes fixed
on the rear of the train as he approached the junction, which, as has been
before stated, was only thirty yards distant.
Considering the state of the junction, it would have been more prudent
in the driver to have waited for the pointsman's signal of "all right" before
he crossed it; but it must be admitted that no danger or caution signal was
exhibited to him at the time to prevent his proceeding.
It may perhaps be said that the pointsman ought to have held the red light
towards the Musselburgh train whilst he allowed the Dalkeith train to pass
the junction ; but he certainly could not with one hand lamp make the necessary
signals to two trains at a time; and there is no doubt that at this junction,
at all events, where trains have to stop and start again after passing his
distant signal, he ought to be provided with main junction signals.
If such signals were properly placed, and kept at danger, no driver could
start from Niddrie, or pass the junction, without first whistling to the
pointsman, and obtaining his special permission, indicated by the fixed light
or semaphore arm ; and to the want of such signals, therefore, the accident
must be attributed.
I have, &c.
The Secretary of the
H. W. Tyler,
Railway Department, Board of Trade.
Capt. Royal Engineers.
NORTH-EASTERN RAILWAY.
Railway Department, Board of Trade,
Whitehall, May 24, 1856.
Sir,
In compliance with the instructions contained in your letter of the 14th
instant, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lords of
the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the
circumstances which attended the accident that occurred on the 6th instant,
near the Gateshead Station of the North-eastern Railway.
Three quarters of a mile to the south of the station at Newcastle, and
opposite to the "old shops" at Gateshead, there is a branch called the Allhusens
Branch; and its junction with the main line is protected towards the south
by a disc signal, 300 yards from the points, worked by a wire. This signal
can be seen upwards of 1000 yards in tolerably clear weather. There is also
a signal towards the north, and one on the branch, the latter having been
fixed about three months since.
The gradient of the branch falls 1 in 70 from the main line, and that
of the main line 1 in 300 towards Newcastle.
A few minutes before six o'clock in the morning of the 6th instant, the
mail train from the south came into collision with twelve empty ballast
waggons which had been placed in its way on the main line, the last waggon
of which was 100 yards from the junction, and therefore 200 yards within
the signal. None of the carriages or waggons were thrown off the line, but
one lady was injured.
The atmosphere is always thick in this neighbourhood; and it is stated,
that on the morning in question there was a good deal of fog, and that the
rails were very greasy.
The driver of the mail train estimates his speed at fifteen or sixteen
miles an hour when he first saw the danger signal at 200 yards distance,
and at three or four when the collision occurred. It may have been rather
greater, but there seems to be no reason to blame this man, as the signal
could not probably have been seen sufficiently far, under the circumstances,
to enable him to stop his train.
This signal might, with advantage, be moved to a much greater distance
from the junction.
The evidence, as to the manner in which the ballast waggons were brought
in the way of the mail train, is somewhat conflicting. The signalman who
was in charge of the junction asserting that it was done in direct disobedience
to his warnings and injunctions ; and the driver and fireman of the ballast
engine denying that the signalman interfered with them or expressed his disapprobation
in any way. They admit, however, that they brought their waggons on the
main line without his permission, and while his signal was at danger ; and
they attempt to excuse themselves for passing that signal, by saying that
they totally forgot all about it, in consequence of its having been a comparatively
recent addition. They admit, also, that the signalman was standing close
at hand at his post when they came off the branch; and that he should have
done so without taking any notice of their proceedings, at a time when the
mail was so nearly due, appears, to say the least, highly improbable. He
had been five years in that situation, and there seems no reason to believe
that he was usually guilty of any laxity in the performance of his duties.
The waggons were placed on the main line because, on account of the severe
gradient of the branch, it was found impossible to bring out the whole train
at once ; but there was a siding close by which might have been used as a
receptacle for the twelve waggons while the engine went to fetch the others
from the branch ; and it is brought by the signalman as an additional charge
against the driver, that he did not use that siding instead of blocking up
the main line.
The driver, fireman, and breaksman of the ballast train state, that they
believed that the mail train had passed, and that they had been induced to
think so by hearing the Sunderland train go by as they were preparing their
train on the branch ; but if the evidence of the signalman be correct, that
the driver and fireman said afterwards, when they were told that the mail
would soon be due, that there was still plenty of time first, then this
must be a false excuse.
It seems probable, altogether, that the signalman may not have been sufficiently
energetic in enforcing his authority, that these men may partly have misunderstood
each other at the time, and that the two parties may each be giving additional
colour to their own after-version of the circumstances of the occurrence
; but there can be no doubt that the driver and fireman were to blame for
passing the signalman's danger signal without his permission, for taking it
for granted—if they did so—when they heard the Sunderland train pass, that
it was the mail, and also for leaving their waggons on the main line when
they might have placed them in a siding ; and whilst it is desirable that
the danger signal to the south should be further removed from the junction,
it may be fairly asserted that the cause of the collision was in great measure
attributable to the misconduct of the driver and fireman of the ballast engine.
I have, &c.
The Secretary of the
H. W. Tyler,
Railway Department, Board of Trade.
Capt. Royal Engineers.
Accidents 1856
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