ACCIDENTS APPERTAINING TO THE MANAGEMENT.


COLLISIONS BETWEEN TRAINS OR PORTIONS OF TRAINS MOVING IN OPPOSITE DIRECTIONS ON THE SAME LINE OF RAILS.


CALEDONIAN   RAILWAY.
Railway Department, Board of Trade, SiR,                                                                                                                                                Whitehall, April 9, 1856.
In compliance with the instructions contained in your communication of the 4th instant, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended the accident that occurred on the 31st ultimo, at the Calder Viaduct of the Caledonian Railway.

This viaduct is eleven miles to the east of Glasgow, and one mile to the west of Motherwell. It is constructed with masonry piers and abutments, surmounted by strutted timber beams. The masonry is intended for a double line of rails, but a single line only is carried over it, 400 yards long, communicating with a double line at each extremity.

The viaduct is approached from the direction of Glasgow on a sharp curve, and on a nearly level gradient. It is protected by two pointsmen, one at each end, with signals and distant signals, and two bells worked by wires.

When a train approaches either end of the viaduct the pointsman there stationed rings the bell at the other end, and, if he receives no reply, and sees that his colleague's signals are kept at "danger," he allows it to pass.

The following are the special regulations on the subject which have been issued by the Company ; —
"127.—The signals at each end of the Calder Viaduct must always be kept "red on," except when one of them is turned off to allow a train to pass.
" Both signals must never be turned off  at the same time.
" If trains approach the viaduct from opposite directions at the same time, they must first be brought to a stand. In such a case a passenger train must be allowed precedence of a goods' train, and a goods' train precedence of a mineral train. If they happen to be trains of the same class, the down train must be allowed to pass first over the viaduct,
"Each of the pointsmen must keep two buckets at hand constantly filled with water, in case of the viaduct taking fire."

Caledonian Railway.—Superintendent's Department.
Order to Pointsmen at the Calder Viaduct.

" Signal bells have been erected at Calder Viaduct to enable the pointsman at one end to give early intimation to the pointsman at the other end that a train is approaching the viaduct for the purpose of crossing over it.
" The bell must be rung to signal the approach of every train.
" In no case must a signal be turned off to admit a train on to the viaduct previous to the bell being rung at the opposite end.
" When either pointsman hears the bell near him rung by the man at the opposite end he must keep his stop signals on till the train signalled has passed over the viaduct.
" In case of doubt as to any signals that may be given, all trains approaching either end must be stopped till the pointsmen have communicated verbally as to which train is to pass first over the viaduct.
" John Addison, Glasgow, October 12, 1855.                                                                                                                       Superintendent"

Another printed regulation directs that the facing points at either end are not to be passed at a greater rate than four miles an hour; and I understand that, in foggy weather, the further precaution is adopted of appointing a pilot man to proceed with every train over the viaduct.

The pointsman at the north end of the viaduct is provided with a distant signal 370 yards from his box, which can be seen for 500 yards further, and which thus allows, in clear weather, 870 yards for a driver to stop his train.

Such being the situation of the viaduct, and the means provided for its protection, I will next proceed to state the circumstances under which the present accident occurred.

The down mail train for Glasgow left Carlisle at 7, and Carstairs at 9.25 p.m., on the 31st ultimo, consisting of an engine and tender, four carriages, and a van. The driver found the signals at the south end of the viaduct turned off on his approach, and he therefore proceeded over the single line. When he was rather more than half way across he perceived a goods' train coming in the opposite direction; and he had succeeded in stopping his train, when the goods' train came into collision with it, a few yards within the pointsman's box at the north end of the viaduct, at a speed of five or six miles an hour.

The buffer planks of the engines were broken, two of the goods' waggons were damaged, and the guard of the mail train was severely contused.

The goods' train was composed of an engine and tender, one empty and nineteen loaded waggons and a van. It left Glasgow at 9.10, ten minutes late, and was still about ten minutes behind time when the accident occurred. The driver states that he was travelling at the rate of twenty-four miles an hour, his usual speed at that point, when he saw the distant signal from the viaduct, and that he then tried to stop his train, but was unable to do so on account of the inefficient state of the tender brake. He admits, however, that he did not reverse his engine until he was fifty or sixty yards past the distant signal. He says that his tender leaked badly, and that the iron-work of his break was loose ; and he adds that he had reported it to the locomotive superintendent at Carstairs nine days after he received the engine, and two or three weeks before the accident, as well as that he had made frequent representations on the subject to the night foreman. His expressions are, "I also told the night foreman that I had a good character on the line, but that if the engine was not repaired I should either hurt myself or some one else."

The fireman corroborates the statement of the driver, in so far as he states that he heard him reporting to the night foreman on two consecutive nights, that "The break was in bad order, and he could not pull up, and that the tender was leaking and wet all the rails;" as well as "That he could not stop at any of the signals with that break and tender."

In reply to these statements, the locomotive superintendent admits that the driver did complain to him about the break and that he examined it; that there was "a looseness," but that he believed it to be perfectly safe, though not in the best of order. The night foreman asserts that the driver never reported to him that the break was insufficient to hold  the train ; and that the only thing he complained of was that the tender was too small, and leaked a little; and he adds "He never directed my attention to the break of the tender at all."

In order to arrive at the truth, in the midst of these conflicting statements, I examined the tender break, and tried it with a train composed of a similar number of waggons to that to which the accident happened, I found that it was far from being in an efficient state of repair, and that with the utmost exertions of the fireman it would only scotch one pair of wheels. The train, travelling at the rate of twenty-one miles an hour, was pulled up in a little less than 500 yards, or nearly 400 yards from the point of collision ; but this fact does not go far towards invalidating the statements of the driver above referred to, as to the circumstances of the collision, because: —
1.   The speed was not so great as that at which he says he was travelling.
2.   The engine was reversed, and the steam put on against it, contrary to my wishes, immediately that the distant signal was sighted, whereas the driver states that he did not reverse his engine till after he had gone fifty or sixty yards past the signal at which the experimental train was stopped.
3. The individual waggons of the experimental train were stated by the driver to have been very much lighter than those of his own train.
4. Great zeal was displayed by the driver and fireman of the experimental train, who had all ready, and did their utmost to stop the train from the moment that the signal was sighted, which would enable them, of course, to pull up rather faster than on ordinary occasions.

The driver had been six years in the Company's service, and has borne an excellent character, though rather inclined, according to the opinion of the locomotive superintendent at Carstairs, to "run sharp." It is true that his tender break was in bad order, and that it leaked considerably; but he was perfectly aware of this, and ought to have approached so dangerous a part of the line at lower speed, and with greater caution.

The breaksman says, "We were going from twenty to twenty-five miles an hour when we approached the distant signal shown from the Calder Viaduct, just about the usual speed;" as also, "We generally pass the viaduct at from twelve to fifteen miles an hour. We are not often stopped outside of it with that train." And these statements, which, from the evidence of the other witnesses, there seems no reason to doubt, point to what was probably the truth, namely, that the driver, accustomed to pass the viaduct at the rate of twelve or fifteen miles an hour, without stopping his train, did not expect to be obliged to pull up on this occasion, and did not approach the viaduct, therefore, with the same caution that he would otherwise have used.

Now it is evident, from the statements of the pointsmen, as well as from those of the breaksman, that the speed of four miles an hour, at which trains are ordered to pass the facing points at the extremities of the viaduct, is not in practice enforced; and it is a question well worthy of the consideration of the Company, whether all trains should not be stopped outside the viaduct, and be accompanied over it either by a pilot man or a pilot engine. This measure would go far to prevent the recurrence of such an accident as the present, and others of a similar nature, in which a driver, approaching the viaduct in the expectation of being allowed to pass, might not be able, on occasion, to pull up his train within the 870 yards which are allowed him for that purpose.

It is right that I should add, however, that the viaduct has been worked without these additional precautions for many years, that the pointsmen appear to have great confidence in the present system, and that the only previous accident which is stated to have occurred on it is asserted to have been caused by the proved recklessness of the driver of a pilot engine.

The present accident has evidently been occasioned by a want of caution on the part of the driver of the goods' train, in which want of caution he was encouraged by being supplied with an inefficient lender, and against which want of caution the system of working the single line on the viaduct did not afford as much security as might be obtained by the means above suggested,

I may add, in conclusion, that a new portion of line is now in course of construction, which, it is expected, will be opened in the course of the present year, and which will then, it is stated, be used instead of the Calder Viaduct for passenger trains.
I have, &c.
The Secretary of the                                                                                                                                   H. W. Tyler,
Railway Department, Board of Trade.                                                                                        Capt. Royal Engineers.


DUBLIN   AND   BELFAST   JUNCTION  RAILWAY.
Railway Department, Board of Trade,   
                                                                                                                                  Whitehall, October 17, 1856.
Sir,       
In compliance with the instructions contained in your letter of the 2d instant, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended the accident, that occurred on the 6th August last, near the Newry Station of the Dublin and Belfast Junction Railway.

The line between Newry and Mount Pleasant, which is 3 3/4 miles to the north of Dundalk, is single, as is also the greater part of the line of this Company. The "main-line station" at Newry, the only one to which I shall have occasion to refer in the present report, is 15 1/4 miles to the north of Dundalk, and 11 1/2 from Mount Pleasant, between which two places the line is double.

On the 6th August, the 5 a.m. goods train, consisting of an engine and tender. 10 loaded and one empty waggons, and a van, left Dundalk at 5.2, and was about to emerge from a cutting about three miles to the south of Newry, when it came into collision with a ballast engine and truck proceeding in the opposite direction.

The goods train was travelling at considerable speed down a falling gradient of 1 in 109, and, on account of a curve of 40 chains radius, which occurs on this part of the line, the driver could not have seen the ballast engine until he was within about 350 yards of it, or 2C0 from the point of collision. Little could be done in checking the speed of the goods train, but the ballast engine was almost brought to a stand before the collision took place. The ballast engine was travelling tender first, with a truck in front of the tender, in which were riding three men and a boy, on their way to their morning's work. The goods engine mounted the axles of the truck, which it crushed to atoms, stove in the tender of the ballast engine, and threw that engine off the line; breaking, at the same time, its own buffer plank, framing, steam-pipe, and exhaust pipe, and bending in its tube plate.

The boy was killed, and the three men who were riding with him in the truck were more or less injured. The driver and fireman of the goods train were but very slightly hurt, and the other servants of the Company not at all so.

A week before the collision, it was found necessary to employ some working men who lived six or eight miles to the south of Newry, at the north of that station, and, application having been made by those men to be conveyed to their work it was arranged that the ballast engine should go out from Newry to meet them half way, as they walked in towards the station, and should then bring them into Newry, in time to keep out of the way of the goods train on its arrival, and to follow it northwards with the ballast train.

This arrangement, after meeting with the concurrence of the inspector of permanent way, was made known to the driver of the ballast engine and the men to be conveyed by the superintendent of the working party, who named five o'clock as the hour at which the engine should meet the men, that having been the time at which the goods train was due to leave Dundalk; and it was considered that there would be no chance of the ballast engine coming in the way of the goods train if this plan was adopted.

The guard states that the goods train was in the habit of leaving Dundalk as soon after five o'clock as possible, and of arriving at Newry at different hours between 5.42 and 6.20, and sometimes even later, according to the weight of the train, the state of the rails, and the time of starting. He looked at his watch about a minute after the collision took place, and it was then 5.34; and he considered that he was about "to time ;" though it is to be observed that he had only three miles to run, which, at 20 miles an hour, would take nine minutes, and which would have brought him to Newry Station at the earliest hour he gives as his time of arrival.—".42. Now. this goods train, though not mentioned in the time tables, was expected to leave Newry at 6 o'clock, and 18 minutes, the difference between that hour and 5.42, is a long time to allow for stoppage at that station, so that this train may be looked upon as having been somewhat early, although, according to the guard, it was not earlier than it had been on previous occasions.

The printed regulations of the Company direct that enginemen in charge of ballast trains "must in no case be in the way of an approaching train within a quarter of an hour of its being due;" and it is this rule which the driver of the ballast engine is particularly accused of infringing; as no blame would have been attached to him for not acting up to the suggestions of the superintendent as to time, if, adhering to this regulation, he had not been the cause of producing an accident. The arrangement made by the superintendent of the workmen, certainly contemplated an extra half hour of margin between the movements of the ballast engine and those of the goods train, but they cannot be considered as having been binding upon the driver of the former, inasmuch as the duty of the superintendent was merely to point out to the driver what work there was to be done, and it was incumbent upon the latter only to perform that work as far as he was able to do so without disobeying his printed regulations, which are supposed to be sufficient to prevent his endangering the safety of the trains. If, therefore, the driver had brought in the workmen safely in front of the goods train every morning, and if no accusation had been made against him of infringing the rule above quoted, no fault would have been found with him in this matter.

The driver's own statement is that he left Newry with the ballast engine at 5.12, and had every intention of obeying the order above referred to, of preserving a quarter of an hour between himself and the goods train ; that the collision occurred at 5.25 by his watch, which was found, on comparison the same evening, to correspond within a minute with that of the guard ; and that, having himself driven that goods train for six weeks a month previously, he had never reached the site of the collision with it until a quarter to six o'clock, and therefore believed that he had plenty of time on the morning in question.

If this man's statements be correct, that the collision occurred at 5.25, and that he never arrived at the scene of it, when driving the goods train, until a quarter to six, then he would just have had time to run into the Newry Station a quarter of an hour in front of it; but, on the other hand, if the guard's statements be true, that the collision occurred at 5.33, and that that might be considered as the proper time for the goods train to reach the spot where it happened, then the driver of the ballast engine infringed his regulations, by not allowing sufficient time before the arrival of the goods train, and thus caused the collision.

The coroner's jury, before whom the circumstances of the collision were investigated, brought in a verdict of manslaughter against the driver of the ballast engine, James Tipping, who will, accordingly, in due course, be tried for that offence. Under these circumstances, I shall express no direct opinion as to his conduct, though I may add that the driver of the goods train corroborates the statement of the guard as to the time of the collision ; as well as that, during the five years that he has been in the service of the Company, there has been nothing against the driver of the ballast engine before. In fact, this man bears an excellent character in every respect, and the locomotive superintendent gives me to understand that there is hardly a man in the Company's service in whose caution and steadiness he would have reposed greater confidence.

From the manner in which Tipping was proceeding at the time of the collision, there can be little doubt, that, whatever may have been his miscalculations, he really thought, as he states, that he had plenty of time before the arrival of the goods train ; and this consideration leads immediately to the question as to whether the regulations of the Company are sufficient to insure the public safety. In this case, a careful driver was entrusted with the duty of fetching certain workmen, was recommended to be with them at five o'clock in the morning, which would have allowed upwards of half hour between him and a goods train travelling on the same line of rails in the opposite direction, and was positively forbidden by his printed regulations to allow a smaller interval than a quarter of an hour between his engine and that train on any part of the line. He started for his destination, later, perhaps, than he ought to have started, but in full confidence that he was within the bounds of safety, if not also that he was acting up to his regulations, and, when nearly a mile from his destination, he came into collision with the train which it was his duty to avoid.

The question, as to the regulations which are required to ensure a reasonable amount of security in the working of single lines, has long been a vexed one ; but there cannot be a clearer proof than this that the safety of the public, and that of the Company's servants, calls for more stringent precautions than a mere order to a driver to allow a specified interval in time between his engine or train, and any other train which may be due to pass in the opposite direction on the same line of rails.

From what I understand, the telegraph of the Dublin and Belfast Junction Company does not appear to.be in the best of order, or to be used to the greatest advantage, at present; but, if they have any desire to prevent the recurrence of similar accidents, the Director- will now establish a better system for working their extensive single line ; and, by means of judiciously arranged telegraph stations, provide against the possibility of a collision, by directing that under no circumstances shall more than one engine be at one time between any two of these stations, and by allowing no engine or train to pass any one of these stations until the line has been telegraphed to be clear from that which is next in advance.
I have, &c.
The Secretary of the                                                                                                                                 H.W.Tyler,
Railway Department, Board of Trade.                                                                                    Captain Royal Engineers.


LONDON  AND   SOUTH  WESTERN   RAILWAY.
Railway Department, Board of Trade,         
                                                                                                                                   Whitehall, March 29, 1856.
Sir,   
In compliance with the instructions contained in your letter of the 5th instant, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended the accident, that occurred on the 29th ultimo, near the Guildford Station of the London and Southwestern Railway.

The branch line from Alton and Ash runs into the main line between London, Guildford, and Godalming, at Guildford; and all the traffic of the South Eastern Company between Reading and Reigate, is carried over the portion of this branch extending from Ash to Guildford.

In approaching Guildford, the branch is on a curve of about 20 chains radius, and, for 2 1/2 miles, on a gradient of 1 in 100 falling towards that station. It forms a junction with the up main line at 500 yards from the passenger platform; and there is a cross-over road to the down line at this point, a second 154 yards from the platform, and a third opposite the platform.

These details will be better understood by a reference to the inclosed plan of the station, and it will be seen that there are two signal-boxes at A and B,  which I shall designate as the upper and lower boxes respectively. The signalman at the upper box (A), works a signal at C, 485 yards from him, which serves at the same time to guide the man at the lower box, and to warn a train coming in from Alton ; and the signalman at the lower box (B) works a signal at (D), 383 yards further, as well as one close to the upper box, for the guidance of the signalman there stationed. There is also a signal at A.  to control the traffic of the station ; and there is a signal up the main line communicating with another signalman, who is there posted for the security of the trains approaching the junction from the north.

It will be observed by the plan, that the Alton branch runs, in the first instance, into a line that terminates in a siding, which line communicates at E and F with the up main line, and at E, and near F, with the down main line also, by means of the cross-over roads above referred to. Now, the greater part of South Eastern trains from Alton, cross at once near the lower box (B), to the down main line, and so run into the station on their proper line of rails ; but the South Eastern goods train at night, and all the South Western trains from Alton, cross from the siding to the up main line near the upper box (A), and run into the station on the wrong line.

The trains leaving Guildford for Alton or London are obliged, of course, to travel in the opposite direction to, and on the same line as, these arriving trains, for a distance of 200 yards, or somewhat less, according as they (the arriving trains) draw up on the east or the west side of the platform; and the departing up goods trains even run back into a tunnel which is situated to the south of the station, before starting northward over this piece of single line, to get up such a speed as may enable them to mount the incline. During this operation, they run back on the proper-—the down line of rails; return on the same line, and in the wrong direction, therefore, for that line ; and, crossing to the up line, at the platform, proceed on their journey.

Portions of each of the two main lines are thus habitually used as single lines, or, in other words, traversed by trains running over them in opposite directions, in the daily working of the traffic ; and there is, further, a third portion of single line, extending from the junction for 100 vards towards Alton, on a gradient of 1 in 100, falling, as before stated, towards Guildford.

None of these single lines are protected by any extraordinary precautions ; but they are all worked by the signals similarly to the safer parts of the line; and it was the practice, previously to the present accident, for the lower box (B) to be unattended at night by a signalman, although a goods train arrived regularly twice at Guildford, and returned once to Alton, after the hours of the man on day duty.

Such being the arrangements for the working of the station, the circumstances attending the collision are easily understood.

The night of the 29th ultimo was exceedingly foggy. The signalman of the lower box went off duty at 9 o clock, or soon after, and left his distant signal (D) "at caution," as usual, the man of the upper box keeping his (C) "at danger." A goods train, due to leave Guildford for London at 10.45, started at 11.45, an hour late, and, according to the usual custom, ran back into the tunnel to get a start up the incline. Having acquired the necessary speed, it returned through the station at the rate of about 15 miles an hour, and met the goods train arriving from Alton, (which, as previously explained, is always brought into the station over the "up" line of rails,) at the point G.

The London train consisted of an engine and tender, 33 waggons, and 2 vans. It had previously arrived from Alton, and was an hour late for two reasons, viz., because it was delayed 15 minutes in taking on trucks, on the road to Guildford,, and because 45 minutes were occupied in shunting at that station. This shunting had formerly been done by the servants of the Godalming train, but, to use the expression of the driver, they had, within the last 3 weeks "ceased doing it, because they were afraid that I should ivith my train come down the bank and pitch into them.'''

The driver of the London train was in no way to blame, as the signals were, in the first instance, taken off to allow him to proceed, and a subsequent warning from the hand-lamp of the signalman was only sufficient to enable him slightly to reduce his speed before the collision occurred.                                            

The Alton train was composed of an engine and tender, 6 loaded and 12 empty waggons, and a van. It was 35 minutes late in arriving at Guildford, the driver having arrived 15 minutes late at Alton on his previous trip, and having been detained there 35 minutes in making up his train, which could not be done till after the departure of the previous train.

The driver found, on approaching Guildford, that the first signal (D) showed "caution," (as it always did, when the signalman was away, at that time of night); and when he was 60 or 70 yards from the next signal (C) he perceived that it showed  "danger," and had not been turned off in reply to bis whistle. According to his own account, he was travelling at the rate of 7 or 8 miles an hour when he passed those signals, and according to the statement of his guard, the speed was not greater than 5 or 6 miles an hour at that time. The driver then found a difficulty in reversing his engine, and could not stop his train before the collision took place, though the breaks were properly applied.

If the speed, as estimated by these men, at which they approached the danger signal be correct, it is impossible to blame the driver of the latter train for the collision, particularly as it further appears that he shut off his steam and put on his tender break at the top of the incline, or about 2\ miles from Guildford.

This accident was, happily, unattended with personal injury to any of the servants of the Company, and resulted in nothing but damage to plant and merchandise; but it is calculated to convey a useful lesson, in drawing attention to the danger which attends the present mode of working of the Guildford Station. Situated as it is, within 500 yards of the junction, and at the foot of a heavy incline, between 2 and 3 miles in length, there must always be a risk of more serious accidents as long as the three distinct portions of single line above referred to are used in the manner which I have described.

Single lines, or lines employed as such, require, even when on the level, to be worked with extraordinary precautions ; but the additional precautions usually adopted would not, with the amount of break-power affixed at present to the trains as will now be seen, insure safety in this particular case.

The evidence of the driver of the London train, (who cannot in any way be blamed for this collision) is, " I have run down several times on to the main line from being unable to stop my train;" and again, "I have even had my steam on, and engine reversed, for half a mile down that bank, and yet come through on to the main line at Guildford after all.''

As was before stated, the South Eastern trains between Reading and Reigate run over this portion of the S. W. Railway. Now, it will be within their Lordships' recollection, that I had occasion, in reporting upon the accident which occurred at Reading on the 12th of September last, to point out that, in spite of the warning afforded by a previous accident, attended by much loss of life that Company persisted in working an excursion train with insufficient break-power, 37 carriages having been provided with only 2 breaks. That very train travelled over the line from Ash to Guildford; and it will be seen, therefore, that immunity from accident has not been due to any stringent precautions adopted by either Company for the working of the incline.

Nor does any extra care appear to have been taken in other respects, even on this foggy night, for the furthest signal, which might otherwise have been of use in warning the driver of the Alton train, was allowed to stand at "caution."

It fortunately becomes my duty, however, in this report, not to blame the Company for a serious accident that has occurred through these defective arrangements, but to request the earnest attention of the directors to them, in order that  these three portions of single line may not be permitted longer to remain at the foot of a gradient of 1 in 100 and so close to a junction, without corresponding precautions for the public safety.

If they be so allowed to remain, it cannot be doubted that some accident of a more serious nature will sooner or later
                                                                                                                      I have, &c.
The Secretary of the                                                                                                                                  H  w  TyLer
Railway Department, Board of Trade.                                                                                   Captain Royal Engineers.


MONMOUTHSHIRE RAILWAY COMPANY.
November 21, 1856.
Sir,
In obedience to the instructions contained in your letter of the 17th instant, I have the honour to report for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances attending the collision which occurred on the 12th instant, between the Pontnewydd and Pontrhydyrun stations of the Eastern Valleys Line of the Monmouthshire Railway.                                              

This line of railway rises the whole way from Newport to Pontypool (8 1/2 miles), the ascent from Pontrhydyrun (6 miles from Newport) to Pontypool being about 1 in 55. On the morning of the 12th instant a goods train, consisting of 11 loaded, 18 empty tracks, and one break van at the tail of the train, reached Pontypool from Newport at about 7.30 or 7..85, A portion of this train was intended for Pontypool, another part for Abersychan, and the remainder for Blaenavon, which is 15 miles from Newport. The loaded waggons were placed in front and the empty waggons behind. On the arrival of the train at Pontypool, the engine stopped opposite to the water crane, and took in water, then drew a short distance a-head, stopped and was uncoupled, and then ran forward, and afterwards backed into a goods siding, leaving the whole of the train standing entire on the up main line. A pilot engine, used for forwarding that portion of the train intended for Abersychan and Blaenavon, was then backed towards the train, and after hooking on to the train, the eleven loaded waggons were unhooked and drawn forward by the pilot engine, until the last of these waggons had passed the points for shunting into the goods siding, when the engine, which had drawn the train from Newport to Pontypool, came out of the siding, hooked on to the last of the loaded waggons, and took those intended for Pontypool into the siding, the remainder being taken forward to another siding by the pilot engine.

It is stated that when these loaded waggons were disengaged from the empty waggons, the latter stood partly on the level space opposite to the Pontypool Station, and partly on the incline of 1 in 55 towards Newport; and that they stood still after the loaded waggons had been drawn a-head six or seven yards. The number of the waggons standing on the incline is somewhat uncertain ; it is stated by some to have been two or three, and by others five waggons.

Before the operation of shunting had been completed, these empty waggons were observed to be in motion, the wind blowing boisterously in the direction in which they were moving, no person being with them ; the guard having got out to carry his lamps into the station, but not before he had, according to his statement, put on the break, which break he had never known to become unscrewed. The empty waggons proceeded with increasing velocity, until they had passed Pontrhydyrun Station, when they came  into violent collision with the 7.30 a.m. up Newport, Abergavenny, and Hereford passenger train. The break van was smashed to pieces as well as three of the trucks, and six others were more or less damaged. The engine of the passenger train was a good deal damaged also, and the boiler mountings and chimney knocked off. Fortunately this portion of the line was straight, and the driver of the passenger train, having seen the waggons approaching, was enabled to bring his train almost to a stand still by shutting off his steam, applying the breaks and reversing his engine before he, the fireman, and guard got off the train. It is said that the breaks were partly taken off before they got down.

The effect of the collision caused the passenger train to travel backwards towards Newport, and but for the judicious manner in which the station master at Pontnewydd acted, the consequences of a return to Newport under such circumstances might have been exceedingly serious.

The up Newport, Abergavenny, and Hereford train passed Pontnewydd at 7. 44., and after about the lapse of three minutes, the station master heard long continuous whistling, proceeding from the engine which had taken the goods train up from Newport, and which had followed the empty waggons from Pontypool, in hopes of being enabled to get  hold of them before any damage was done, and the whistling was succeeded by a great crash. The station master shortly afterwards was enabled to make out that the passenger train was returning on the same line, with the engine disabled; and he placed stones, ballast, and rubbish on the rails, so as to impede its progress; and by running alongside the train, which was then travelling about seven or eight miles an hour, he was enabled to get into a carriage which had a break to it, at the same time that another man, who was farther down the line, was enabled to get into the break van ; and by applying both breaks the trains were brought to rest without any further injury.

I should mention that the nut on the screw of the break was found in such a position as to prove that the breaking power of the van at the tail of the empty waggons had not been placed so as to act against the wheels. Four Irish sailors are understood to have been slightly hurt.

There is, in my opinion, no doubt whatever that the accident was entirely caused by the neglect of the guard in quitting his van at Pontypool without having first screwed on the break.

Experiments have been made by the Company subsequent to the accident, and it has been ascertained, that a van of the same kind as that used for the goods train on the 12th instant, when screwed on was sufficient to keep the whole of the empty waggons at rest on the incline of 1 in 55.

There appears also to have been sufficient space to have placed the whole of the train on the level part at Pontypool Station, instead of allowing any portion of the train to stand on the incline.
I have, &c.
Captain Gallon, Royal Engineers,                                                                                                      W. Yolland,
&c.  Colonel, Royal Engineers



Accidents 1856

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Sidan uppdaterad den 14 juli 2006