ACCIDENTS APPERTAINING TO THE MANAGEMENT.

ACCIDENTS AT STATIONS OR SIDINGS FROM SHUNTING OPERATIONS

BIRKENHEAD,   LANCASHIRE,  AND  CHESHIRE  JUNCTION RAILWAY.

Railway Department, Board of Trade
                                                                                                                                            Whitehall, May 27, 1856.
Sir,   
In compliance with the instructions contained in your letter of the 20th instant, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended the accident, that occurred on the 15th instant, near the Frodsham Station of the Birkenhead, Lancashire, and Cheshire Junction Railway.

As a special train, consisting of an engine and tender, five empty carriages, and a van, was passing this station, at a speed of twenty-five miles an hour, at a quarter to four o'clock on the afternoon in question, a youth named Atherton, employed as a porter, and engaged at the time in shunting with a horse, drove a waggon upon the main line. The engine of the train grazed the waggon, and some of the carriages striking it, two of them were thrown off the line. The horse was killed, and Atherton was most severely injured in the arm, thigh, and head.
The guard of the empty carriage train also had a narrow escape, as well as the passengers in another train, which passed the station a few seconds before the accident on the other line of rails, inasmuch as if this passenger train had been a little later it would have come in contact with the empty carriages.

The boy, whom I visited, says, that he observed the passenger train approaching from Warrington, and that, when that had passed, he went on with his shunting, not having an idea of the approach of the other train. And here it must be explained, that on account of the curves of the line, the station would have intercepted his view, and prevented him from seeing the empty passenger train until it was close upon him.

The head porter, Bazley, was assisting and superintending Atherton in shunting the waggon, which had to be taken to a siding on the opposite side of the line, to be in readiness for the 5 p.m. goods' train from Chester, immediately before the accident; and he states, that, having seen the two trains approaching in opposite directions, he desired Atherton to remain in the siding while he lowered his signals to allow them both to pass. He then went to the other end of the platform to lower his signals, and during his absence the accident occurred.

Bazley brought two witnesses, a joiner and a labourer, who were standing on a bridge over the line, to corroborate his statement, as to his having warned Atherton of the approach of the two trains. But, considering that each of these men, when examined in regard to the details of the occurrence, contradicted him in other respects, and looking to the manner in which Bazley's own evidence was given, it does not appear by any means certain that what he said was true.

It is the custom on this line to attach a red tail-board, or extra red light, to the tail of a preceding train, in order to notify that a special train is about to follow; but it appears that in this particular instance it was not found possible to carry out the regulations in this respect; and these empty carriages having been borrowed from the London and North-western Company, and having been required by them for use on that evening, it was necessary to return them at once. As no telegraphic message was sent to announce its having started from Chester, it was not known at Frodsham that the special train was to be expected.

I understand that the Directors are now providing for a more free use of the telegraph wires, with a view to prevent such an accident in future.

To their not having been used on this occasion, and to a misunderstanding between Bazley and Atherton, or, possibly, to the neglect of the former in not giving proper intimation to the latter before lowering the signals for the passage of the special train, the present catastrophe is to be attributed.
I have, &c.
The Secretary of the                                                                                                                                   H. W. Tyler,
Railway Department, Board of Trade.                                                                                        Capt. Royal Engineers.


EASTERN  COUNTIES  RAILWAY.
Railway Department, Board of Trade,
                                                                                                                                          Whitehall, April 22, 1856.
Sir,   
I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, that I have inquired into the circumstances connected with a collision that occurred at the Bishopsgate Street Station of the Eastern Counties Railway on the 1st February.

The confined nature of the Bishopsgate Street Station, and the large amount of traffic, render the working of it, both difficult and complicated ; to accommodate the traffic, the expedient at all times dangerous is resorted to of converting one of the main lines into a temporary siding; and it was the appropriation of the main line to this purpose that caused the present collision.

About 300 yards from the arrival platform there are two sets of points, on the up line, one a little in advance of the other, from which branches extend to the arrival platform, the lowermost set of points are habitually kept open for up trains, and this branch is known as the main line, the part of the up line which extends beyond these points being called the coal line. The arrival platform is protected by a semaphore signal, and an auxiliary signal, both under the charge of the platform signal man : the auxiliary signal stands close to the points I have before described. The printed rules say that the auxiliary signal is "to protect trains standing beyond the semaphore," this "standing" however is explained to mean, standing at the platform, and extending beyond it.

At about 10. 45 p.m. the goods train from Colchester arrived at its usual time, it was allowed to go up the main line towards the platform, which is the usual practice, and which appears to be necessary, in order that it may be shunted to some particular spot for unloading, immediately after the goods train had passed the points, the pointsman turned the Hertford train, which was waiting, through the second set of points, in order that it might reach the platform by that other road, called the coal line, which I have described.

Some short time after the Hertford train had passed, the Woolwich train arrived. The pointsman states that be looked up the main line and saw nothing on it, and as the auxiliary signal showed a white light, all rigrht. he allowed the Woolwich train to proceed up the main line, which it appears the goods' train  was  now occupying as a  siding.  The guard of the goods' train, having considered that his duty was over, had taken off the tail lamp and  gone home.  It appears that this is the  usual  practice, the train being consigned  to the men charged with the unloading of it. The driver of the Woolwich train states that he did not perceive the goods' train until close upon it; the night was dark, and he was dazzled by the light of the auxiliary signal.  The signal man stated that the auxiliary signal has only reference to the platform and that he had nothing to do with obstructions on the line, even though they occur within the auxiliary signal. If this case, and the signal lamps are removed from the tail of the train occupying the line as a siding, I do not understand (especially if if the night is dark and stormy) how the obstruction is to be indicated.  The traffic superintendent says that  the pointsman must have known that the goods' train could not have left the main line;  this he denies.   I think it very proable that he ought to have known, but that he was momentarily confused, and the circumstances were sufficient to account of his forgetfulness, viz., the main line was occupied as a siding before the regular trains had ceased running, the  signal lamps had been removed from the tail of the goods' train, and there was an all right signal shown in rear of it.
If the necessities  of the station and the accommodation of the traffic   render necessary the departure from sound principles, and the application of a portion of the line to purposes for which it never was intended, a more efficient system of signals is required, which should fully indicate the state of the line it is intended to protect, and safety   should be left dependent on the memory of one man, which circumstances may momentarily confuse.
I have, &c.
The Secretary of the                                                                                                                       Geo. Wynne,
Railway Department, Board of Trade.                                                                        Lieut.-Colonel, Royal Engineer.


EASTERN  COUNTIES  RAILWAY.
Railway Department, Board of Trade,           
                                                                                                                          Whitehall, 10th November 1856.
Sir,  
In compliance with the instructions contained in your letter of the 24th ultimo, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances connected with the collision which occurred on the 17th October, on the main line of the Eastern Counties Railway (London to Colchester), at Stratford Station

About 270 yards east of the Stratford Station, on the Colchester line, there is a semaphore signal and telegraphic signal-box, close to Angel Lane over bridge; this spot being the eastern limit on this line of the Eastern Counties Railwav of the system of working the traffic by portions with the aid of the electric telegraph.

Immediately beyond, and east of Angel Lane signal, there are goods and cattle sidings, the former on the south, and the latter on the north of the main line ; these are protected by a distant or auxiliary signal 220 yards from Angel Lane semaphore signal, and about 20 yards further than an over bridge called the "Cart and Horses Bridge." This distant signal is situated just at the end of a sharp curve, which prevents the driver of an engine travelling on the up line towards London from seeing the Angel Lane semaphore signal, until he has passed inside the distant signal.

The first station on the main line beyond Angel Lane Bridge is Forest Gate, distant about one mile, and the practice has been adopted of signalling every train that passes or leaves Forest Gate Station for Stratford, or that passes Angel Lane signal for Forest Gate, by means of a telegraphic bell signal; and this signal is immediately replied to by bell from the other station. The object of this cautionary signal appears to be, to give warning that a train is on its way to the other station, so that the distant signals may be placed at "danger" if there is any necessity for it.

The normal state of the Angel Lane distant signal is "all right," and it is only placed at "danger" when anything is on the main line, or when shunting operations are going on in the sidings.

On the night of the 17th ult., about 7 p.m., immediately after the telegraphic bell signal had been sounded from Forest Gate, and been replied to from Angel Lane, an Eastern Union goods train, on its way to London, whistled for the Angel Lane distant signal to be lowered to "all right." This was done before the train had come to rest, and as the train was passing the distant signal, it was again restored to "danger."

Arrived inside the distant signal, the Eastern Union Norwich goods train proceeded to drop 13 trucks into one siding, and to take out one truck from another, then ran back and reunited the whole train on the up main line, and had just got into slow motion about 7h. 15m. p.m., when the tail of this train was run into by the 6h. 30m. p.m. up passenger train from Tilbury, and a slight collision occurred, by which one passenger was severely, and eleven others very slightly, injured; very little damage was done to the carriages.

The head guard of the goods train informed me that he was at the time walking up towards the Angel Lane signal-box, to get the invoice of the truck taken on, and hearing the noise of the collision, he turned round and looked in that direction for a moment, and then turned round again and asked the signalman if he had shifted the signal, to which the other replied, "See, see." The wire of  the distant signal at this moment was off the wheel and slack, in fact, in the position it should be for the signal to be at  "danger."

The passenger engine whistle had been heard by both the signalman and the head guard, immediately before the collision taking place, and prior to this, the Forest Gate telegraphic bell had been sounded, denoting that a train was passing that station on its way to Stratford, and the signalman had told the head guard that a passenger train was due, and that the goods train must be got out of the way. The signalman denies having touched the distant signal after he had placed it at "danger" to cover the shunting of the goods train ; and the yardsman in charge of the sidings states he saw the distant signal at "danger " a few minutes before the collision occurred.

The distant signal can be seen from Forest Gate Station, and the driver of the up passenger train from Tilbury informed me that it was the usual practice, for trains that stopped at Stratford, to shut off the steam as they passed the down distant signal on the Stratford side of the Forest Gate Station, and that he did so on the night of the 17th ult.; that he was on the look-out at the time for the Angel Lane distant signal, and that he observed that it had a white light. This statement is fully confirmed by the guard of the same train and other parties.

The driver further states, that as he got through the arch of the Cart and Horses Bridge, he saw three red lights in front of him, and that he then reversed his engine, and whistled for the guard, and did all in his power to stop, but could not do so before he struck the other train, when running about six or seven miles an hour.

The guard of the passenger train states, that as soon as he saw the red lights in front of him, he exclaimed to a fireman of one of the Tilbury trains, who was riding in his van at the tail of the train, "Here's a train in front of us, and the 'auxiliary' is 'all right.'"' And the fireman distinctly states that he heard the rattle of the distant signal, as it was changed from  " all right" to "danger," immediately after the driver sounded his whistle.

I am unable to decide between this conflicting testimony. The collision was certainly occasioned either by the Angel Lane signalman having exhibited the "all right" signal before the shunting operations were completed, and changed it again to "danger" before the head guard of the goods train spoke to him, or the driver of the Tilbury up passenger train ran past the Angel Lane distant signal whilst it stood at "danger." The accident would not have happened except by neglect of duty.

I should, however, remark, that the normal state of this distant signal should, in my opinion, be that of "danger," in accordance with the practice usually followed at junctions, and lowered to "all right" for trains to advance at the sound of the whistle. It may possibly be contended that this is actually not a junction; but it is a dangerous place, not very far removed from a junction.
The more effectual method of providing for the safety of the public would be to extend the system of working by the electric telegraph to a greater distance from London; for instance, to the first station beyond Forest Gate, both on the main line and on the Tilbury line.
I have, &c.
Captain Galton, Royal Engineers,                                                                                                          W. Yolland,
&c.,           &c.           &c.                                                                                                     Lt.-Colonel, Royal Engineers,


EASTERN  COUNTIES RAILWAY.
Railway Department, Board of Trade,
                                                                                                                                          Whitehall, December 3, 1856.
Sir,
In compliance with the instructions contained in your letter of the 25th ult., I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances attending a collision which occurred at the Bishopsgate Station of the Eastern Counties Railway, on the 21st November.

When No. 3 up Norwich goods train reached Brick-lane, about 730 yards from the arrival platform at Bishopsgate station, on the 21st ult., at 11.55 a.m., the Inspector of goods trains gave one of the shunters orders to place a portion of the trucks in a siding lying to the south of the up main line, the entrance to which is about 245 yards from the platform; and he assisted the shunter in the operation, the other portion of the trucks being left standing on the up main line.

As soon as this had been effected the goods engine, with one or two trucks attached, drew ahead, and then backed out along the up main line, and picked up the rest of the goods train, again moved ahead, and finally placed the whole of  these trucks in the same siding as the first portion had been deposited.

At this time a passenger train from Woolwich arrived by the up main line, but which, instead of following the goods train along- the curved cross over main road leading to the siding, was diverted by a pair of facing points, situated about 255 yards from the platform, along a piece of straight road leading to the platform. As soon as it had passed, the goods  train made on or two shunts into sidings leading out of the one on which it had been standing, and then drew ahead until it again stood on the main line, nearer to the platform than the curved cross over road before referred to, and the driver was directed by  the shunter to stop.

The straight piece of road, along which the Woolwich train passed to the station, was thus left clear, and according the up signal for the 11.15 a.m. up Broxbourne train was lowered from ''danger" to "caution," to enable it to come forward.

The shunter then went to the Inspector to receive his orders regarding the disposal of the rest of the trucks of the goods train, which were intended for sidings lying north of the down main line, and was told he must wait till the Broxbourne train had arrived.

The Broxbourne train arrived at its proper time at 12.20 p.m. ; it consisted of four carriages, and as it approached the curved cross over portion of the up main line, the driver saw that the goods train wras in the act of backing out towards him, and he immediately reversed his engine and put on the steam the reverse way, whistled for the guard's break, and did all in his power to reduce his speed, which he estimates at four or five miles an hour when he struck the last of the goods trucks and knocked it off the rails, breaking the buffer plank of his own engine and the buffers.

The pointsman at the commencement of this curved portion of the up main line, seeing that a collision was inevitable, very properly alowed the points to drop to their natural position, so that the two trains might strike each other fairly instead of permitting the Broxbourne train to pass along the straight road, as in that case the goods trucks would have struck the passenger carriages on the side, and probably have caused some very serious accidents. As it was, nine persons are stated to have been slightly hurt by the collision.

The driver of the goods train states that after standing about eight minutes where he had been directed to stop by the shunter, he heard some one call out, "Come back;" he admits that he did not see any one ; and he says that he thought the voice was like that of the shunter.    The fireman supports the driver's statement, but there is no other corroboration.

I am informed that the practice in the Bishopsgate yard, with regard to shunting operations, is, that the drivers are signalled to go ahead or go back, by means of waving the hand and by word of mouth during the day, and by waving a white light and by word of mouth by night. The driver of the goods train states that he has frequently been moved by word of mouth alone, without any waving of the hand or of a light; but the bulk of the testimony is the other way. There are no written or printed regulations on the subject, and it is therefore solely a question of practice.

The driver of the goods train further states that when he backed his train, in accordance with the call, he had no idea that he was going along the curved cross over road, but imagined that he was going back once more into the siding, as he saw the semaphore arm down for an up train to come in.

With regard to the cause of the accident, I have no doubt that it was occasioned by the carelessness of the driver, and a loose way of conducting the shunting in the yard; and I am of opinion that proper instructions on the subject of signalling for the shunting of trains should form part of those issued for the guidance of drivers and shunters.
I have, &c.
Captain Galton, Royal Engineers.                                                                                                        W. Yolland,
&c.           &c'.           &c.                                                                                                       Lieut. - Col. Royal Engineers.

EAST  LANCASHIRE  RAILWAY.
Railway Department. Board of Trade,    
                                                                                                                                          Whitehall, August 2, 1856.
Sir,
In compliance with the instructions contained in your letter of the 30th ultimo, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended the accident, that occurred on the 26th ultimo, near the Bury Station of the East Lancashire Railway.

As will be seen by the enclosed diagram, there are some points (marked a) on the main line, 833 yards to the south of the Bury Station, leading to the company's engine shed and workshops, and the sidings connected with them ; and there is a, signal at 80 yards from these points, and between them and the station, for their protection.

It is stated that the shunting from the sidings in the neighbourhood of this signal occupies sometimes three or four hours in the course of the day, but that at other times there is not more than an engine going twice to and fro in the same period.

It has not been customary to station a signalman at this point; but it has been considered the duty of each driver, who required to pass from these sidings to the main line, to see that the signal was turned to "danger" before he did so; and, in fact, a notice-board pointed out that the drivers were responsible in this respect.

An engine proceeding from the shed to the station, along the siding which contains the pit marked in the diagram, has to join the main line at a, then to run eighty yards up the wrong line to the signal, and there to cross to its proper line.

The gradient falls 1 in 132 from the station.

Such being the position and mode of working of the sidings, the points, and the signal, I will now7 proceed to detail the circumstances connected with the accident.

On the 26th ultimo, a driver was standing by the side of a new engine, which was over the pit near the shed, as his fireman returned from dinner ; and, finding that it was necessary that he should go to the station for coke and water, he then directed the fireman to set the signal to "danger," that he might get out on the main line. The fireman obeyed him, and he moved forward to the main line ; but he had no sooner reached it than he was run into by a passenger train from the station at considerable speed.

This driver could not have seen the passenger train approaching until he was near the main line, on account of the position of the sheds, and he was too much engaged with the pet taps of his new engine to observe it when he might have done so. The fireman, as soon as he had turned on the signal, heard a whistle from, and then saw, the approaching passenger train ; but did not succeed in attracting the attention of his driver in sufficient time to prevent the catastrophe.

The goods manager of the company, who was riding on the passenger engine, unfortunately sustained a compound fracture of his leg below the knee in attempting to jump off, but the secretary of the company, who was also on the engine, the driver, and the fireman escaped unhurt. The guard was slightly cut by the van window, and two passengers received contusions.

The passenger train left Bury at 1.51 p.m., one minute late, and the driver was travelling at the rate of 25 or 26 miles an hour, and was within 150 yards of the signal, when he suddenly saw the fireman turn it to *danger.'' He therefore whistled for the breaks, and seeing the new engine coming on the line reversed his engine, and did his best to pull up. He was unable, however, to reduce his speed by more than about 10 miles an hour on so heavy a gradient; and the collision would have been even more severe but from the circumstance that the van and two carriages were fitted with Mr. Newall's break, which was applied by the guard upon hearing the whistle of the driver.

No blame can be attached to the servants of the company who were with the passenger train, but undoubtedly the driver of the new engine was guilty of great carelessness in bringing his engine on the main line without looking to see whether a train was in sight, and particularly when a passenger train wras due.

The great cause of the collision, however, was the want of a signalman for the control of this means of communication with the main line; and I am happy to be able to enclose copy of a regulation which has been issued to the two men who have been appointed since the accident to perform that duty.

I may add that these men should be supplied with time bills, and the means of knowing the correct time, in order that they may not only prevent obstructions on the main line when trains are in sight, but also provide against dangers from this cause when trains are to be expected, as well as that a distant signal towards the station should be erected for their use, to be worked by a wire from the present signal. The latter precaution is the more necessary because fogs are not unfrequent on this part of the line.
I have. &c.
The Secretary of the                                                                                                                               H. W. Tyler,
Railway Department, Board of Trade.                                                                                        Capt. Royal Engineer*.

Enclosure.
East Lancashire Railway. Notice.
Sidings at Buckley Wells.   Engine Shed.

Before any engine is removed from the sidings the driver must receive notice from the signalman specially appointed by the company that the main line is clear.

No engine must leave the sidings for the main line, or commence to shunt from one siding to another, until the driver has been assured by the appointed signalman that the main line is clear and properly protected by signals or otherwise.

The signals are not to be worked cither in the day or night except by the persons specially appointed by the company to discharge that duty.

Loco. Dept., Bury, August 1,1856.

I hereby acknowledge receipt of copy of the above. August 1,1856.                            ""                                    (Signed)             R. Parkinson, Day Signalman
I hereby acknowledge receipt of copy of the above.
August 1,1856.     "                                                            (Signed)             John Sandiford, Night Signalman,


EDINBURGH, PERTH,  AND DUNDEE RAILWAY.
Railway Department, Board of Trade      
                                                                                                                                 Whitehall, October 15, 1856.
Sir,  
In compliance with the instructions contained in your letter of the 30th August last, I have the honour to report. for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended the accident, that occurred on the 8th of that month, near the Dunfermline Station of the Edinburgh, Perth, and Dundee Railway.

This is a joint station between the Edinburgh, Perth, and Dundee, and Stirling and Dunfermline Railway Companies; but it is entirely under the control of the former company, though the station servants are joint servants. Under an arrangement which has been entered into between the Edinburgh, Perth, and Dundee, and Scottish Central Railway Companies, the line of the former has been placed under the same management with the line of the latter and that of the Edinburgh and Glasgow Company; and the general manager of these three companies is, therefore, under the Directors of the Edinburgh, Perth, and Dundee Company, responsible for the working of the Dunfermline Station, and the line to the east of it; though these directors are, as far as I understand, unable to make additions or alterations to the station without consultation with, and without the approval of, the Stirling and Dunfermline Company, the question being, of course, supposed to arise out of such additions or alterations, as to what share of the cost ought to be borne respectively by the Companies receiving the benefit of them.

The line to the east of Dunfermline is single for nearly a mile and a half, and is worked for that distance by a pilot-man, under regulations which are badly drawn up, though of so recent a date as 1854, and which cannot possibly be carried out. By the last of those regulations it is directed that "the signals at each end of the single line shall be worked by the pilotmAn only," whilst in other parts of them the pilotman is directed to travel backwards and forwards with the trains, or to "place himself at that extremity of the single line where he is likely to be first wanted; " and it is, therefore, on the approach of this man more than at any other time that the signals require to be attended to. It is hardly necessary to add that he cannot then take charge of them himself.

The only signal to the east of Dunfermline is at 300 yards from the platform, and is worked from the station by a wire. Now, when the pilotman is at the station, no train is permitted to pass along the single line towards it, and the signal is not required | but when the pilotman is approaching the station with an engine or train, or when he has sent one in front of him, which he is also permitted by these regulations to do, it is then necessary that the signal should be worked from the station, to indicate the state of the line between itself and the passenger platform, or the goods yard, as the case may be ; and it is the more essential at this particular station, inasmuch as the shunting is performed over the single line traversed by the passenger, as well as all the other trains.

Having thus directed attention to the inconsistency of the regulations. I shall now proceed to detail the circumstances of the accident in question.

On the 8th ultimo, there was a general holiday in the neighbourhood, and excursion trains were dispatched in the morning both eastward and westward from Dunfermline, the former having been destined for Edinburgh, St. Andrews, Perth, and Dundee. The trains for the two last-mentioned places started as one train, and when the train from Perth returned in the evening, at half-past nine o'clock, it did not occur to the station master that the train from Dundee had not arrived at the same time. The station was full of carriages, and in one siding there were, in the following order from the eastward, nine carriages, two engines and tenders, 25 carriages, and another engine and tender. The station master was not aware of the presence of the engine and nine carriages first mentioned, but believed them to have been sent on to Glasgow, and he ordered the second engine to draw its 25 carriages forward so as to allow the third engine, to the west of these, to proceed to the turntable. In consequence of impediments in turning this last engine, a great deal of time was consumed in the operation, and in the meantime the excursion train returned from Dundee, and came into collision with the carriages thus pushed forward, which are stated to have been somewhere near, and probably 15 yards beyond, the signal. Fourteen of the passengers were injured by the shock, but none of them, so far as I have learnt, seriously.

The night was very dark, but not foggy, and the pilotman was riding on the engine of the Dundee train, having joined it at Hulbeath station, some two miles to the east of Dunfermline, at ten o'clock, for the purpose of conducting it over the single line. The signal to the east of Dunfermline is approached on a rising gradient of 1 in 130, extending for 700 yards, and is visible for about the same distance.

The pilotman, who formerly had charge of a level crossing at the other end of the single line, has filled his present position for about six months; and he states that during that time he never before found the line blocked when approaching the station with a train. In giving his evidence, he did not impress me with the idea that he was altogether telling the truth ; but what he stated was to the effect that he observed the danger signal from the signal post, and the lamps at the rear of the carriages, soon after passing a bridge 700 yards from the former; that he believed the carriages to be on the passenger line, and that he therefore called the drives attention to these circumstances, and told him he ought to stop : that he them told the fireman to apply his break, and afterwards, on turning round, and seeing the lights from the carriages, and finding that the driver had not shut off his steam, he told him again to do so, when it was shut off some 150 yards from the point of collision. He adds that when 60 or 70 yards from the carriages, he told the driver to reverse his engine for fear of a collision.

The driver has been for 18 months in the service of the Scottish Central Company. He had never been in Dunfermline before, and the fireman had only been once or twice over the single line leading to the station, about six years previously. The train he was thus driving consisted of an engine and tender, and 17 carriages, including two break carriages.

The statements of the driver are very different from those of the pilotman; he says that, so far from warning him to stop, the pilotman told him that the steepness of the gradient required him to keep up a considerable speed for the purpose of surmounting it; and that when he asked the pilotman what were the lights in the rear of the carriages, the latter replied that it was the other train shunted in the siding. The fireman also denies that he was told by the pilotman to apply his break.

Another disputed point is as to the state of the signal. The pilotman saw it from a considerable distance, showing a red light; the driver and fireman could not see it until they were very near to it; the guard of the train saw it showing danger, from 600 or 700 yards ; the locomotive foreman of the company, who drove the previous train to Dunfermline, could not see it as he then approached the station, and, when he examined the lamp after the collision, found that though the semaphore arm was up, it was only turned half way round, so as to look across the line instead of down it; and the stationmaster, who also examined it after the accident, observed that it was working properly.

It is stated that no alteration has since been made in the working of this lamp, and it certainly appeared to work well when I visited the spot.

Under these circumstances, it is difficult to arrive at a conclusion in reference to some points connected with this accident; but there can be no doubt that great blame is to be attached to the Company, for sending such inexperienced servants in charge of the engine of an excursion train in the dark.

As it seems that it not unfrequently happens, in shunting at the station, that trains have to project beyond the present signal, I would recommend that this signal should be removed to a greater distance from the station, and that another should be provided nearer to the station, to indicate when it is safe, or otherwise, for in-coming trains to run up to the passenger platform.

At present, as I have before stated, the shunting requires to be performed over the single line traversed by all trains, passenger, goods, or mineral, in their progress to or from the station. It is highly desirable that additional accommodation should be provided for the relief of this line. And I may add, that, from the evidence given in regard to the working of the single line, it is clearly highly important, both for the safety of the public and the real interests of the company, that the Edinburgh, Perth, and Dundee Company's line should be doubled, from the commencement of the present single line into the Dunfermline station.
I have, &c.
The Secretary of the                                                                                                                                 H.W.Tyler,
Railway Department, Board of Trade.                                                                                    Captain, Royal Engineers,

LONDON AND NORTH-WESTERN RAILWAY.
Railway Department, Board of Trade,      
                                                                                                                               Whitehall, February 4,1856.
Sir,     
I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, that I have inquired into the circumstances connected with a collision that occurred at Watford, on the London and North-western Railway, on the 4th ultimo.

The Rugby goods' train, which is due at Watford at 9.50 p.m., arrived there a few minutes before time; it was turned into the up siding, which is situated on the south side of the station; this siding, which is 500 or 600 yards in length, communicates both at its north and south end with the main line ; at the far or south end there is an ash pit, the extreme end of which is only 93 feet from the point leading into the mainline. The driver was taking his engine up to this pit, and had improperly given the charge of the engine to his fireman whilst he (the driver) was engaged on the tender; the night was very dark, and the sign board, which is placed there to indicate how far an engine may come, was not visible through the darkness ; the consequence was that the fireman, who had only been a few weeks in the employ of the Company, allowed the engine to overshoot the pit, and to get foul with the main line. The steam was so low that the engine could not shove back the train, and while in this position it was struck by the express train from Scotland. The driver was undoubtedly the person to blame in this matter, for if the night was so dark that the sign board was not visible he should have taken precautions to ascertain the position of the ash pit. Considering that the ash pit is in somewhat dangerous contiguity with the main line, it would be a proper precaution on the part of the Company to place a small lamp there to indicate its position. The fireman said he understood other trains had got foul of the line in going to this ash pit. I should therefore recommend that this siding should be made to terminate in a blind siding, with points weighted to lead trains into the blind portion, unless expressly held back temporarily for the passage of a train into the main line.
I have, &c
The Secretary of the                                                                                                                     Geo. Wynne,
Railway Department, Board of 'Trade.                                                                         Lieut-Colonel Royal Engineers.

LONDON  AND  NORTH-WESTERN RAILWAY.
Railway Department, Board of Trade,   
                                                                                                                                     Whitehall, October 15, 1856.
Sir,
In compliance with the instructions contained in your letter of the 10th ultimo, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended the accident, that occurred on the 6th August last, near the Albion Station of the London and North Western Railway.

This station is about six miles from Birmingham on the Stour Valley line, and is protected towards Dudley Port and Wolverhampton by a semaphore signal, worked by a wire, 400 yards from the passenger platform, and visible (though not very distinctly, on account of the nature of the background against which it is seen), for upwards of 800 yards.

The gradient at this part of the line rises considerably from Dudley Port towards the Albion Station.

On the day in question, a goods train, consisting of an engine and tender, two long six-wheeled trucks used for the transport of marine boilers, three loaded and ten empty waggons, and a break van, reached Albion from Birmingham at 1.25 p.m. Some four or five trucks were there standing, waiting to be taken on, in a siding on the opposite side of the line ; and in order that they might be properly placed in the train, the driver crossed with his engine, the two boiler trucks, and a loaded waggon, from* his own, the down line of rails, over the up line and into the siding, to fetch out these trucks : having coupled them on, he then moved forward again, across the up line, for the purpose of getting to the head of his train ; but, unfortunately, one of the boiler trucks left the rails, and delayed him on the crossing, and a passenger train from Liverpool and Wolverhampton came into collision with the goods engine with considerable violence, before the driver of that engine could detach his couplings and get out of the way. Forty persons were more or less injured, and of these one woman had a leg and a jaw broken, and one man died a week afterwards.

The passenger train, which was 29 minutes late on account of its load, left Liverpool at 7.45 that morning. It was a third-class train, consisting, when the collision occurred, of engine and tender, about 11 carriages, and a van. The driver, whose name was Baxter, had been 17 years in the company's service, and had worked in his turn on the Stour Valley Railway ever since its opening. He had always borne an excellent character, and no previous fault was recorded against him. He has not been heard of since the coroner's inquest, which was held on the 14th of August, on the view of the body of the unfortunate man who lost his life by the collision, and I have not therefore had an opportunity of examining him ; but he stated before the coroner that he did not see the signal, and that, therefore, he was unaware of his danger until he saw the goods engine 250 yards from him, when he was within a few yards of the signal post. He admitted that if he had seen the signal from the point where it could be first observed, he would have been able to stop his train, and he added that though he had worked once a week for some years on the Stour Valley line, he never recollected to have seen it "at danger."

A verdict of manslaughter was returned by the coroner's jury against this man, and I understand, that, availing himself of a temporary inattention on the part of those who had him in charge, he walked out of court, and made his escape.

The collision occurred 237 yards within the signal referred to above, which I have already described as being 400 yards from the station platform; and the driver, if he had observed it when he first came in sight of it, would have had upwards of 1000 yards in which to stop his train. There appears to be no doubt that the arm showed "danger," and it is extraordinary that the driver, well aware as he was of its position, should not have noticed it. His fireman, who had only been three times on the line before, may well have overlooked it, for it is low, and on account of the background against which it is seen, not well calculated to attract attention. I learn that it was in contemplation to improve this signal before the collision took place, and that this measure will be carried out now that the inquiries into the circumstances of the accident have terminated. It would, perhaps, be well to remove it to a greater distance from the station, and to add another signal nearer to the passenger platform.                                                                                                                        

The next question that arises in regard to this accident is as to why the main line was not kept clear for the passenger train.

It will be remembered that the passenger train was 29 minutes late, and, as the trains are not telegraphed to the Albion station, the pointsman on duty did not know when it would arrive. In consequence of the nature of the traffic brought upon this line from various directions and divers distances, a greater or less degree of unpunctuality must always occur ; and it is stated to be impossible, under the present system, to keep the main line clear in all cases when a passenger train may be expected to arrive. In order, therefore, to obtain the best chance of safety for the public, other means than those now employed must be adopted for the prevention of collisions of this nature ; or, in other words, if it be not possible to keep the main line clear for the arrival of the several trains, on account of their irregularity, and the uncertainty that exists as to the exact time when they may be expected, these trains should not be allowed to start from, or to pass any one telegraph station, until the line shall have been reported by telegraph to be clear to the next telegraph station.

Applying these remarks to the instance under consideration, it may be observed that if the pointsman at the Albion Station had been able, when he permitted a part of the goods train to shunt across the up line of rails, to signify by telegraph to Dudley Port (which is a mile and a quarter distant), that the up line was not clear, and thus to prevent the passenger train from starting from that station until he was ready to receive it, then the collision would not have occurred, and at least 40 people would have been saved from injury, and one from death.

This collision, therefore, which was occasioned by the neglect of the driver of the passenger train, in not keeping a better look-out, might have been avoided if the recommendation which has been already made to the London and North Western Company by their Lordships, to work their lines by telegraph, had been adopted, and, probably, if the signal supplied for the protection of the station had been more efficient.
I have, &c.
The Secretary of the                                                                                                                                 H. W. Tyler,
Railway Department, Board of Trade.                                                                                    Captain, Royal Engineers.

LONDON  AND  NORTH-WESTERN  RAILWAY.
Railway Department, Board of Trade,    
                                                                                                                               Whitehall, October 15, 1856.
Sir,       
In compliance with the instructions contained in your letter of the 20th ultimo, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended the accident, that occurred on the 17th ultimo, near the Spon Lane Station of the Stour Valley section of the London and North-Western Railway.

This station is four and a half miles from Birmingham ; and 800 yards on the other side of it there is a goods station called the Spon Lane Basin Station, provided with a station signal, which I shall designate as the "basin signal," and an auxiliary signal toward Spon Lane Station, 376 yards from it, called the "Canal Bridge signal." This last signal is visible for 580 yards, and there is another signal towards Birmingham, 460 yards from it, at Spon Lane Station, as well as an auxiliary signal 600 yards further beyond that again.

The gradient rises 1 in 344 from the Spon Lane Station signal to the Bridge signal, falls 1 in 216 from thence to the basin signal, and then falls 1 in 120 towards Wolverhampton.

A goods train from Birmingham reached the Spon Lane Basin at 7.50 p.m. on the 17th ultimo. After shunting some waggons off and taking others on, it was placed in a siding, and it remained there while two passenger trains passed. As soon  as the second of these trains had gone by, at 8.20, it was brought out again on the down main line, and seven new carriages from some neighbouring carriage works were attached to it. The engine then ran round by the up line to get to the other end of the train, for the purpose of pushing it on to Oldbury, a distance of 660 yards, in order that the train might there cross over to the other, the up line, and return to Birmingham.

As the goods train was thus starting, with its engine behind it, for Oldbury, the passenger train due to leave Birmingham at 8.20 came into collision with it at 8.34, and the driver of the goods train and 11 of the passengers were injured. The night was dark and misty, with a mizzling rain.

The passenger train was four or five minutes late, as it happened, in passing this spot, and when the collision occurred the goods train had then to proceed to Oldbury before it could get out of its way. The first remark that suggests itself therefore in reference to this case, is that the goods train ought to have been kept in the siding for this passenger train, as it had been for the two that preceded it, instead of being placed in it's way on the main line.

The rules of the company did not require this, how ever, and the pointsman and guard believed that the goods train could have been got on to Oldbury without interfering with the passenger train, besides which, particular orders had been given in reference to the new passenger carriages, which were to be sent to Birmingham.

Some delay appears to have taken place in the movements of the goods train, in consequence of the rain, the state of the rails, and the stiffness of the new carriages but these are contingencies which must always be expected in the working of goods traffic, and the degree of security against collisions which the public have a right to expect can never be obtained as long as these contingencies are  not properly provided against, or, in other words, as long as the goods trains are thus permitted to stand about on the main line when the passenger trains are  due to arrive.

As I had occasion to remark, in my report upon the fatal accident which occurred under somewhat similar circumstances at the Albion Station of this railway, on the 6th August last, the main line cannot always be kept clear tor passenger trains when they are late, and when it is uncertain at what time they may be expected ; but in this case the line could not even be kept clear till  the passenger train was due; and this collision IS, therefore, another strong proof of the necessity that exists for extending  the use of the electric telegraph, and employing the means that it affords for the prevention of collisions of this nature, by prohibiting any train from passing a telegraph station until the line has been repeated by telegraph to be clear to the next telegraph station.

The number of witnesses in regard to the state of the signals is unusually great, but their evidence is very conflicting. The driver, fireman, and guard of the passenger train found all the signals at "all right" until they sighted the basin signal, which showed "danger," though the driver admits that the bridge signal might have been turned to danger before he passed it without his having seen it, because he was attending to his engine after he observed that it showed white. The pointsman at the basin had turned his canal bridge signal to "danger," and the driver and breaksman of the goods train saw him do so at 8.20, before the goods train came out on the main line. The station master at Spon Lane, the signalman, and a porter, were in conversation when the passenger train passed. The station master states that he saw the bridge signal showing "danger" as the passenger train approached him, and that in consequence of the speed of the train and the driver not shutting off his steam, be said, "Listen, and you'll hear a crash." The signalman did not see a red light at the canal bridge and thinks he saw a white one there, before the train passed him ; but he saw a red one afterwards, as it passed him. The porter saw a red light at the canal bridge after the train had passed.  They neither of them heard the remark referred to by the station master, and they contradict him in other particulars. The mode, also, in which the station master gave his evidence renders it impossible to place much confidence in it. The signalman and porter do not agree altogether in their statements.

This signalman was a platelayer, selected by the station master to take charge of the signals for that night, in the absence of one of the regular signalmen from sickness. He had only come on duty a few minutes before the accident, to relieve the other signalman, who had been on duty for 26! hours. This last man, whose name was Ronca, after doing duty on the previous night, had volunteered to remain for the day also, and had thus been kept on duty for that great length of time by the station master. His successor, Reid, had acted as signalman several times before at inherent places, but never previously at that post. When Ronca went away about half-past eight, a few minutes before the accident, he observed that the bridge signal showed a white light, and he left his semaphore signal at "caution," on account of a passenger train having so recently passed, and his distant signal at "all right; " and Reid did not alter them until after the passenger train that caused the collision had passed him, when he turned the station signal to "danger." The station master states that Reid told him before the accident of Ronca's having left the station signal at "caution," and the porter observed that it was so as the passenger train passed.

Altogether, it appears probable that the driver, fireman, and guard of the passenger train are not telling the truth in regard to thee signals, and that the semaphore at Spon Lane Station showed "green," and the bridge signal "red," as they approached them. If this be the case, there is no excuse for the driver, as he would have had upwards of 1000 yards for stopping his train, which consisted only of an engine and tender, three carriages, and a van, on a rising gradient for 500 yards, and a falling gradient for the remainder.

It seems likely, therefore, that the driver of the passenger train is directly to blame for this accident, while the Directors of the London and North-Western Company are themselves responsible for not preventing it, by adopting the means which are placed at their disposal by the electric telegraph for providing against such catastrophes, on a section of their railway where it appears to be impossible, under the present system, to keep the main line clear in all cases for the passage of the passenger trains.
The station master at Spon Lane is also greatly to blame for having permitted a signalman to remain on duty for so long a period as £6 hours, though this circumstance had no influence in producing the accident.
I have, &c.
The Secretary of the                                                                                                                                     H. W. Tyler,
Railway Department, Board of Trade.                                                                                         Capt. Royal Engineers.

LONDON AND NORTH-WESTERN RAILWAY.
General Manager's Office, Euston Station,
                           _                                                                                                                        November 19, 1856.
SIR,
The report of Captain Tyler of the 15th October on the accidents near the Spon Lane and Albion Stations, and of the 25th October on the accident near the Rugby Station, have been taken into consideration by the Directors of the London and North-western Company.

With reference to the accident near Spon Lane, the Inspecting Officer remarks, that "the driver of the passenger train is directly to blame for the accident."

In the case of the collision at Albion, he observes, that "the driver had upwards of one thousand yards in which to stop his train," and that "it is extraordinary that, well aware as he was of its position, he should not have noticed the signal,''and that "the collision occurred by the neglect of the driver of the passenger train, in not keeping a better look-out."

In regard to the accident near Rugby, Captain Tyler observes, that "there does not appear to be any proof of blame attaching to any of the servants of the company."

But while thus tracing the causes of the accidents, in two instances, distinctly to the neglect of two individuals, and in the third acquitting all parties, Captain Tyler proceeds to comment severely on the management of the Directors. The officer remarks, that the Directors of the London and North-western Company are themselves to blame for not preventing "such casualties " by adopting the means which are placed at their disposal by the electric telegraph for preventing such catastrophes; and, in each of the Reports under consideration, similar observations are made. In reference to this remark, it may be observed that the remainder of the Inspecting Officers Report does not justify it; for the telegraph apparatus only enables communication to be made with the driver by signal; and if a driver is so reckless as to neglect altogether a signal which the Inspecting Officer admits gave one thousand yards warning, it is impossible to prevent collision by the use of the telegraph, or any other precaution. But Captain Tyler appears to think that the adoption of the rule proposed in his Report of the 15th October, namely, "that trains should not be allowed to start from, or pass any one telegraph station until the line shall have been reported clear by telegraph to the next," must invariably ensure immunity from collision. Unfortunately this is an error, and a recent painful event on this line, has shown that even when the rule is rigidly acted on, a collision may happen. In fact, fatal accidents have even occurred through the operation of a telegraph message; and it cannot be concealed that, while removing; one class of casualties, this agency may introduce another class, quite as serious in its results. From a remark in the Inspecting Officer's Report, it appears that their Lordships are not aware of the fact, that some months previous to the circular from the Board of Trade on the subject, the Board of the London and North-western Company had adopted the train telegraph signals, and had placed the arrangements in the bands of Mr. Clarke, Engineer to the Electric Telegraph Company. This gentleman stated in his Report, that he found it necessary to arrange an entirely new description of instrument, and much time elapsed before the details tor introducing the system could be completed. When first prepared for work, serious and unexpected difficulties presented themselves in making the short circuits act independently, especially as regards the bells; and much derangement occurred from thunder- storms. From these causes, some time passed before it was considered safe to commence the use of the signals. The system has, however, for some time been in operation, at distances of about two miles, over the whole length from Rugby to London, 82 3/4 miles; and no expense has been spared in carrying it out. A large number of additional men have necessarily been employed for the special purpose. It cannot be disguised that, since it has been fully in operation, derangement of the instruments and bells has occurred more frequently than is consistent with the unerring certainty such a system should possess,—and it would almost seem that the frequency with which, under this system, the engine-driver sees the danger signal, removed, after he has come in sight of it, is not unlikely to cause great danger by encouraging him to hesitate for a valuable moment in the expectation that the signal will, as possibly it has on every former occasion, vanish before he reaches it.                                                                      

While, therefore, the Directors have always been and are ready to incur any expense necessary for the public safety (which it is their first duty to provide for), they do not think, from the experience they have had,'that the new system, perfect as it may appear in theory, can yet be extended with safety till the contingencies to which it  is subject are materially lessened, and bearing in mind the fact that any derangement of traffic by delay, which must be the inevitable result of any failure of the apparatus, has been found to be a most fruitful cause of accident) until they find that actual safety can be secured by the present, or some modification of the new system, they do not deem it prudent to extend a plan which has undoubtedly been found in practice to render the drivers and guards less attentive to ordinary precautions, by lulling them into a fancied security.

In conclusion, I am desired to add that the Directors will continue to give their earnest attention to the subject, with the view of  introducing any improvements, which practical experience shall demonstrate to be useful.
I am, Sir,  &c.
The Secretary of the                                                                                                                                         Mark   Huish
Railway Department; Board of Trade.

Railway Department, Board of Trade,

Sir,                                                                                                                                             Whitehall, January 7, 1857.
I have been directed by the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade to transmit to you a copy of the report which they have received from Lieutenant-Colonel Wynne, R.E., of his inquiry into an accident which occurred at Leighton, on the London and North Western Railway, on the 26th November 1856, and also a copy of a memorandum which they have received from Captain Tyler, with reference to the letter from Captain. Huish, dated the 19th November, in reply to Captain Tyler's report on the accidents at Albion and Spon-lane Station-, and the accident near Rugby of the 25th October.

Both these documents bear upon the mode of working the railway by the electric telegraph.

My Lords direct me to request you to draw the attention of the directors to the remarks made by Lieutenant-Colonel Wynne, on the rules adopted by the Great Northern and South Eastern Railway Companies, for regulating their telegraphic service, viz.

1st. That only one train is allowed between the telegraph stations at one and the same time ; 2nd, that every signalman is provided with a clock and a book, in which he enters the time at which every train passes his station ; and 3rd, that an inspector is employed, whose sole duty it is to visit the different telegraphic stations, in order to see that the regulations laid down for working are strictly adhered to.

This subject is one of great importance both to the Railway Companies, who have expended considerable sums upon establishing the system, as well as to the public; and as the directors of the London and North Western Railway appear to express some doubt of the efficacy of the system, my Lords are anxious that all objections perceived by those engaged in carrying it into effect may be stated and considered. They are, therefore, glad to receive any communication on the  subject.

With respect to the accident at Leighton, my Lords trust that the Directors will adopt the recommendation made by Lieutenant-Colonel Wynne, that the Dunstable train should be conducted to a distant platform.

I have, &c.
The Secretary of the   
                                                                                                                           Douglas GAlton,
London and North Western Hallway Company,                                                                     Captain, Royal Engineers,

Railway Department, Board of Trade, Sir,                                                                                                                                                        December 29, 1856.
I have the honour to aquaint you, for the  information of the Lords of the Committee of  Privy Council for Trade
that I have inquired into the circumstances connected with an accident that occurred at the Leighton Station of the London and North Western Railway. on the 26th  November.

The Dunstable line, which is single,  makes a junction with the up main line at Leighton, and the passenger trains discharge and take up their passengers at the up platform, which, I must observe, is an exceedingly objectionable practice, never to be resorted to when other arrangements are practicable.

The Leighton Station, being on a curve, is protected by signalmen, placed at the north and south ends, 160 yards apart; they have, each of them, station and distant signals under their charge, and they work in concert by means of hand signals; the man at the south end signals the down trains, while the man at the north end does the same by the up trains; the same division of responsibility is observed in working the telegraph, the north signalman has charge of the up line telegraph, and the south signalman, of the down line telegraph.

On the morning of the 26th, the 7 a.m. train, from Dunstable, arrived at the junction (which is at the south end of the station) ; before allowing it to come on to the main line, the south signalman exchanged signals with the north signalman, and receiving "all right" from him, he allowed the Dunstable train to come to the up platform, when it was almost immediately run into by the up goods train from Liverpool, which was one hour late.

It was the duty of the signalman at the north end to have ascertained, by communicating with the next station farther down the line, that there was no train on the line between them, and to turn on his signals before giving "all right;" it is certain that he did not turn on his signals, and if he did make a telegraphic communication, he neglected a most important part of his  instructions, viz.. having his message acknowledged, for, it appeared, that at the station with which he communicated (the ballast pit] the man was absent, trimming the lamp of his distant signal, having taken the precaution of breaking the circuit before Leaving his box ; but it came out in evidence that these stations had habitually been in the habit of transmitting messages without having them acknowledged.

Had there been but one signalman, it is probable that the accident would not have occurred, and the only question is, was there a necessity for this divided responsibility? I think not. As long as the safety of the station was dependent upon signals alone, the arrangement of having two signalmen to repeat signals round the curve, and to watch the tunnel, (which is 600 or 700 yards north of the station,) appears to have been a necessary one, but with the introduction of the telegraph the necessity ceased, provided the company were satisfied to work the telegraph on sound principles, that is not to allow more than one train on a telegraph length at the same time; it is hardly within the bounds of probability that both the telegraph and signal should tell a false tale at the same time.

On the Great Northern Railway, and on the South Eastern Railway, where the telegraph system of working trains has been introduced with the best results ; it is a fundamental principle that not mere than one train shall be on a telegraph length at one and the same time ; and there is another most excellent principle adopted, which is, that the signalman enters in a book the time that every train passes his box, and for this purpose he is supplied with a folio book, and a clock is fitted up in his box. To insure regularity in working, there is an inspector appointed whose exclusive duty it is to visit frequently the signalmen's boxes, and to check any irregularities in working the code. Had a stricter surveillance been maintained over the London and North Western signalmen, the irregularity of working between the north signalman at Leighton Station, and the man further down the line, would have been discovered, and one proximate cause of the accident removed.

Should the London and North Western Company work the station with one signalman a new arrangement of his position would, probably, be necessary, and he should be relieved from attending to the level crossing. It would also be desirable that the Dunstable trains should discharge and take up passengers at a separate platform ; an arrangement that could be made without difficulty.

When I said that the signalman at the ballast pit had broken the circuit before leaving his box, I, perhaps, did not express myself quite correctly, for, as I understood the operation, it was that the current from the batteries at either end were sent in opposite directions, along the same line, so as to neutralize one another, and it was stated by the signalman that when one of the batteries was more powerful than the other, it would, under the circumstances, communicate a motion to the needle, and this is the way the  signalman at the north end of the station accounts for his having been deceived; as he asserts that he made the signal "line blocked" to the ballast pit, though he got no acknowledgment.
I have, &c.
The Secretary of the                                                                                                                           George Wynne,
Railway Department, Board of Trade.                                                                      Lieut.-Colonel, Royal Engineers.

Railway Department, Board of Trade, Sir,                                                                                                                                         Whitehall, December 27, 1856.
It was only on the 20th instant that I had an opportunity of seeing, for the first time, the reply of the directors of the London and North Western Railway Company to my reports upon the accidents at the Spon Lane, Albion, and Rugby stations, that reply not having, through an inadvertence, been sooner sent to me. Since the receipt of it, I have been absent on other duties; but I should now be glad to be allowed to offer a few remarks upon it, for the consideration of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade.

The questions at issue may thus be simply stated-. — 1st—Are the directors providing, in a reasonable degree, for the safety of the public, and that of their servants, on those parts of the London and North Western Railway where the telegraph is not in constant use for working the trains?

And 2ndly. If they are not, could not a better chance of security be obtained by means of the electric telegraph?

The directors partly evade these questions in their letter of the 19th ultimo, by bringing prominently into notice the blame which I thought it right to attribute to their drivers, and by omitting from all consideration other important circumstances connected with two of the collisions referred to. They certainly state my remark in regard to the third case, that there was no proof of any of the servants of the company having been in fault:  and they thus tacitly admit that there the present system failed; but they afterwards argue that, because the drivers were to blame in two cases, therefore, "it is impossible to prevent collision by the use of the telegraph or any other precaution."

In order fully to expose the fallacy of the reasoning of the directors, it will be necessary briefly to recapitulate the causes of collision in the two cases referred to.

In the case of the Albion collision, the driver of a passenger train, 29 minutes late, overlooked an inefficient signal, which would, if he had noticed it, have afforded him upwards of 1,000 yards in which to pull up his train,) and came into collision with a goods train which was blocking up the main line, in consequence of a long boiler truck having got off the rails.

In the case of Spon Lane collision, the driver of a passenger train, four or five minutes late, ran in like manner into a goods train which he found in his way on the main line; and in this case, also, I came to the conclusion, though the evidence was conflicting, that the driver would have had upwards of 1,000 yards for stopping his train, if he had attended to the signals.

The directors say, in reference to these cases, "the telegraph apparatus only enables communication to be made with the driver by signal; and if a driver is so reckless as to neglect altogether a signal which, the inspecting officer admits, gave one thousand yards warning, it is impossible to prevent collision by the use of the telegraph, or any other precaution;" but, in so saying, they forget altogether the circumstances, that if the line had been properly worked by telegraph, the passenger trains would not, or ought not to, have been permitted, in either case, to pass the preceding station while the line was blocked at these two stations ; and that therefore the drivers would not have found the goods trains in their way, and could not have come into collision with them.

I did not hesitate to throw upon the drivers the full amount of blame which they appeared to deserve, for overlooking or disobeying the signals on these occasions ; but I may here observe, in reference to the directors' remarks, that it does not follow, because a man missed seeing an inefficient signal on a particular occasion, that, therefore, he would be likely to disobey one better situated; and that many a man, for many reasons, might, in anticipation of a signal being turned off delay longer than is prudent in stopping his train in obedience to it, and thus be the means of causing a collision, who would not altogether disregard the same signal if he perceived that it was not lowered in accordance with his expectations.

In these cases, therefore, the system of working without the telegraph failed, while the system of working by telegraph would have prevented two collisions, and saved 52 people from injuries of a more or less serious character, and one from death.

The collision near Rugby was the fault of the system alone ; one cattle train having run into another, in consequence of the failure of its engine, on a sharp curve, without any fault, apparently, on the part of the company's servants; and this collision demonstrated the defects of the present system in the most marked manner, inasmuch as it showed a want of security even in the case of two trains of the same class, travelling at comparatively moderate speed, when the engine of one became temporarily disabled.

It will be seen, then, that these three cases all point to the insufficiency of the present five-minutes-interval system ; the, first two on account of the chance of collision that may arise from inattention to, or neglect of signals, on the part of the drivers, when the line is not kept clear for them; and the third in consequence of the probability that exists, when an engine fails in one train, at a point of the line where the view is obstructed, of its being run into by any other train closely following it; and I may add that another serious collision, in which one person was killed and eight were injured, has since occurred on the Stockport and Stalybridge section of the London and North Western line, which leads quite as strongly as the other three to the same conclusion. In that case, a pilot engine drawing a dead engine ran into a passenger train which was standing at the Denton Station, in consequence of the passenger train having lost three minutes in slipping on a curve. It is true that the boy whose duty it was to turn on the distant signal from the station, neglected to do so; but so closely Were the engines following after the passenger train, that they would probably have passed that distant signal too soon for the driver to have seen it, even if the boy at Denton had turned it to danger on the arrival of the passenger train.

I may mention, also, other cases ; such as the collision at Heaton Norris, in June 1855, when a passenger train ran into an excursion train which was standing at that station, from the direction of Stockport; and the collision at the same station, in October 1855, when the mail train ran into a goods train, which had not sufficient time to shunt out of its way, from the opposite direction. In the former of these cases the directors adopted the recommendation contained in my report, that the line should be worked by telegraph between Stockport and Heaton Norris; and in the latter, their Lordships drew the attention of the directors to a similar recommendation which was made by Colonel Wynne.

It would appear that these two cases, together with the four which were more particularly specified above, bear out, as far as six collisions can do so, the assertion that the directors, under the present system, (of working without the aid of the telegraph), do not provide, to the extent that might reasonably be expected of them, for the safety of their passengers.

This point being so far established, I come now to the second question, viz. -.—Could not greater security be obtained by means of the electric telegraph?

In speaking of the present system, I have hitherto alluded only to the system under which the greater part of the London and North Western Railway is worked, and omitted from consideration the method of "train telegraph signals" adopted between London and Rugby ; but it will be necessary, before discussing the latter question, to examine this method in detail, and to determine, as far as possible, whether the desired reasonable degree of safety is to be found in it.

There is no doubt that the directors have, at considerable expense, established between London and Rugby a set of telegraph stations, and that the whole distance of 80 miles has thus been divided into lengths of about 2 miles each; and it is not to be disputed, that if they never permitted a train to pass one of these stations until the line was telegraphed to be clear to the next station, collision would be almost prevented, except in the cases of mistakes on the part of signalmen, or failure of communication between the telegraph instruments ; in both of which cases, they would still have the ordinary system to fall back upon, and would not be much worse off than before.

The only case in which trains can approach each other when the line is worked in this manner, is when a train breaks down immediately after passing a signal station; and then, if the line be properly worked, the nearest following train may just have passed the preceding station, and must be warned by the signals of the station next to which the accident has occurred.    A recent instance of a case of this description will be presently referred to.

Now, the directors of the London and North Western Railway Company have established the means of carrying out the above system, but have not adopted it.  On the contrary, as appears from their regulations which accompanied Colonel Wynne's report on the collision which occurred at Berkhampstead in October 1855, and from his report on the collision at Nash Mills in November last, they permit more trains than one to be upon the same length at the same time, taking care only that the signalman they pass shall inform the signalman they are about to pass that such is the case; and that after a train has passed on to a length, each succeeding driver shall be warned, and in some cases stopped and informed of the distance in time which there may happen to be between himself and the train which he is following. They also provide wires on certain telegraph posts, which may be disconnected by the fireman or guard in case of accident, so as to warn the proper signalman to stop all following trains; but it is evident that under such a system a second, or even a third train, may have passed the signalman before the first has broken down, and before, therefore, the necessary warning can be given; and this method of providing against collision in the case of trains becoming disabled, would appear, consequently, to be far from perfect, though it might be useful in certain cases.

The directors appear to consider that they have thus established a rigid system, which has "undoubtedly been found  in practice to render the drivers and guards less attentive to ordinary precautions, by lulling them into a fancied  security;"  they mention that "the unerring certainty which such a system should possess, has been disturbed by the occasional derangement of the instruments;" and they add, "It would almost seem, that the frequency with which, under this system, the engine driver sees the danger signal removed after he has come in sight of it, is not unlikely to cause great danger by encouraging him to hesitate for a valuable moment in the expectation that the signal will, as possibly it has on every former occasion, vanish before he reaches it."
It would argue a very superficial acquaintance with, or very erroneous conception of the directors system, on the part of the drivers and guards, if they can be rendered less attentive, or lulled into security by it; and there can be no unerring certainty, except that of collision, if, when two trains are travelling on the same length, with only a short distance between them, the foremost becomes disabled, from the failure of an engine, or from an accident to the train; but there certainly is a likelihood of the drivers becoming so accustomed to see the signals turned off on their approach, as to lead them to do what they are too apt to do under any system, namely, to put off until too late the stoppage of their train.

That disposition on the part of the drivers arises from a natural desire to keep time as far as they are able, and is increased by the necessity often forced upon them of running great risks. The system of the directors is more likely perhaps to increase that tendency, than either the old system of five minute intervals, or the more rigid one of permitting only one train to be on one length at the same time; for when the driver of an express train, timed to travel at 40 or 50 miles an hour, is sent forward with an intimation that a goods train is two minutes or so in front of him, or with a simple warning that there is a train a-head, then every quarter of a mile that he advances, is travelled at risk more or less serious in proportion to the degree in which the view happens to be obstructed on that part of the road ; and in proportion also to the size of his train, the amount of his break power, the nature of the gradients, and the weight and condition of the train in front of him, on which last point, important as it is, he is probably utterly uninformed.

It is not, therefore, to be wondered at, that the directors should have found a bad effect produced by their system upon the guards and drivers, though the reasons for such a result can hardly be those which they have given, as it would rather appear that the men are induced to become reckless, than that they are "lulled into fancied security."

The directors remark, "Captain Tyler appears to think that the adoption of the rule proposed in his report of the  15th October, namely, that 'trains should not be allowed to start from, or pass any one telegraph station until the line "shall have been reported clear by telegraph to the next,' must invariably ensure immunity from collision. Unfortunately this is an error, and a  recent painful event on this line, has shown that even when the rule is rigidly acted on, a collision may happen. In fact, fatal accidents have even occurred through the operation of a telegraph message ; and it cannot be concealed that, while removing one class of casualties, this agency may introduce another class, quite  as serious in its results."

I would therefore observe, that I do not believe that any system will ever produce the Utopian results which the directors attribute to my imagination. Mistakes, inattentions, neglects, failures, must always be the cause of catastrophe upon railways; and, looking to the dangerous practices that are often permitted, the risks that are run, the number of people and the quantity of material employed, and the difficulties frequently encountered, I never cease to wonder at the paucity of the accidents that occur in the kingdom ; but I have nevertheless made such recommendations as appeared to me right, with a view to the diminution of those accidents which are evidently preventible; and it will not be denied that these are far greater in number and importance than those which cannot be guarded against.

As the directors assert, in the face of Colonel Wynne's report, that a recent painful event on their line, the Nash Mills collision, has proved that even when the rule which I recommend is rigidly acted upon, a collision may happen; and as they infer that the cause of that accident is inherent in the system of working by telegraph proposed, rather than attributable to other circumstances, it becomes necessary to refer to the details of that collision, in order to show clearly what were the actual facts and real causes of this occurrence.

It appears that a coal train, of most unwieldy dimensions, was started from Tring three minutes after an express was due at that station; that it came to a stand 230 yards the other side of the Nash Mills telegraph station, that the signalman had already given the all clear signal to the back station, and did not alter it, as he might have done ; that the express followed at 45 or 50 miles an hour, and the driver saw the Nash Mills signal at danger from a distance of nearly three-quarters of a mile; that he then put on his tender-break, and whistled for those of the two guards, and that he afterwards reversed his engine ; but that he ran 1,550 yards, and came into collision with the coal train at the end of that distance.

The directors, in one portion of their letter, already referred to, lay great stress upon the impossibility of preventing collision "by the use of the telegraph or any other precaution," if the drivers neglect signals giving one thousand yards warning ; but in this case the train could not be stopped within that distance, as it had only two breaks, besides that of the tender, for 19 carriages.

Whatever system of working be adopted, it is in all cases necessary to give unmistakeable warning to a driver at such a distance from a point of danger as shall enable him to stop his train before reaching that point of danger ; and, if this be not done, the best chance of safety cannot be afforded. Reversing this proposition, the break-power attached to a train should be proportioned to the distance given for stopping that train, in the event of an obstruction being indicated, either in the neighbourhood of a telegraph station or anywhere else, so that a driver may be able, without fail, to pull up his train under any circumstances within the required distance.

In applying this rule to the case of the Nash Mills collision, the true causes of the accident will be more readily perceived. It appears, from Col. Wynne's report, that the break-power was not sufficient for so heavy a train, and that, far from being able to pull up at the telegraph station, the driver ran 250 yards past it before the collision occurred, notwithstanding that his engine was reversed for a great portion of the whole distance.
Instead of proving that the telegraph system is at fault, therefore, this accident only shows what was sufficiently evident before, namely, that if the London and North Western Company do not supply a proper proportion of break power to heavy express trains travelling at high speeds, the drivers will be unable, in all cases, to avoid collisions; and it is moreover a strong evidence of the necessity for adopting my recommendation to allow only one train to be upon each length at a time; for if the driver took more than 1,550 yards to stop his train after having been warned by the Nash Mills signal, what would have been his fate, and how would his passengers have fared, if the coal train had been brought to a stand a mile or less in front of him, on some part of the line where, the view is obstructed, while he was following on the same length, without the interposition of such a signal?

The more this subject is investigated the more it appears desirable that the system of train telegraph signals adopted by the London and North Western Company should be superseded by the mode recommended by their Lordships, and already in force in tunnels on most lines, and wholly or in part upon some other railways. The only objection to it which I have not yet noticed that the directors offer is, "that the derangements of the instruments and bells occur more frequently than is consistent with the unerring certainty which such a system should possess." On this point  I heartily concur with Col. Wynne's remark, that as the objections urged by the Directors have not been found to interfere with the working on other lines, there must be some defect either in the local circumstances or the voltaic arrangements. It would, however, be both interesting and instructive, and would tend to a better understanding of this part of the question, if the Directors would obtain a report from Mr. Clarke of the number of times, within the last twelve months, that the instruments have failed, with the dates and causes of those failures; and if similar information were obtained from other lines where the telegraph is used, the comparison and publication of the results would no doubt be attended with beneficial effects, not the least of which would be an increased rivalry amongst the telegraph engineers, which could not but be favourable to the improvement of the necessary apparatus.

In replying to the letter of the Directors, I have been unavoidably drawn into an examination of the three systems of working, which may be called the five-minutes-interval system, the London and North Western telegraph system, and the telegraph system. I have taken pains to consider them in their results, as far as the cases referred to would admit; and I conceive that the conclusions are not to be avoided, that the first must always be hazardous, that the second is full of risk, and that the third offers the best chance of safety.

I have always considered the London and North Western telegraph system as most unfair towards the drivers, because they are evidently placed in a false position when they are made to follow other trains, without further information than that some short interval of time, which may indicate a longer or shorter distance of space, of which they can, at the best, be but imperfect judges, separates them from those trains. The case becomes a cruel one when the driver of an express is following a goods train, of the circumstances of which he knows nothing, of which the couplings may break, or an axle give way, or a truck get off the road, or to which, in fact, any one of the numerous accidents that constantly happen with goods trains may occur, while he is timed to follow it at the rate of 40 or 50 miles an hour ; and when he is told, as if in mockery, by the regulations, that he is to have his engine " in sufficient command to be able to stop at any moment;"  the shortest distance within which he can pull up varying, perhaps, between 500 and 1,500 yards.

Be the defects of the London and North Western telegraph system, however, what they may, I would submit, in conclusion, that, as far as the evidence which has been adduced is concerned, it appears that the following replies may fairly be made to the questions proposed at the commencement of this communication : —

1.   That the five-minutes interval system does not provide for safety in a sufficient degree.
2.   That a better chance of security might be obtained by means of the electric telegraph.
I have, &c.
The Secretary of the                                                                                                                                    H. W. Tyler,
Railway Department, Board of Trade,                                                                                      Captain, Royal Engineers,
General Manager's Office, Euston Station, Sir,                                                                                                                                             January 27, 1857.
The letter of Captain Tyler, under date the 27th ultimo, enclosed in your favour of the 5th instant, has been laid before the Directors.

It appears to them unnecessary to occupy the attention of their Lordships with any further detailed remarks relative to the system of telegraphing trains, but I am instructed to make the following brief observations on the report of the inspecting officer.

In the first place, as regards the alleged "inefficiency" of the signal at the Albion Station on the Stour Valley Line, I am desired to remind you that this signal was erected previous to the inspection of the railway by the officer of the Board of Trade before the opening of the line, and was considered by him sufficient for the public safety.

In reference to the accident at Denton, arising from the engine being allowed to follow a passenger train at too short an interval, I am to state that the person who permitted the engine to proceed, is an officer in the service of the Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railway Company, under whose control alone the Junction and its signals are placed.

As respects the signalling apparatus between London and Rugby, and the rules laid down for its application on the London and North Western Railway, the Directors apprehend that the remarks of the inspecting officer are founded on a misapprehension of the system in force. It is quite true that when the telegraph only communicated between one station and another with long and irregular distances, the green, or caution signal, was used to warn the drivers of a train a-head; that signal, however, indicated Dot that some short interval of  time, but that an interval of space (which could not exceed the distance of the next post), separated the trains.

When, however, the intermediate stations dividing the line into two mile lengths were completed, (which, from the accidental destruction of one of the stations, and the difficulty in providing the requisite number of trained men, was not till late in October last), the green signal was altogether discontinued, and the red signal made absolute, as had always been the intention on the completion of the system. If a train is not clear of the length in advance, the succeeding train is stopped, and the driver and guard are told, either that the "line is blocked," or "train is on the line," as the case may be, and it is then the duty of the driver to proceed with the knowledge that a train is between him and the next post, that is, less than two miles,) at slow speed and with great caution, in order to ascertain the cause of the detention, or to. render assistance if required. The Directors do not consider such a system open to the remarks in Captain Tyler's letter.

With regard to Colonel Wynne's report on the accidents at Leighton, I am desired to say that the Directors concur with that officer on the policy of enabling the Dunstable passengers to alight on a separate platform without the branch train coming on the main line, and they are endeavouring to arrange this by negotiation with the Road Trustees, whose consent to increased accommodation is necessary.

In conclusion, I am desired to say, that the Directors will endeavour to obtain the information suggested in regard to the electric apparatus, but they may remark that during the late severe storms many of the posts were blown down, and the communication by wire altogether suspended for a time on several parts of the line.
I am, &c.
Captain Galton, R. E.                                                                                                                                             M. Huish.
Railway Department, Board of Trade.

MIDLAND  RAILWAY.
Railway Department, Board of Trade,
                                                                                                                                       Whitehall, February 21, 1856.
Sir
In compliance with the instructions contained in your letter of the 4th instant, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended the accident, that occurred on the 17th ultimo, near The Holmes Junction of the Midland Railway.

The Holmes is a station at which the lines from Rotherham and Masbro' to Sheffield meet, and it is about a mile from the former, and half a mile from the latter place.

The junction is protected by a semaphore, and three wire signals, one arm of the semaphore applying, in conformity with the practice in force upon the Midland Railway, equally to the lines from Masbro' and Rotherham, and the wire signals in the direction of these two stations being distant from the junction about 250, and 160 yards, respectively.

To the west of the station, and 132 yards from the junction, are some three-throw switches, conducting by a cross-over road to the other main line, and to a siding on the south of the station, called Stubb's siding ; and at the other extremity of the cross-over road there are some points leading to a siding on the north of the main line.

The line from Masbro' to The Holmes is level for 572 yards from the junction, but that from Rotherham rises on a gradient of 1 in 122. Between The Holmes and Sheffield the gradient rises 1 in 122, for upwards of 400 yards from the junction.

As the 10 a.m. passenger train from Rotherham to Sheffield, consisting of an engine and tender, eight coaches, and two waggons, was drawing up at the platform at The Holmes on the 17th ultimo, six waggons ran back against the engine at the rate of about eight miles an hour, under circumstances which I shall now proceed to describe.

On the morning in question, a pilot engine arrived at The Holmes from Masbro', with four waggons in its front and nine in its rear, at a few minutes before ten o'clock, in charge of a "shunter" from that station, whose particular duty it is to accompany such trains some five or six times a day. In passing the pointsman's box, the shunter signified by a motion of his hand that he wished to place waggons on the other main line, and his signal was understood by the pointsman. A passenger train was due from Rotherham at 10 o'clock, but the pointsman, not imagining that there was any danger of this train being interfered with by the shunting train, so far as its arrival at the platform was concerned, did not turn on his wire signal towards Rotherham, but followed the shunting train for a short distance: he then observed that the shunting train, instead of stopping in front of the points to the west of the station, continued to move forward; and he therefore concluded that it was proceeding to a siding called the blast siding, 400 yards further on, for the purpose of leaving there some waggons loaded with metal, which he had seen in the rear of the others; whereas the true cause of its so proceeding was that one of the waggons in front of the engine had become uncoupled, and the driver had followed it for the purpose of re-attaching it to the train.

After this had been done, the shunting train returned towards The Holmes, and the shunter uncoupled six of the waggons in the rear of the engine, in order that they might be propelled to the other main line at the same time that the engine pushed a seventh waggon into Stubb's siding ; and he beckoned to the driver to move the train backwards, believing that the pointsman was ready to turn the six loose waggons over the cross-over road.

The pointsman, however, misled by their movements, and unaware that the waggons in rear of the engine had been uncoupled, was not prepared to do this. He saw the passenger train coming, and held up his hands, as a signal to the driver of the shunting train to stop : the driver did so, with the waggons that were still attached to his engine, but the six loose waggons ran back against the passenger train from Rotherham, just as the latter was drawing up to the station platform. The buffer of the passenger engine was broken, one lady was hurt in the forehead, and some other passengers were slightly shaken.

The immediate cause of this accident was no doubt the misunderstanding that took place between the shunter and pointsman, in consequence of the forward movement of the shunting train after the waggon in front had become uncoupled. I understand that the company have punished these two men, the former for having detached the waggons, and caused them to be propelled backwards, without first seeing that the points were properly attended to, and the latter for not having placed his wire signal towards Rotherham at "danger," on the arrival at his junction of the shunting train.

There are, however, several circumstances to which it becomes necessary to direct their Lordships' attention, as showing a mode of conducting the traffic on this part of the line which greatly needs improvement.

In the first place, the shunter arrived at "The Holmes" with his train, only a few minutes before the passenger train from Rotherham was due, and thus disobeyed the instructions which he had received when appointed to this duty four years before, to "keep out of the way of the passenger trains." As this man appears, however, never to have bad a timepiece, and as he had no means of knowing, on this occasion, that the train from Rotherham was so nearly due, the blame in this respect cannot fairly be laid upon his shoulders. It is his duty to take five or six trains a day, (sometimes more and sometimes less,) from Masbro' to Rotherham, at irregular intervals between the ordinary trains, and he cannot possibly be expected to do this satisfactorily or safely without possessing the means of ascertaining at any moment the correct time.

2ndly. The shunting train consisted, as has been previously explained, of four waggons in front of, and nine behind the engine*; and it appears that this is a customary mode of running these trains, for the greater convenience of depositing the waggons in the sidings for which they are respectively destined. There must always be more or less danger in such a practice, both on account of the greater liability of the waggons to leave the line, and because of the increased difficulty to the engine driver in working his train, particularly in a country where his view is obscured by smoke from the neighbouring manufactories ; and I therefore recommend that it should be prohibited for the future.

3rdly. The shunting of waggons from one main line to another is always an objectionable proceeding, but it must be still more attended with risk at a junction, such as The Holmes, on a gradient of 1 in 122, where the operation of double shunting is attempted, and where the junction signalman is expected to work the points 130 yards, as in the present case, from his box. It frequently becomes the duty of this pointsman to work a pair of points situated at a considerable distance on the other side of his box, as well as the points before referred to, for these shunting trains, and it is a question worthy of the serious consideration of the Directors, whether it would not be better to afford some additional assistance in the working of these switches, than to oblige the junction signalman to absent himself from his other duties to attend to them.

4thly. It would appear that the operations of double and detached shunting are permitted by the Company in the cases of engines used for shunting purposes only, and when they are attended by a competent shunter, and that therefore no regulations were broken on the occasion in question, when the six waggons were pushed forward, detached from the engine, for the purpose of being turned to the other main line. I would suggest for the consideration of the Directors, that this practice must be an unsafe one at the point in question, where the waggons are on a falling gradient of 1 in 122, and are running along the main line towards a junction.

5thly. As their Lordships are aware, from reports which have been presented to them on the subject of former accidents, the system of junction signals on the Midland Railway differs from that which is in force on many other lines, inasmuch as instead of placing two semaphore signals at each junction, and allowing one arm to apply to each separate line of railway, the Midland Company content themselves with one semaphore, and consider one arm as sufficient for two Lines, to each of which it is expected to apply according to circumstances; and instead of keeping the distant signals at danger, and causing them to be turned one at a time to all right, to allow a train to pass when necessary, they consider  it more desirable to keep all the junction distant signals at ''all right."' and to leave it to the signalman to turn them to danger, upon occasion, or when any obstruction occurs.

Such was the system in force at The Holmes Junction before this accident, and under this system the Rotherham stopping trains were always permitted to run in past the junction to the station platform, without reference to the "danger" signal exhibited at the semaphore. It is explained that, as they were not due to stop at The Holmes, the trains from Masbro' were obliged to whistle outside the junction until the semaphore arm was lowered, and that such trains from Rotherham as were not due to stop at The Holmes, were expected also to be guided by this arm, but that stopping trains were allowed to run past it to the platform, because it was considered in the light of a station signal; left up for their protection.

This being the case, the semaphore signal, though "at danger," afforded no protection to the passenger train from Rotherham, and the driver who thus passed the junction without its being lowered cannot be blamed for having come into collision with these loose waggons, though his doing so, under other circumstances, would, of course, be a grave offence.

I find that since the occurrence of this accident the junction signalman has taken upon himself to keep his distant signal towards Rotherham at danger, in opposition to his instructions, because he considers it to be the safer course to adopt; and that the station master agrees with him in opinion. I do not wish to justify the pointsman for adopting a practice which is not in accordance with the regulations furnished to him, as it is clearly his duty to obey orders, and simply to make such representations to his superiors, with a view to their modification or improvement, as may appear to him at any time to be desirable; but I consider that his views on this subject are correct.

I find also that this pointsman, as well as one of the drivers whom I examined, would much prefer working with a double semaphore at the junction, because they consider it more safe than a single one; and I think it right to mention these circumstances in order that the Directors may take them into consideration in reference to this vexed question of junction signals. I trust that they will admit, at all events, that it is undesirable to permit the Rotherham trains to pass the junction, and to run in to the platform at The Holmes, whilst the semaphore is at danger.
I have, &c.
The Secretary of the                                                                                                                          H. W. Tyler,
Railway Department, Board of Trade.                                                                                 Captain, Royal Engineers.
General Manager's Office,
 Sir,                                                 .                                                                                         Derby, March 18, 1856.
Your letter of the 27th ultimo, with the report of the inspecting officer upon the accident which occurred at The Holmes Station of this railway, on the 17th of January last, have been considered by the Directors of this Company, by whom I am instructed to request you will be good enough to lay before the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade the following remarks upon the observations of the inspecting officer.

The cause of the accident was, as the inspecting officer states, the misunderstanding, or, rather, neglect of the pointsman and shunter, for which they have been punished. My Directors consider, however, that that neglect was the sole cause of the accident, and that it is not in any degree attributable to the mode of working the traffic and signals, as inferred by the inspecting officer.

The shunter has not been supplied with a time-piece ; and, as there is a station clock at Masbro', from whence he starts, and which is only half a mile from the Holmes Station, where he can again refer to the clock there, it is not necessary that he should carry one with him.

The practice of propelling waggons in front of the engine when shunting has prevailed for many years, and there is no record of any waggons having left the line in consequence. It makes no difference in the working of the engine whether they are before or behind it, and Captain Tyler's allusion to the smoke is the first intimation the Directors or officers of the Company have had of its interfering with the view of the engine driver ; nor do they, upon inquiry, find that such difficulty has been experienced.

In the third place, the inspecting officer states that the practice of shunting waggons from one main line to the other is always an objectionable proceeding. My Directors, however, are at a loss to conceive how the traffic of any railway can be conducted without the performance of such operations; nor can they understand why it is objectionable if the regulations of the Company are properly attended to.

As to the signalman being required to work points which are some distance from the place from whence the signals are worked, it is his duty to exhibit the proper signals for the protection of the junction before attending to the points, and the Directors do not therefore see how any greater degree of safety would be obtained by having another man to attend to the points; and the nature of the duties at that place are so light that it is certainly not necessary on that ground to afford additional assistance. The practices of double shunting and detached shuntings are permitted, subject to certain regulations, as the inspecting officer states, and if those regulations are attended to, there is no doubt those operations can be, and in fact experience proves that they are, performed with safety; but, if regulations are not adhered to, there are few, if, indeed, any, operations connected with the working of the railways which would not be dangerous.

The system of signalling at the junctions on this railway has, as the inspecting officer reminds their Lordships, previously been the subject of considerable argument between Captain Tyler and the Directors and officers of this Company. Apart, however, from the general question, there is one point in the inspecting officer's report which conveys a wrong impression, viz.: the allowing the trains stopping at The Holmes to pass the semaphore signal; this practice cannot be, as he infers, attended with danger, inasmuch as when there is a necessity for trains to stop before reaching the station, the distant signal is exhibited, and they are stopped by it. I would also remind their Lordships that where the system of double semaphores at junctions is in operation, distant signals are not generally used; but, upon this railway the junctions are all provided with distant signals in each direction, and which are constantly worked as auxiliaries to the semaphore, consequently there can be no danger in our system, as when the semaphore is lowered for a train to enter the junction from one of the converging lines, the distant are exhibited, to close the other approaches to the junction.

Captain Tyler also reports the evidence of one of the drivers whom he examined, and whose opinion on the subject of junction signals coincides with his own; but he omits to state that another driver, whom he also questioned, stated he had driven over this railway many years, had never seen a collision arising from the existing system, and considered it perfectly safe. Upon the operations of double and detached shunting, and upon the system of junction signalling as a general question affecting the working of railways, I am to observe, that the practice in both as now adopted upon this railway is the result of the most careful consideration, and joint deliberation of men who have been engaged for the best portion of their lives in the working of railways, and who, during such time, have had constant experience in the working of the various systems which have been tried on railways, as well as of those now in use upon this line, and it is their unanimous conviction that the safety of the public, and the efficient working of the railway is fully insured by the practice of the system now in operation upon this line.
I have, &c.
Captain Galton, R. E.                                                                                                                            James Allport.
&c.      &c.      &c.

Railway Department, Board of Trade,
 Sir,                                                                                                                                  Whitehall, March 27, 1856.
In reference to your letter of the 19th instant, I have now the honour to return Mr. Allport's letter of the 18th instant, remarking on my report upon a recent accident near the Holmes Station of the Midland Railway.

Mr. Allport and the Directors of the Railway represent the accident as having been solely caused by the neglect of two of their servants, whereas I am of opinion that the mode in which the traffic was carried on on this part of the line, and the manner in which the signals were worked, had a great deal to do with it.

I pointed out that the shunter was not supplied with a time piece, with the full knowledge that clocks existed at Masboro' and The Holmes, but with the conviction that those clocks were not conveniently situated for his use, as well as that it was essentially necessary that a man constantly employed in conducting irregular trains between trains worked to a time bill, should at all times have the means of ascertaining the correct time.

The Directors appear inclined to continue the system of double and detached shunting at this point, as heretofore, as well as to authorize the running of an engine between the regular trains for half a mile, between Masbro' and The Holmes, along the main line, with its load partly in front and partly in the rear. I have already stated my opinion on these subjects, and I need only now add, that they choose an inappropriate occasion for asserting that experience proves the safety of the former practice, when they do so in reasoning upon an accident which has been in great measure occasioned by it.

Their reply to this point, as implied in their letter, is, that the practice itself is not dangerous, except in the case of neglect on the part of their servants ; but it must be remembered that in order to ensure the greatest amount of safety on railways, the working of the traffic should, as far as possible, be so conducted as to afford a minimum of risk, and that it is not sufficient only to blame those who by misapprehension or neglect are the occasion of accidents, as long as it is possible to prevent their recurrence, by the adoption of further measures of precaution, or by a safer mode of conducting the traffic.

It would not probably answer any good purpose to carry further, at present, the argument on the comparative safety of the mode in which the junction signals are worked on the Midland Railway as against the mode more commonly adopted. I must, however, not allow Mr. Allport's statement to remain uncontroverted that distant signals are not generally used at junctions, on other lines, where the system of double semaphores is in operation. This is not by any means the case, and I may add that, in opening new lines, I have never even heard it asserted that such distant signals were not wanted in addition to double semaphores.
I have, &c.
The Secretary of the                                                                                                                             H.  W. Tyler,
Railway Department, Board of Trade.                                                                                    Captain, Royal Engineers.


NEWCASTLE  AND  CARLISLE  RAILWAY.
Railway Department, Board of Trade,
SIR,                                                                                                                                   Whitehall, October 25, 1856
In compliance with the instructions contained in your letter of the 16th instant, I have the honour to report for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended the accident, that occurred on the 13th instant, near the Fourstones Station of the Newcastle and Carlisle Railway.

This station is 24 3/4 miles to the west of Newcastle. It has for its protection two disc signals in front of the station buildings, the one which looks towards Carlisle being visible, though not very distinctly, for nearly half a mile. The gradient falls 1 in 500 towards Newcastle, and the station is situated on a curve of 60 chains radius.

As a cattle train was standing on the down line, or that which leads to Newcastle, with its last carriage, a third-class carriage conveying about 16 drovers, 30 yards to the east of the station platform, at half-past one in the afternoon of the 13th instant, it was run into by a mineral train, at a speed of 4 or 5 miles an hour. Eight of the drovers were in the carriage at the time of the collision, and five of them were unfortunately hurt.

The cattle train was one running every Monday. It was considerably after time, according to the time bills; but it is always an irregular train, depending to a great extent upon the arrival of the drovers with their cattle. It consisted of an engine and tender, 26 loaded cattle trucks, a van, and a third-class carriage ; and 13 more trucks were in a siding waiting: to be attached to it. The engine had left its train on the line, and was in a siding leading to the cattle wharf, preparing; to bring out these last trucks, when the collision occurred.

The mineral train left Carlisle punctually at 10.55, and came into collision with the cattle train with equal punctuality at half-past one. It was composed of an engine and tender, 10 waggons loaded with haematite ore, 15 empty chaldron waggons, 17 empty coke trucks, and a van. The driver saw the disc signal of the station "at danger" from a considerable distance, as well as the guard; but they both thought that it was ''turned on" to intimate to them in the usual manner that they would be required to stop at the station to take on some waggons of lime, and not as an indication of any obstruction, and they accordingly prepared to stop their train in such a position that the tail of it should come in front of the points leading to the lime siding, or, in fact, on the very place where the cattle train was standing, though with the engine further to the front, in consequence of the greater length of the mineral train.

The driver could not see the cattle train until he was within 108 yards of it, on account of the curve in the line, and the situation of the buildings ; and the guard was not in sight of it when the collision took place.

It is dangerous to excuse a driver for running past a red signal in almost any case; but when a signal is habitually used for a length of time, as this signal was, to indicate to a man that he is to stop a train at a particular place for a special purpose, and when, on an accidental occasion, the same signal is employed as an intimation of danger at the same spot, then, such a signal, instead of acting as a warning to, becomes a trap for the driver, and, far from being a protection is a source of danger, to the public. It is impossible, therefore, to impute much blame to the driver of the mineral train for producing this accident, although, as he freely admits, he ran 50 yards past a danger signal, which he saw from a distance amply sufficient to have enabled him to stop his train in time to avoid the collision.

There are a station-master and two porters at Fourstones; but they, as well as the guard, were busily employed and were unable to proceed to the rear of the cattle train for its protection, or even to stand near the disc signals, and intimate by signs to the driver the danger he was in of running into the cattle train; and it would appear that another man is" much wanted, at least for three days in the week, to enable the work of the station to be properly carried out.

In order to prevent the recurrence of an accident of this particular nature, a regular signalman should be established at the station, with signals worked by wires, to a distance of 500 or 600 yards, which should be used specially to indicate obstruction on the line; and this man should not be taken away to other work when he may be required to give the necessary instructions, by hand signals or fixed signals, to the driver of an in-coming train.

To the want of these ordinary measures of precaution the present accident must be attributed.
I have, &c.
The Secretary of the                                                                                                                                 H.W.Tyler,
Railway Department, Board of Trade.                                                                                   Captain, Royal Engineers.

NORTH  EASTERN.
SlR  
                         Liverpool, May 28, 1856.
In compliance with the instructions contained in your letter of the 21st instant, I have the honour to report for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the  circumstances connected with a collision which occurred on the 17th instant at Hetton Station of the Durham and Sunderland Branch of the North Eastern Railway, between a portion of a train of empty coal waggons and a passenger train

That portion of the Durham and Sunderland Branch between Murton and Shincliffe, consists only of a single line' with sidings at Murton, Hetton, Letch, Pittington, Sherburn, and Shincliffe: and the traffic in both directions is worked by means of stationary engines at Murton, Hetton, Letch, Pittington, and Sherburn. Loaded and empty waggons and passenger trains are hauled up and let down the inclines by means of wire ropes, proper means being provided for stopping the machinery by which the wire rope is moved and also for disconnecting the latter at any moment from the waggons and carriages.

It frequently happens that a portion of the empty waggons belong to one colliery and another portion to another and it is usual to separate these portions, and to place them in different sidings at the stations contiguous to the various collieries. This is effected in the following manner. The man in charge of the empty waggons, termed the waggon rider places himself on the last of the advanced portion of the empty waggons, which are intended to be diverted into one siding, and as he approaches the station he signals to the man in charge of the points that he wishes to be turned into a particular siding, and a short time before he reaches these points he withdraws a bolt, that connects the waggon on which he is riding with the next, and the train is thus divided into two parts, the aftermost being that which is attached to the wire rope. The first part of the train is thus turned into one siding by the pointsman, and as soon as it has entirely passed the pointsman changes the points and thus prevents the aftermost part of the train from following the other into the same siding ; and he then forthwith takes the necessary steps, in conjunction with the waggon rider, for arresting the progress of the foremost part of the train. No action on the part of these men is necessary as regards the aftermost part of the train, as the machinery of the stationary engine is stopped when a certain part of the wire is run out.

On the 17th instant about 8 1/2 a.m. a train of 34 empty coal waggons was in the act of entering the siding at Hetton having been lowered down the incline of 1 in 68 from Murton, a distance of 1 1/2 miles, when, according to the waggon rider, the bolt or pin connecting the 20th and 21st waggon from the front was in some manner withdrawn and the train of empty waggons was divided into two parts, the first consisting of 20 and the latter of 14 waggons. The waggon rider, who was on the 20th waggon, states that it was the stopping of the machinery that caused the bolt  to fly out, and that he did not himself withdraw it.
                                          
In accordance with a signal previously given, these 20 waggons, travelling at the rate of 8 or 10 miles an hour, were turned by the pointsman into the westernmost siding, and as soon as they had all passed he shifted the points and allowed the 14 aftermost waggons to continue in the intermediate siding, and he then ran after the 20 waggons and endeavoured to stop them by inserting spragues of wood in the waggon wheels. He states that he made use of two, and then applied himself to the break of one of the coal waggons ; and the waggon rider states that he had also used two spragues of wood and applied the break on the 20th waggon.

The result of their united efforts was, that the train of 20 empty coal waggons was just stopped, standing partly across the main line, when No. 1 passenger train from Shincliffe to Sunderland, proceeding in an opposite direction to the coal waggons, was hauled into Hetton Station by the machinery of the stationary engine, and was travelling about 8 miles an hour when it came into contact with the empty coal train; two out of five of the passenger carriages had their ends knocked in, and two passengers complained of being hurt, and the others, 65 in number, being much shaken.

The total length of the siding is 244 yards from one end to the other.

With regard to the cause of the accident, 1 do not consider that blame attaches to the Company's servants, they work the line in the customary manner, and although I am satisfied that the bolt was withdrawn by the agency of the waggon rider that has hitherto been done every time a train of empty coal waggons is required to be divided, and placed in two different sidings. But the whole responsibility of the accident rests with the North Eastern Railway Company, as it evidently was the result of the very dangerous manner in which the traffic is worked, and followed from the absence of proper regulations. Trains are continuously approaching each other in opposite directions, at very considerable speed (8 or 10 miles an hour each way) and yet the North Eastern Railway Company permit their servants to sever a train into two parts, and to shunt one part into one siding, and the other part into another without first stopping the train.

I beg therefore to suggest that their Lordships will be pleased to call the attention of the Directors of the North Eastern Railway Company to the propriety of extending their sidings at Hetton, so as to allow empty coal waggons to run on into a blind siding, in the event of the breaksman not being able to stop them, and furthermore that they will direct the coal waggons to be stopped altogether before they commence shunting them into different sidings.
I have, &c.
Captain Galton, Royal Engineers,                                                                                                      W. Yolland,
           &c.           &c Lieut-colonel, Royal Engineers.



Railway Department, Board of Trade, Sir,                                                                                                                                        Whitehall, August 8, 1856.
In compliance with the instructions contained in your letter of the 28th ultimo,  I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended the accident, that occurred on the 26th ultimo, at the Church Fenton Station of the North Eastern Railway.

Church Fenton is eleven miles to the south of York, and, though not what is commonly termed a junction, is the station at which the main line and the branch to Harrogate meet. It will be seen by the drawing which I herewith enclose, that there are separate lines at the station for the main line trains and those for Harrogate, and that, facing points being avoided, connections with the main line are established at the points A and B, the one to the north and the other to the south of the passenger platform. It will also be observed that the main line is protected to the north by a distant signal at G, 610 yards from the station, worked by a lever at D on the east platform, as well as by a semaphore signal at E on the centre or west main line platform.

I may add that there are, further, two signals on the branch, and a distant signal to the south of the main line, the two former worked from the north-west end of the station platform at G, and the latter from the public road level crossing gates at H.

For night duty, there is a watchman who attends to the signals worked at and from the station, and there is a boy in charge of the crossing and the distant signal to the south.

On the morning of the 25th ultimo, an excursion train started from Wetherby, a station 10 1/2 miles from Church Fenton, on the Harrogate Branch, to Market Weighton, via Milford and Selby ; and it left Market Weighton on its return journey at 9.55 p.m., reaching Church Fenton a little after midnight. It was then composed of an engine and tender, 14 carriages, 2 vans, and 9 horse-boxes and trucks, of which one horse-box, and, if possible, some empty carriages, were to be left at the station.

This train, coming from the south, was taken through the station on the main line, and then backed into the shed on the Harrogate line, through the points at A. The signalman had turned the down signal of the semaphore (towards the south) to "danger" as the train arrived, and the driver then asked him whether his up signals were "on," and, receiving a reply in the negative, told him to go and put them on. The signalman went away, apparently to do so, and was seen by the driver to go in that direction, and by the fireman to go first towards the lever of the distant signal at D, and then to cross towards the semaphore at E. The driver and fireman then concluded that the signals were turned "on," and they proceeded to place their horse-box in the siding K, pointed out for it by the signalman; but before doing so, the driver, learning that two pairs of points required to be worked, desired the signalman to shout to the boy at the crossing, to ask if his signal was on, and to request him to come and assist at the points.

In order to place the horse-box in the siding, the train was then pushed back from the station shed, across the down line, and out on the up main line at B, whereby both main lines were blocked at the same time. It would undoubtedly have been better to have left it on the down main line, as it arrived, while the engine shunted off the horse-box; but the train having been once brought on the Harrogate line, the former was the only mode that presented itself to the driver; and the signalman, who had only been 11 or 12 weeks at that post, had never before been placed in a similar situation.

While the excursion train was in this position, with four passenger carriages and a few other vehicles standing on the up main line to the south of the points at B, a goods train from York, composed of an engine and tender, 36 loaded, and 14 empty trucks, and a van, dashed into these carriages at a speed of about 30 miles an hour, entirely demolishing three of them, and damaging the others more or less. The goods engine was thrown on its side with great violence in the ditch at the east of the line, and its tender was thrown 70 yards further forward, and then turned over.

Two of the passengers were killed, another is not expected to recover, and at least 19 were injured, some of them very severely. The driver and fireman of the goods train, and the guards of both trains also suffered considerably; and, indeed, it is extraordinary that the two former should have escaped with their lives.

The goods train appears to have arrived at a time when, according to the custom of working it, it might have been expected, though considerably before the time at which, according to the time bills, it was due. The guard's reports, sent in daily, announce that it left York at 12.40, every night during the months of June and July, up to the date of this accident, though on that night he returned the time of departure as 12.25, which was, as nearly as he could guess, the real time.

The evidence, however, shows that the train has, in fact, been in the habit of leaving York as soon after 12 as it could get away after the arrival of the train from the north, and that it started frequently very soon after midnight. Upon being questioned on this subject, the guard admitted that he always entered 12.40 in his journals, when making them up the day after his journey, as the time at which he actually started, not because it represented the truth, but because that was the time at which he ought to have started.

The night "shunter" at the York goods station, who appears to share with the guard the responsibility of starting the goods trains, states that the same custom had obtained with the goods train which leaves York at 3.40 a.m., and that it was the practice, both by day and by night, to send the goods trains away as soon as they were ready, without waiting for the times mentioned in the tables ; but the foreman of the goods yard and the overlooker of the shunters deny that this practice has been permitted in the day time, and concur in stating that the night shunter was warned by them both a few weeks before not to allow it at night. The shunter, however, asserts positively that the foreman, in receiving a complaint from him, on the occasion referred to, as to the impatience of the servants of the Company in charge of the particular goods train in question, told him that there was no reason why it should be kept waiting after it was ready to start.

It is not clear that the statements of the night shunter are to be entirely depended on, but it is evident that, for a length of time, an irregularity in the starting, at all events of this particular goods train, likely to endanger the safety of the traffic, has been permitted to exist.

This circumstance, however, though arising out of the present accident, and therefore to be remarked upon, cannot in any way be brought forward in extenuation of it, because the goods train reached Church Fenton at a not unusual hour, and might therefore have been expected to come into collision with the passenger train if the proper precautions for arresting its progress were not adopted, when that train was standing across both main lines : and I may add, here, that two other goods trains might also have been looked for at the same moment, from the opposite direction, one from Leeds, and another from Hull.

I shall now proceed to consider the evidence in regard to the state of the signals at Church Fenton, which is the most material, as well as the most difficult part of the present inquiry. The coroner's jury have come to the conclusion that the signalman was guilty of manslaughter ; but some important evidence was not laid before them, and, as I shall presently show, this is a finding which is not borne out by the facts of the case, so far as they have hitherto been brought to light.

I regret that I could not be present at the adjourned inquest, at 10 a.m. on the 30th ultimo, in consequence of the short notice afforded by the coroner, as I received their Lordships' directions on the subject at too late an hour on the previous evening to enable me to reach the spot in time.

The two signals, the semaphore at E, and, the distant signal at C, which have been previously referred to as affording protection from the north, are well situated, and, the line being straight, they can be seen in clear weather for nearly two miles. The night in question was dark, but not foggy, and if the lights of these signals had been both burning, and turned to " danger," there could be no possible excuse for a driver who neglected to obey them.

With reference to the distant signal (at C), the signalman states that he turned it to "danger" by means of his lever (at D) when ordered to do so by the signalman, and that when he had done so he observed the green light towards him, which indicated that a red light was shining towards York. The station master saw this signal lighted at a quarter past 10, and the boy in charge of the crossing observed that it was alight about a quarter of an hour before the arrival of the excursion train, but did not notice it afterwards. The signalman observed that the lamp was out after the collision, and relighted it. The driver of the goods train states, that he did not see any light in approaching it, but that he particularly observed it as he passed it, and noticed that the red board was turned to "all right" ; the fireman did not see any light in approaching it, and did not notice in passing in what direction the signal was turned ; and the guard says, that he observed as he went by, that the signal was turned to danger, though the lamp was not burning. After the accident, the guard of the goods train returned to York on the engine of the excursion train for assistance, and to get his face, which was cut, dressed; and the driver of that engine states, that when told by the guard that the distant signal had not been "on," he pointed out to him, as they passed it, that it was turned to "danger," though the lamp was out. The evidence of the guard to me was, as before stated, to the effect that he saw the signal at " danger," but the lamp out, as he passed it before the collision, and he denies having told the driver that this signal was not turned to "danger.''

It appears then, that the lamp of the distant signal was burning before the collision, and after the arrival of the excursion train, if the signalman is to be believed in this respect, but that it had gone out previous to the arrival of the goods train. As the signalman was told to turn it to danger, and was seen to go in that direction, with no other conceivable object; as the guard of the excursion train admits that it was at " danger," though not burning, when he passed it in his van ; as the fireman did not notice its position; and as the driver is alone in asserting that the signal was at "all right,"— the only inference which can fairly be drawn in regard to this signal is, that the signalman turned it to " danger when directed to do so by the driver of the excursion train, but that the lamp went out at an unfortunate moment.

If this inference be the true one, the driver is greatly to blame for having run through the station, with his steam on, at the rate of thirty miles an hour, after passing a distant signal at "danger, "though without a lighted lamp, which he particularly observed : and the guard of the goods train is also to blame, by his own confession, for not having applied his break when he saw the signal at "danger." The excuse of the latter is, that he took no notice of this signal because he saw a white light at the station semaphore, the truth of which assertion is the next point to be considered.

This semaphore signal had been set to "danger" towards the south by the signalman on the arrival of the excursion train, and this man states that, in obedience to the instructions of the driver, he crossed the line, and turned it on towards the north, after working the lever of his distant signal. This statement is to a certain extent confirmed by the fireman of . the excursion train, who saw the signalman go first towards one signal, and then towards the other, though he could not, from his position, and on account of the darkness of the night, see whether the signalman actually turned on those signals' About three minutes after the collision, the excursion driver came back to the platform, after going to call up the station master, whose house is close to it, and observed that the semaphore was " at danger " towards York. The driver and fireman of the goods train both assert that it was white until they passed it, and the guard of that train states that he saw it turned to red after the engine had passed it, and just before he was pitched out of his van by the shock. It is singular, however, that the guard did not make this statement before the coroner, when examined on his oath, but simply said that he saw nothing but the white light at the semaphore; as also, that, in the course of a conversation on the subject, he stated to the fireman of his own train, on the station platform, (according to the statement of the latter,) half-an-hour or so after the collision, that he saw nothing but a white light when he struck the other train. He also saw the signalman and excursion driver on the platform immediately after the collision, and maintained to them that the semaphore was not "on," while the signalman asserted that it had been on. But it appears that he communicated to the excursion driver, both on the platform and while going afterwards to York, that he had seen the semaphore altered to red just before the collision, and he states that the reason why he did not make the same statement on the two other occasions referred to was because he had not sufficient presence of mind, asserting, at the same time, that he did tell the fireman of this circumstance, though this man denies having heard anything of the sort from him.

There is but little more evidence bearing upon the question of this signal, though that which relates to the position of the signalman himself is of importance, as showing whether it was possible, or likely for him to have altered the semaphore, either just before the collision, or after the collision, and before the excursion driver saw it "at danger." His own statement is, that he had been to see what room there was in the sidings for the empty carriages which the driver wanted to leave, and was returning to tell the driver that he could take some of them when the collision took place. He was seen on the station platform with his handlamp by the guard of the excursion train a minute or two before the collision, by the other guard in about the same place "just after the collision," and by the excursion driver, as he came from the station master's house, and found the semaphore "at danger," three minutes after the collision ; and the position he was in at these several times appears to have been somewhere about the spot marked M, away, it will be observed, from the signal handles, though at no great distance from the semaphore.

It would appear, then, as regards the semaphore signal, that the driver, fireman, and guard of the goods train, all agree that it showed the "all right" signal as they approached the station, while the guard has made a statement, not always asserted, of its having been turned to "danger" after the engine passed it, which tends to invalidate the rest of his testimony; and that, on the other hand, the signalman asserts that it was at "danger" from the time he was told to turn it on by the driver, before the excursion train was shunted across the main line, while the driver and fireman of the latter train believed that it was so, the former because he ordered the signalman to place his signals " at danger " and saw him go away for the purpose, and the latter, because he saw the signalman go first towards one signal, and then towards the other. As regards the position of the signalman, there seems no reason to believe that he was sufficiently near the semaphore to alter it either as suggested by the guard, immediately before the collision, or after the collision, and before it was seen by the excursion driver to be at "danger;" and, altogether, as far as the evidence goes, it would appear to be quite as reasonable to suppose that the driver neglected the warning afforded him by a red light at the semaphore, as that the signalman, with his up line about to be blocked, neglected to place that signal at "danger" when told to do so.

With so much doubt, however, on the subject, it is necessary to look also at the probabilities of the case, and all the concomitant circumstances. And amongst these it must be stated, that, while it is almost incredible that the driver should have passed through the station at such speed if the semaphore had shown danger, a partial reason for this proceeding is given in the fact that he had not been in the habit of being stopped for such shunting at that station, coupled with his statement that he observed the excursion engine shunting backwards and forwards at the station when he was a mile off but "thought it was the Hull goods train." It appears from the statement of the signalman, that, during the eleven or twelve weeks that he had been at this post, he had never had his up line blocked in this manner before, and this circumstance, which ought to have made him use increased caution on this occasion, may have made him the less careful about his distant signal lamp in the general way, from his not having much use for it.

Whatever be the cause, it is certain that the lamp of his north distant signal had been previously in the habit of going out. The boy at the crossing had observed this, and remarked to him on the subject; and the signalman, himself, states that he had been obliged to relight it sometimes three or four times in a night. He never reported it to the station master or to any person besides the lamp-man. The signalman is much to blame for not having used his best endeavours to get such a lamp changed for a better one.                                                                                                                                      

The lamp of the distant signal worked by the boy at the crossing was of a somewhat similar description, and the same oil was used for them both, but this lamp had never been known to go out, and is stated to burn well for twenty-four hours. The north lamp of the signalman is of more modern construction, and appears at first sight to be of a superior character in two respects—in furnishing air to the flame, and in supplying oil, so as to keep the wick saturated without allowing the oil to overflow. This lamp went out again the night after the accident, but it was scalded the next day an operation which is requisite about once in six weeks, and it appeared to burn better afterwards. On the day of my inquiry, however, I had it taken to York, and I found that it would not burn for more than twelve hours, even in the station master's office, and that after it had been burning for between five and six hours, it gave but a very indifferent light though it was very brilliant at first. It appeared that the oil was not, under the supposed improved arrangement, supplied fast enough to the wick after the lamp had been lighted for some little time.                                               

When the lamp was relighted after the accident by the signalman, he found it to burn so dimly that he requested a porter to go and put a new wick into it, which was done ; but when it went out on the following night it was found that the wick was again too short. On the day before the accident, the signalman had neglected to bring his lamp to the regular lamp-man to be trimmed, and in such cases it devolved upon him to trim it himself, which he states he did in the evening before lighting it; but it was trimmed at the station by the lamp-man the next day, previously to its going out on the following evening though it should be stated that it was under the charge of the same signalman on that occasion.                          

It now becomes my duty to make one or two remarks in regard to the staff of the Church Fenton Station.

The station master, whose name is Wing, had only been there a fortnight, and his predecessor, John Phillips, who had been there for six months, was still living at the station, according to his own account for the purpose of assisting Mr. Wing, and as an accommodation until he could obtain other employment, and according to Mr. Wing's account for the purpose of instructing him in his duties. Mr. Phillips left the station at eight o'clock in the evening, telling Mr. Wing that he might expect the excursion train back about eleven o'clock that night; and Mr. Wing went away about half-past ten, telling the signalman that there were eight passengers and a horse-box booked from the station in the morning, and that they might all be expected to return, and asking him if he thought he could manage without his sitting up, for which he states that the signalman said there was no occasion. He also directed him to be careful.

Now, it was clearly not right that the boy who was in charge of the crossing should be taken away from his gates to assist at the station ; and the only other person at the station was the night watchman, whom I have designated as the signalman, who was expected to attend to the signals, work the points, collect the tickets, look after the passengers, and assist in the shunting, besides being generally responsible for the station. Mr. Phillips, the former station master, says that it has been his practice to sit up for extra trains on such occasions; but it is hardly fair that any man should be required to work by night as well as by day; and, though additional assistance was certainly required at Church Fenton on the night in question, I cannot blame the station master for not sitting up himself to afford that assistance. He should however, either have appointed a man for the purpose or applied for one.                                                                                 *

The boy at the crossing is not yet fifteen years of age, but he has been seven months at that post, on night duty. He appears to be a sharp lad, and to have saved the lives of several of the passengers by warning them to jump out when he saw the goods train approaching. He also whistled, and endeavoured with his hand lamp to attract the attention of the signalman, though, apparently, without suceess.

What with the steam under the shed obstructing their view, and their various occupations, it does not appear that any of the servants of the Company, except this boy, had an idea of the approach of the goods train until the collision took place; and the driver and fireman of the goods train do not seem to have known that the passenger carriages were on the up-line until they were within twenty or thirty yards of them. The excursion train was detained on this line for some minutes after the horse-box had ben placed in the siding, while search was being made for another horsebox, which was stated by a passenger to have been in the train, and to have been destined for Ulleskelf, a station about two miles to the north.

In a former portion of this report, I had occasion to remark upon the irregularity in the departure of the goods trains from York at different times between midnight and 12.40, and that the guard made a false return every morning by inserting 12.40 in his journal as the actual time of departure. I may here observe that, though no excuse can be made for the conduct of this man, yet the Company do not take the best means of insuring punctuality, or correct returns from their goods guards. They make them sign a paper on joining their service, stating either that they have a good watch or that they have not, and in the latter case, they direct them to provide themselves with one. If they would supply these men with proper timepieces, and institute suitable regulations for providing that they should be kept in good order, and repaired in case of accident, they would then have a better right to demand correctness in the guard's journals, and avoid that which occurred in the case of this particular train, namely, that no servant belonging to it had a watch at the time of the accident, for the driver's watch was unfit for service, as well as that of the guard.

There is also one remark which it is right that I should make in reference to the signals at Church Fenton, namely, that the handles and levers by which they are worked are so scattered about (as may be seen by the diagram,) as to render it much less easy for one man to attend to them all, than if they were all collected into a suitable position, where they could be under the hand and eye of the signalman.

The principal circumstances that have produced this accident may be stated, in conclusion, to be:

1.   The want of a better lamp at the north distant signal.
2.   Either the neglect of the signalman, in not turning his semaphore signal to "danger," or else the disobedience to it of the driver. It is impossible to say at present which of these men is to blame in the matter, but it is to be hoped that the truth may be ascertained in the course of the approaching trial of the signalman for the offence of manslaughter.
I have, &c.
The Secretary of the                                                                                                                                 H. W. Tyler,
Railway Department, Board of Trade.                                                                                       Capt. Royal Engineers.

NORTH EASTERN RAILWAY.
Railway Department, Board of Trade,
 Sir,                                                                                                                           Whitehall, 12th December, 1856.
In compliance with the instructions contained in your letter of the 6th instant, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended the accident, that occurred on the 26th ultimo, near the Cottingham Station of the North Eastern Railway.

The Cottingham Station is four miles to the north-west of Hull, and there is a signal on the platform for its protection: the gradient is nearly level, and the line is straight for some miles to the northward: a public road level crossing 400 yards to the north, and another 300 yards to the south, are each provided with fixed signal-posts, and are intended to act as distant signals to the station.

On the 26th ultimo, a goods train left Scarborough at half-past 2 p.m., about 20 minutes late, and, being due at Hull at 7, reached Cottingham at 7.10. It consisted of an engine and tender, ten loaded and seven empty waggons, and a van, and was delayed by the slippery state of the rails, and by extra shunting at the different stations. It did not usually take on waggons at Cottingham, whilst travelling in that direction; but it was stopped for the purpose, by signal, on the evening in question, because the Bridlington goods train, due at Hull at 6 o'clock, which usually performed that duty, having been detained by somewhat similar causes, had not arrived.

Under these circumstances, the Scarborough goods train remained for ten minutes at Cottingham, while a passenger train passed through on the other—the down line of rails ; and the driver then moved his engine to the down line siding, and brought out a waggon which was waiting there to be sent to Hull, in order to attach it to his train. He was almost ready to start again for Hull when the 6.10 p.m. passenger train from Bridlington, five minutes late, consisting of an engine and tender, seven carriages, and a van, came into collision with the goods train at a rate of 12 or 14 miles an hour.

The guard of the passenger train, and three of the passengers, were injured.

As was before stated, there is a level crossing 400 yards to the north of Cottingham, provided with a fixed signal-post. As the gateman in charge of the crossing was cleaning the lamp belonging to the signal-post, on the morning in question, he broke the red glass, and, afraid of not getting it back in time if he sent it to Hull the same day, he determined to make it available, as well as he could, for that night, and to send it by his wife on the following day, so that she might bring it back with her. He therefore cut a piece of bunting off his red flag, and secured it with some white lead, which he happened to have in his possession, to the glass-hole of the lamp; and he then attached the lamp as usual to the signal-post, to do duty as a danger signal ; trusting partly to the efficiency of this his contrivance, and partly to the improbability which, judging from upwards of four years' experience, he believed to exist, of there being any serious occasion for its services.

The night was unfavourable, however, for his experiments, as well in regard to the weather, as because a goods train was standing at the station when a passenger train was overdue: what with snow and rain, the best of lamps looked less bright, and were visible for a  less distance than usual; and the red bunting, instead of taking effect as the signalman expected, and converting the flame of the lamp into a red light, only made it paler and less distinct; so that neither the driver, the fireman, nor the guard of the passenger train, perceived any light at all on the signal-post as they approached it.

They all saw the lights on the van of the goods train, but, as there was no red signal at the post of the crossing, they supposed that that train had been shunted to the down line out of their way, a practice which appears to be not unfrequently adopted at this station, and which, therefore, they had good reason to imagine might have been pursued; and it was not until they were within 100 yards or so of the crossing, and 250 of the van of the goods train, that they received from the hand-lamp of the gateman a signal of danger. The driver then reversed his engine, and employed his steam to retard the progress of the train, but only succeeded in reducing the speed from 28 or 30 to 12 or 14 miles an hour before the collision occurred.

It is somewhat singular that the driver, fireman, and guard of the passenger train, should not have seen any lamp at the crossing signal-post, because the evidence leaves no doubt of the facts that the lamp was lighted, and that the bunting was turned towards them as they passed it: when tested afterwards, also, it was found to show as a pale red light, with tolerable distinctness, for 40 or 50 yards. It is, perhaps, possible that as these men only expected to see, either the usual red light or none at all attached to the post, they may in approaching it have overlooked this bad imitation of one, as not having been in any way belonging to the line; and when they were passing it, they were probably too much engaged in stopping the train, and too anxious for their own safety, to notice it, as they had been warned of their danger by that time by the gateman's hand-lamp.

It is probable that this accident would not have happened if there had been an efficient red light at the crossing signal-post, and the want of such a light may be therefore set down as the immediate cause of the collision ; the blame lying with the gateman, who, with good intentions, trusted, in his ignorance, to a useless contrivance of his own, instead of reporting to the station master the fracture of his red glass, and doing his best at once to procure another.

But it must be added that the glasses used in this lamp are more liable to fracture than the "bulls' eyes" which are very generally employed, and that it would be better to supply the latter in their place ; and I may observe that the glass which I saw this day in the same lamp was also cracked, probably from having been too tightly fixed when inserted after the accident.

The van of the goods train on the present occasion was only 150 yards within the level crossing, and, looking to the necessity that exists for protecting the station in foggy as well as in clear weather, this distance is evidently insufficient. It is desirable, therefore, that it should be increased, and it is also desirable that the man who may do the duty of signalman at the station should be able in all weathers to protect the station himself, either by means of a more distinct wire signal, or by working a signal extending to the level crossings, to be repeated by the gatemen by means of other wire signals for 400 or 500 yards further.

If these means be adopted, and if, either by a different arrangement of the traffic, (which is comparatively light in amount,) or a siding at the station, or the extended use of the telegraph, the dangerous practice of shunting goods trains from one main line to the other when passenger trains maybe expected, be discontinued, better security will be afforded in the working of the traffic.

In making these recommendations, however, it is only right that I should add, in conclusion, that the present system has been carried on for nine years without any previous accident.
I have, &c.
The Secretary of the                                                                                                                             H. W. Tyler,
Railway Department, Board of Trade.                                                                                  Captain, Royal Engineers.

NORTH   STAFFORDSHIRE   RAILWAY.
Railway Department, Board of Trade, Sir,                                                                                                                                        Whitehall, March 5, 1856.
In compliance with the instructions contained in your letter of the 26th ultimo, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended the accident, that occurred on the 17th ultimo, near the Longton Station of the North Staffordshire Railway.

Longton is two and a quarter miles to the east of Stoke-upon-Trent, and at the former station there is a goods' yard 230 yards to the west of the passenger shed. The goods'  yard is protected by a wire signal reaching to within a few yards of the passenger station, and the latter is provided with a semaphore signal on each side, as well as a distant signal towards the eastward.

At 1100 yards to the east of the passenger station, is the Millfield public road level crossing, and this is attended by a gateman by day as well as by night, who works a wire signal at 300 or 400 yards from his gate, besides exhibiting his flag  or hand lamp*, on occasion, to trains proceeding towards the station. His wire signal is never set at "all right,"' but is ordinarily kept at " anger," and is turned to "caution " on the approach of a train.

As a goods' train, composed of twenty-five loaded and two empty waggons, and a van, was standing at the Longton Goods' Station at 1.10 a.m. on the 17th ultimo, with its van seventy yards within the distant signal, another goods' train, consisting of engine and tender, twenty-four loaded and one empty waggons, and a van, came into collision with it at a rate stated to be ten miles an hour.

The effects of the shock were considerable.    The chimney breast of the engine of the second train was stove in, the buffer plank shattered to pieces, and the exterior framing and foot plate much bent; the tender was turned round and thrown on its side by some of the waggons in the rear, whilst others mounted the engine, and bent and damaged the regulator handle, the reversing lever, and other parts of the projecting portions ; and the driver and fireman, who fell under the tender, were so crushed and injured that one died on his way to the infirmary, and the other shortly afterwards.

The first goods' train left Burton at 10 p.m. on the 16th ultimo, and Uttoxeter at 11.10, ten minutes late, and arrived at Longton at 12.30, half an hour late. The second train left Derby at 10 p.m., and Uttoxeter at 11.43, three minutes late, and arrived at Longton at 1.10, thirty-five minutes late. They were both heavy trains, and the gradients between Uttoxeter and Longton are severe and rising for the first part of the journey.

The first or Burton train was detained at Longton for an unusual length of time, in consequence of the inability of the driver to attach to his train ten waggons heavily laden with iron, which it was his duty to take on with him. He uncoupled his engine from his train, and endeavoured to get these waggons out of the siding by means of a tail rope, when the rope gave way ; and, after several unsuccessful attempts, the breaksman went back with his hand lamp for the purpose of stopping the Derby train, and requesting the assistance of its driver.

He had only proceeded 440 yards from the tail of his train, however, when he met the Derby train approaching at what he thought was very great speed for that part of the line, "perhaps twenty miles an hour."

The gradient falls 1 in 100 for two miles from the eastward towards Longton, and as far as the point of collision. The breaksman of the Derby train had said to the driver at Uttoxeter, "We are all right for Longton," by which he intended to communicate to him that they had no trucks to leave at that station, and that, therefore, it would not be necessary to stop there, unless compelled to do so by the signals in order to take on other waggons. Half an hour had been lost on the r6ad after leaving Uttoxeter, and it would appear that the driver, with a probability of not having to stop at Longton, considered that this incline would afford him the means of making up some part of it; for the guard says that he gradually increased his speed after passing the summit, until he travelled over the Millfield crossing at the rate of twenty miles an hour.

The gateman at the crossing observed the train coming, and showed the green light from his distant signal,
which, as the white light is never shown at it, was not an indication of any obstruction. He then, seeing that the train was travelling so fast, showed the green light from his hand lamp to tell the driver to proceed cautiously, because he thought it possible that the other train, which he imagined had passed him three quarters of an hour before, might not have got out of the way. The gateman says that he had never seen, in two years' experience, a goods' train pass him at so rapid a rate before, on that part of the line, though he had seen some of the passenger trains going by at greater speed.

There seems no doubt, therefore, that the unfortunate man who lost his life increased his speed to a highly imprudent extent in descending the incline, and, having done so, it is not to be wondered at that he could not then stop his train on so severe a gradient in time to avoid the collision. The reversing lever was found in forward gear after the accident, but from the way in which it was bent, and from the appearance of the segment in which it worked, there seemed little doubt that it had been reversed before the collision, and was forced forward with great violence by the waggons which mounted the engine. For similar reasons, it is most likely that the steam was on when the collision took place, and, as the handle of the tender brake was tightly screwed down, there is good cause to believe that when too late the driver was using his utmost endeavour to pull up his train.

He is represented to have been an exceedingly steady and deserving man. He had been in the Company's service since 1849, and had driven those particular trains for four years. The locomotive superintendent had never received a complaint in regard to him, nor was there to be found a report against him in the books. The man who was with him was not his regular fireman, but is stated to have been an experienced and good man.

Before the occurrence of this accident, it was not the custom to use the signals of the passenger station, or, to keep them lighted at night, because there is no passenger train after eight o'clock in the evening; and the only danger signals which were exhibited to the deceased driver, were the lights on the rear of the van, the distant signal from the goods' station, seventy yards in rear of the Burton train, which could be seen 660 yards further, and the hand lamp of the breaksman, who had gone 440 yards to the rear when the Derby train passed him. It is true that the gateman at Millfield exhibited the green light both from his wire signal and from his hand lamp; but the former would not indicate any obstruction, and the latter was shown on account of the speed of the train and the possibility of the other train not having started, and not from any knowledge that an obstruction existed.

Under these circumstances, and taking into consideration the nature of the gradient, it is evident that the arrangement of these signals is capable of, and requires, improvement. There is always a gateman at the Millfield crossing, and it is highly desirable that he should be kept informed, either by a wire signal or by other means, of the state of the station, in order that when there is an obstruction he may be able, at 1,100 yards from the passenger station, to give warning to an approaching train from his post, as well as with his wire signal, which extends some hundreds of yards further up the incline.

This accident is mainly attributable to the recklessness of a most experienced and careful driver, who was, from long practice at this particular point, and from having being stopped frequently for the very train against which he struck, in a position to appreciate to a nicety the amount of risk which he ran in increasing his speed down the incline. He could not, of course, foresee the breaking of the tail-rope, and the consequent unusual delay of the train which he knew to be in front of him, but this was a contingency against which he might reasonably have been expected to have provided, by proceeding at a more cautious speed, if it were safe to trust to individual discretion.

This is a striking and melancholy instance, however, amongst many others, of the danger of relying too much upon the caution even of the best drivers, and of the necessity that exists for providing signals at ample distance from every point of danger ; and to the want of better signal arrangements on this occasion, therefore, the accident in question must also be partly attributed.       

                                                                                        I have, &c.
                                                                         H. W. Tyler,
The Secretary of the                                                                                                                       Captain Royal Engineers.
Railway Department, Board of Trade.

NORTH UNION RAILWAY.
Railway Department, Board of Trade, Sir,                                                                                                                                    Whitehall, October 16, 1856.
I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, that I have inquired into the circumstances connected with a collision that occurred on the North Union Railway, on the 4th inst., near the Preston Station.

The accident which I am about to describe belongs to a class of accidents to which, in my opinion, a more than usual amount of blame attaches, inasmuch that in most instances they arise, not from carelessness or forgetfulness, but from the persons in charge deliberately undertaking a hazardous operation without allowing sufficient time for its execution. The operation to which I refer, and which caused the collision, was from shunting carriages and engines in and out of a siding on to a line of great traffic within a few minutes of the expected arrival of a fast train.

The limited nature of the siding accommodation at Preston obliges the Company to have a siding inconveniently placed about half a mile south of the station; this siding is a very long one, off the down line. On Saturday the 4th inst. there were forty-two carriages and trucks standing in this siding; of these, the twelve last, which were carriages, were required; to get at these, therefore, the whole number of carriages had to be drawn out beyond the points of the siding on to the down line ; when this was done they were halted, and the twelve last carriages being uncoupled, they were shoved through a crossing on to the up line; in drawing back the remainder a portion, consisting of the nine last waggons, became detached by the couplings breaking, the disconnected portion resting on the down line between the points of the siding and the points of the crossing into the up line; whilst standing in this position they were run into by the 5.15 p.m. fast train from Manchester, due at Preston at 6.29, and at the place where the collision occurred at about 6.27. According to the statement of the pointsman it was eighteen or nineteen minutes past six when he allowed the engine to go into the siding to bring out the carriages, leaving but eight or nine minutes for the operation; but there is independent evidence of an inspector of carriages and a signal man to show that the engine employed to bring the carriages out of the siding did not leave the station yard till between twenty and twenty-five minutes past six; but, giving the pointsman credit for his statement being true, the time was inadequate for the operation with a due regard to safety, and most hazardous with a fast train nearly due.

The siding, as I before stated, is 800 yards from the station, and the pointsman being therefore removed from any superior control, should have specific instructions with regard to the minimum interval in which he might shunt carriages or waggons in advance of a train being due, and not left as he is, altogether to his own discretion. I would also remark, that there is no time piece to his box, and he has therefore nothing to guide him with respect to time beyond his own indifferent watch.

The siding is protected by a distant signal 800 yards from the points. The evidence is very conflicting as to whether the signal was on at the time of the collision, and I am therefore unable to decide on this point, though my impression is that it was on, and that the driver of the fast train ran past it, his attention being engaged by two signals which were farther down the line, and which showed all right for entering the station, and which are quite independent of the siding signal.

I have, &c.
The Secretary of the                                                                                                                        Geo. Wynne,
Railway Department, Board of Trade,                                                                        Lieut,-Colonel Royal Engineers.


Accidents 1856

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